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Introducing Interpretations of
Evolutionary History
1 Statement of Problem and Purpose
Just as astronomy teaches us that our planet orbits an unremarkable star
at the edge of the Milky Way, evolution teaches us that our species is but
a tiny part of the history of life – and, some think, almost an afterthought
amidst the vast multitude of species that have ever existed. If we think
of the progression of life over time as a complex web of paths, connecting
species to species, it would seem easier to find the proverbial needle in
a haystack, or drop in the ocean than for evolution to ‘find’ something
resembling the human being in the vast space of biological possibilities.
And yet, find it evolution did. Was this a concatenation of unlikely
events, or does life unfold with some directionality over time, biased to-
wards certain types of outcomes rather than others? Once upon a time
this question had a straightforward answer: life was like a ladder – the
scala naturae – with the human as the pinnacle of natural creation. To-
day, however, the answer is no longer so clear, since we are much more
aware of how life could have evolved otherwise.
If evolutionary history were to be replayed from the beginning, what
would be the same, and what would be likely different? Would there be a
human-like species, multicellularity, or even DNA? This question is the bi-
ological equivalent of counterfactual history, such as wondering what would
have happened if Caesar had never crossed the Rubicon, or Nazi Germany
had won the war. What role does contingency play in evolutionary history?
One of the reasons why science alone cannot answer this question for us
1
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is that we have no way of empirically comparing life on Earth with life as
it could have possibly evolved. This is what is known as the ‘N = 1 prob-
lem’ in astrobiology literature: the sample size of all possible evolutionary
histories is one. Having a larger sample size, for example, by discovering
life on other planets, would allow us to directly test hypotheses about how
contingent a given evolutionary outcome is.
However, lack of empirical data is but one obstacle. At a conceptual
level, the question – how contingent are evolutionary outcomes – seems so
broad and general that one may doubt whether it can have any answer.
For instance, are some outcomes not much more contingent than others?
Any one individual person would seem to be much more contingent as an
outcome of evolutionary history (e.g., if your mother and father had never
met, you would not be here) than, say, the appearance of multicellular
organisms. From this perspective, one may be tempted to say that there
is no single answer to contingency in evolution.
Another conceptual problem lies in how we are to understand the evo-
lutionary process itself. Evolution is descent through modification, and
such ‘modification’ can be influenced by any number of causal processes,
from mutation to climate change and asteroid impacts. From this perspec-
tive, to ask about contingency in evolution ‘as a whole’ seems to convey
only ignorance of the complexity of causal processes that affect evolution.
In contrast to empirical investigation, such conceptual problems lie
within the scope and methods of philosophy, and in this dissertation I will
seek clarification on conceptual issues that underlie the question about
evolutionary contingency. I will pursue the twin goal of analyzing what
contingency means, and what the causal basis of evolution implies about
contingency.
However, such conceptual problems cannot be pursued wholly indepen-
dently of empirical phenomena: the analyses of contingency must, at least
in principle, be applicable to empirical phenomena. The problem there is
that, in order to pursue a full investigation of the question of contingency,
I would need to have a full understanding of evolutionary processes – for
example, how phylogenetic biases constrain variation and natural selec-
tion. However, not only would it be too vast a task to complete a survey
of contemporary biological theory, such perfect understanding is not avail-
able (for example, it is still controversial as to how precisely phylogenetic
2
constraints work – and even what those constraints can be).
For this reason, I must limit the scope of the investigation. Instead of
directly tackling empirical phenomena, I will focus on what I call interpre-
tations of evolutionary history. I will spell out later what precisely I mean
by ‘interpretation’, but for the moment it is sufficient to think of it as a
simplified representation of the complex total of evolutionary paths, based
on a limited number of principles. By simplifying the complex whole, an
interpretation attempts to explain some of the large-scale features of evo-
lutionary history, such as whether evolution tends towards any particular
kind of state, or towards a limited number of states.
These interpretations are almost always controversial, since they often
ignore problematic details for the sake of the coherence of the bigger pic-
ture. They are also often very influential, since their conclusions serve to
orient how other domains think of evolution. For example, evolutionary
meta-ethics has been influenced by interpretations of evolutionary history
that imply that outcomes (including moral beliefs) are contingent. Some
(e.g. Street 2006) have taken this interpretation to argue that our moral
beliefs likely do not correspond to absolute moral truths.
Such interpretations are often products of decades of work by profes-
sional biologists grappling with empirical phenomena. Different biologists
have built up different interpretations with different conclusions for con-
tingency. Some have argued that evolutionary history tends towards an
increase in complexity or size (such as John Bonner or Geerat Vermeij),
others (such as Conway Morris) suggest that life inevitably converges on
specific structures, and yet others propose that almost everything in life
is contingent (such as Gould). These biologists support their claims with
many empirical examples. What I will do is to take their interpretations as
starting points for my own investigation. In this way, the end-product of
scientific investigation becomes the beginning of philosophical reflection.
The reflection undertaken in this dissertation will be structured along
two main lines. First, the contingency claims made by biologists are not
always justified given their own interpretation of evolutionary history. For
example, Gould claims that every single outcome is “utterly” contingent;
yet, upon closer analysis, the statements he makes about the course of
evolutionary history do not necessarily support this claim. In the first
part of the dissertation I will seek to analyze how contingency claims can
3
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be extracted from interpretations of evolutionary history – and how this
extraction can sometimes go wrong.
However, I do not wish to take biologists’ claims about large-scale
features of evolutionary history merely at face value. Investigating the
causal basis of interpretations of evolutionary history will be the topic of
the second part of the dissertation. In particular, and second, I will be
zooming in on what the causal structure of natural selection implies about
resulting evolutionary histories. I will take a critical look at how some
biologists have argued that trends for increased size or complexity result
from natural selection, and will propose that they overlook the role that
contingency plays in evolution by natural selection. Natural selection does
not allow for privileged directions in evolutionary history as a whole, with
possibly one exception (to be elaborated later).
This global argumentative structure is summarized in the figure below.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will first give a broad
overview of interpretations of evolutionary history and then lay out with
more precision what I precisely mean by an ‘interpretation’. Finally, I will
show how the global structure of the dissertation can – at another level
– be understood as a sustained response to two skeptical stances towards
interpretations of evolutionary history.
2 Some Prominent Interpretations of Evolution-
ary History
In the following section I will briefly describe four different interpretations
of evolutionary history. While each of the four has slightly different impli-
cations concerning contingency in evolution, the four form a continuum,
ranging from interpreting (almost) every evolutionary outcome as neces-
sary to interpreting (almost) every outcome as contingent. Some of the
interpretations are an update of aspects of older interpretations (for exam-
ple, Bonner’s interpretation and the Chain of Being); others (such as the
Gouldian interpretation) explicitly react to and distance themselves from
other interpretations. After sketching these different interpretations, I will
systematize the discussion and give a ’minimal characterization’ of inter-
pretations of evolutionary history, which will serve to orient the discussion
in the dissertation as a whole.
4
Figure 1: The overall structure of the dissertation, relating biological the-
ory with evolutionary history, and evolutionary history with the contin-
gency of evolutionary outcomes
2.1 The Great Chain of Being
The ’Great Chain of Being’ is a term originally used by Arthur Lovejoy
(1936) to refer to the metaphysical scheme where all entities are ranked,
starting with the inanimate world, rising through plants and animals,
through humans and angels, ultimately reaching God. The scheme was
popular among 18th century naturalists, such as Charles Bonnet (1720-
1793) and Jean-Baptiste Robinet (1735-1820), who used it to interpret evo-
lutionary history as a temporalized scala naturae, where the lower rungs
of the ladder of life are populated first, followed by higher rungs until the
human being evolves (see Ruse 1996: 42-49).
In this way, the Great Chain of Being depended on two now-discarded
assumptions: species essentialism, where different species can be identified
by a number of essential properties, and a linear progression of nature
according to some measure, such as complexity or intelligence1.
1Or simply ‘perfection’: “one observes a kind of gradation in intelligence of animals,
as it exists in the increased perfection of their organization.” (Lamarck 1802: 124, quoted
5
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Darwin directly attacked the idea of species essentialism by arguing for
the ‘slow and gradual’ mutation of species: species formed a continuum
rather than a discrete set of categories. Species essentialism – including
an essentialist understanding of human nature – is now widely seen as
incompatible with the phylogenetic definition of species (cf. Mishler and
Brandon 1987, Hull 1986). The idea of linear progression was not directly
targeted by Darwin, but it became increasingly untenable in the light of
his theory of natural selection – and especially after the establishment
of the Modern Synthesis in the 1920s and 1930s. Natural selection only
distinguishes between organisms that are more or less adapted to a specific
environment: it does not care about better or worse in an absolute sense.
It may be noted in passing that not all skepticism towards the Chain of
Being idea is merely scientific in nature. First, it has been associated with
the ideological use of science – such as creationist science and ‘scientific
racism’ (i.e., the use of science to justify racism). Some, such as David
Smith (Smith 2011), even argue that the Chain of Being continues to “cast
a long shadow over our contemporary worldview”, being “a prerequisite for
the notion of dehumanization” (Smith 2011: 42).
Second, some have associated it with a hardwired ‘folk biology’ – the
collection of heuristics and intuitive judgements about living beings (Atran
1998, Gil-White 2001). According to this view, part of the reason we intu-
itively reach for the Chain of Being metaphor (i.e., understanding humans
to be superior to mammals, mammals superior to reptiles, and so on –
or even certain groups of humans superior to others) may be because an
essentialist appraisal of the value of living beings allows for more imme-
diate judgements on how to act in certain situations (for example, when
threatened by potential predators or rival tribes). Thus, even though it is
no longer thought useful today, perhaps it was beneficial in our ancestral
environment and thus still hardwired into our brain’s architecture, making
it difficult for us to avoid it.
2.2 The Large-Scale Trends Interpretation
Skepticism towards the Great Chain of Being has not prevented some pa-
leontologists from salvaging one aspect of the interpretation, and making
in Ruse 1996: 50)
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it compatible with contemporary phylogeny: the idea that there are global
trends in evolution. For example, in his classic work, The Evolution of
Complexity, John Tyler Bonner argues for a large-scale trend in size and
complexity, and even explicitly connects it with the Chain of Being:
The two generalizations [that we will aim to isolate] are . . . (1)
an evolution from small to large, and more importantly (2) an
evolution from simple to complex. Therefore, our task will be
to reexamine this reincarnation, in modern form, of the great
chain of being from the point of view of current population bi-
ology, genetics, developmental biology, and behavior. (Bonner
1988: 25, my emphasis)
For Bonner, selection for size is causally more significant than selection
for complexity, because it is the sustained selection for larger body size
that drives changes in the organization of an organism. For example, a
larger body size means that, at a certain point, the organism cannot only
rely on osmosis to take in its nutrients from the environment, but must
develop some circulatory system that transports nutrients from the surface
to the interior2.
Further, Bonner hypothesizes that selection for size is nearly ubiq-
uitous: size allows for a competitive advantage in securing nutritive re-
sources, allows for increased evasion of predators, and increased robustness
against environmental stresses. Bonner also acknowledges costs associated
with increased size (for example, a larger organism needs more nutrition
to survive), but argues that, on the whole, selection for increased size
dominates.
Bonner uses this hypothesis of the dominance of selection for size to ar-
gue that evolutionary history can be understood as a large-scale macroevo-
lutionary trend in size. Increased size drives increased complexity, and
drives widespread changes, from life-history to ecology. In this way, Bon-
ner cuts through the complexity of evolutionary history to focus on one
parameter – size – and this allows trend to be distinguished from mere
2The reason for this is ultimately simple mathematics: volume increases are pro-
portional to the cube of the dimensions of an organism while surface increases are
proportional to the square. This relation between body plan and complexity will be an
important consideration in chapter 3, when analyzing the Gouldian interpretation.
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Figure 2: The increase in maximum body size over time. (Reproduced
with permission from Bonner 1988.)
fluctuation. The following figure shows how the maximum size of organ-
isms has steadily progressed over time, from the first bacteria to whales
and Sequoia trees.
Figure 3: Microtrends
in body size, within the
large-scale trend in body
size. (Reproduced with
permission from Bonner
1988).
However, in ascribing such a general trend,
Bonner is not denying that there are numer-
ous exceptions to the trend. For instance, if
one looks at shorter timescales, one finds that
decreases in body size are as frequent as in-
creases, if not more frequent. One main rea-
son for this is that since larger organisms need
more energy from the environment for suste-
nance, they are hit harder during mass extinc-
tion events than smaller organisms. This is
why, according to Bonner, many of the largest
species of families have gone extinct – from
club mosses to reptiles – with only the smaller
species still extant (Bonner 1988: 39).
Further, such decreases are to be distin-
guished from the general trend. Sudden in-
creases are also not necessarily part of the
trend (see Figure 3). For a microtrend to con-
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tribute to the trend in maximum size, the mi-
crotrend would need to end at a point where
the maximum size increase. Thus, only a minority of microtrends will
contribute to the macrotrend.
Although Bonner’s case for a trend in size is exceptionally well-documented
and argued, numerous other biologists have proposed global macroevolu-
tionary trends. We mention one other prominent account, the Red Queen
hypothesis, first formulated by Leigh van Valen in 19733. The Red Queen
is a character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, who at one
point proclaims “Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do,
to keep in the same place.” Van Valen, in analyzing the extinction rates of
a wide variety of taxa in given adaptive zones, observed that the extinc-
tion rate is constant and thus independent of the age of the taxon (older
taxa are no less likely to go extinct than younger taxa), implying that ex-
tinction is a random process. Nonetheless, from an ecological perspective,
this does not seem to make sense: if the adaptive zone remains constant
over time (i.e. the external environment does not meaningfully change),
a population of organisms would be expected to increase its fitness under
the influence of natural selection.
Van Valen’s solution is to posit that, because of competition and preda-
tion, increases in fitness in one lineage come at the expense of the fitness
of another lineage. The cheetah increases its fitness by evolving to run
faster; correspondingly, the fitness of the gazelle is lowered. This zero-sum
game means that the fitnesses of other species will need to increase just
so that they will not be driven to extinction. In order to simply maintain
a certain ecological status, species will need to continually evolve in order
to avoid being at a competitive disadvantage.
The Red Queen hypothesis describes an ecological process, and on its
own does not constitute an ‘interpretation’ of evolutionary history; how-
ever, it has been used to this end, most notably by Geerat Vermeij’s 1987
view of evolution in terms of ‘escalation’ – an arms race between predator
and prey. The zero-sum game described by the Red Queen has led, ac-
cording to Vermeij, to a macroevolutionary trend in ‘energy-intensiveness’:
species that extract more resources from the environment and use them in
3Incidentally, Valen terms this trend ‘A New Evolutionary Law’: a further illustra-
tion of the affinity between trends and laws.
9
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a more concentrated way (e.g. for predation or competition) have consis-
tently been favoured by natural selection.
Vermeij’s interpretation is one of the most worked-out interpretations
of evolutionary history, but other commentators, such as Richard Dawkins,
have likewise used Van Valen’s hypothesis to propose that evolution may
legitimately be viewed as directional, despite being driven by ‘blind’ nat-
ural selection (Dawkins 1986).
2.3 The Convergence-Centric View
Another type of trend that natural selection can cause is located at a
smaller scale: the trend in a population towards its most adaptive state4.
When two species independently evolve a similar structure in response to a
similar selective pressure, this is known as convergent evolution. One classic
example of convergent evolution is the similarity in wing design between
bats and birds, or the similar morphology of whales, Ichtyosaurs and fish.
Another well-analyzed example is the independent evolution of the camera
eye in vertebrates and cephalopods. Despite subtle differences between the
eyes of, say, octopi and humans (for example, the eyes of octopi do not
have a blind spot), the general structure, consisting of pupils, lenses, glassy
material and retina, is identical.
Instances of convergent evolution imply that a particular evolutionary
outcome, such as the evolution of the camera eye, is not entirely contingent
on the past evolutionary path, since two independent evolutionary trajecto-
ries could lead to the outcome5. The phenomenon of convergent evolution
is clearly relevant for questions as to whether a particular outcome is con-
tingent; however, like selection for size or the Red Queen hypothesis, the
mechanism of convergent evolution must be further elaborated in order to
attain a full interpretation of evolutionary history.
The paleontologist Simon Conway Morris is perhaps the most well-
known proponent a ‘convergence-centric’ interpretation of evolutionary his-
tory. In his work he has amassed countless examples of uncanny similarities
4Thinking of natural selection as an optimizing process is controversial when one
looks in more detail at how natural selection actually occurs in populations. See chapter
5 for further discussion of this.
5For more discussion of some problems involved in distinguishing convergent evolu-
tion from other types of evolution, see chapter 1.
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between lineages which have been evolving independently for hundreds of
millions of years. His most spectacular examples include ants that tend
to fungus gardens and harvest them at regular intervals, much like human
agriculture. He argues that convergence is ubiquitous, and can be found in
all the sensory modalities (vision, hearing, olfaction, taste, touch), in cogni-
tive abilities, consciousness and even in culture. In particular, capabilities
that seem uniquely human could have been realized by other species. For
example, Conway Morris claims that human language “. . .may, on this
planet, be unique, but waiting in the wings of the theatre of consciousness
are other minds stirring, poised on the threshold of articulation.” (Morris
2003: 253)
In order to argue that a trait that has evolved only once, such as
human-like intelligence, is inevitable, or at least highly probable, Conway
shows how the prerequisite structures for human intelligence have evolved
repeatedly, from mimicry and babbling in dolphins to agriculture in ants.
Sentience in its various forms, from vision and olfaction to hearing, has
evolved repeatedly, as have nervous systems. Human intelligence may
only have evolved once, but the building blocks for human intelligence
have evolved repeatedly.
We will be analyzing Conway Morris’s interpretation in more depth
in chapter 3; for the moment we can point to two important parts in
his argument. First, he claims by numerous empirical illustrations that
convergent evolution is ubiquitous, so much so that “99.9%” of all possible
organizations of living beings is maladaptive (Morris 2003: 309). In the
words of Dennett (who holds similar views about convergence without
elaborating them in the same way as Conway Morris6), there are relatively
few “Good Moves” in design space (Dennett 1996: 306).
Second, because there are so few structures that actually work, it is
‘inevitable’ that all of them are realized at some point in evolutionary
history. Indeed, many of them are realized multiple times in different
lineages. In particular, the prerequisite structures for human intelligence
have evolved repeatedly and independently, and Conway Morris takes this
to specifically argue that it was inevitable that some species resembling
6Dennett interprets natural selection in a more ‘standard’ way, a way I will associate
with the Modern Synthesis in chapter 4. In this view, natural selection can only lead
to contingent directionalities.
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human beings were to evolve ‘sooner or later’:
As all the principal biological properties that characterize hu-
mans are convergent, then sooner or later, and we still have a
billion years of terrestrial viability in prospect, ‘we’ as a bio-
logical property will emerge. (Morris 2003: 96)
2.4 The Gouldian Interpretation
When it comes to the contingency of human beings within evolutionary
history, the contrast between Conway Morris’s and Gould’s view could not
be starker. In Gould’s words:
We came this close (put your thumb about a millimeter away
from your index finger), thousands and thousands of times, to
erasure by the veering of history down another sensible channel.
Replay the tape a million times from a Burgess beginning, and
I doubt that anything like Homo sapiens would ever evolve
again. (Gould 1989: 289)
If for Conway Morris evolutionary paths tend to inevitably converge on
a limited number of adaptive solutions to design problems, such as wings
and limbs, language and culture, and even human intelligence, for Gould,
by contrast, nothing is inevitable in evolutionary history. On the contrary,
had life on Earth struck out on different paths, especially at the beginning,
life might have looked completely different.
Gould made many contributions to biological theory, and other contri-
butions could be mentioned as part of his ‘interpretation’ of evolutionary
history7. However, I will isolate two arguments in particular, as these are
particularly important for how the contingency of evolutionary outcomes
is understood. The first, which I will term the ‘disparity reduction’ ar-
gument, shows how evolutionary history can be irreversibly affected by
7In particular, I will not discuss Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium, as it
does not matter for the contingency of outcomes whether speciation events occurred
gradually as opposed to discontinuously or very rapidly. We will assume some form
of group and species selection in chapter 6, since this is common practice in studies of
evolutionary trends, even though these types of selection face some conceptual problems
and are not entirely uncontroversial.
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Figure 4: Reconstructions of trilobites. The two left trilobite genuses
(Marrella and Leanchoilia) went extinct, and their distinctive body plans
with them. The right trilobite (Sanctaris) is thought to be the ancestor of
chelicerates (a group including spiders and scorpions). (Reproduced with
permission from Gould 1989.)
certain contingent events. The second, here termed the ‘random walk’
argument, attempts to show how evolutionary trends (in complexity for
example) can simply result from biological lineages randomly exploring
biological possibilities.
2.4.1 Disparity Reduction
A central observation Gould makes in his 1989 book, A Wonderful Life,
concerns the proliferation of body plans (Baupläne) among the trilobites
and other arthropods in the Cambrian. A body plan determines a number
of large morphological features, for example how the body of an organism
is segmented into different sections, how limbs are placed, and what spatial
symmetries the body has. Of the twenty-five basic body plans that can
be distinguished, only four remain – a small sample is given in the figure
below.
In this way, all extant animal life follows just a limited number of body
plans, so that the ‘disparity’ (number of distinct body plans) has de-
creased in evolutionary history even though the diversity (number of dis-
tinct species) has increased.
Crucially, Gould holds that this reduction in disparity occurred during
a series of mass extinctions during the Paleozoic, and argues that there is
no evidence at all that the body plans that survived were in any way more
adaptive (Gould 1989: 236). The selection of organisms during a mass
13
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extinction could be truly random,- resembling a lottery. Alternatively,
mass extinctions could represent a radically novel environment, with new
selection pressures. In this case, the selection for organisms would be
‘effectively’ random if viewed from a larger time-scale: since the organisms
evolved their traits during normal times, and since the precise nature of
the mass extinction is contingent (i.e. could have been otherwise), which
organisms are selected for during mass extinctions are contingent as well.
There are ‘different rules’ during mass extinctions (Gould 1989: 306-307).
Only a fraction of body plans survived, but these body plans have
constrained all future life (the genes, such as the Hox gene, responsible for
body plans are very much upstream in development and almost impossible
to dislodge through mutation). In this way, the shape of evolutionary
history has been largely determined by these ‘frozen accidents’: a highly
impactful but contingent event (a mass extinction) that fixates a number of
traits (body plans) that are very resistant to change (due to developmental
bias).
Gould allows for convergent evolution, but in the argument above the
importance of convergence is undercut. Convergent evolution may have
occurred in subsequent evolution, but such convergent evolution only took
place in the narrow bands set by the body plans. Had very different body
plans been selected at the end of the Cambrian, life today would look very
different, regardless of how much or how little convergence there is.
Life is a cone of increasing disparity, but at a certain point this disparity
is pared back in a contingent way, in such a way that this contingency is
‘passed on’ to the evolutionary outcomes. If the tape of life were to be
replayed, other body plans could have been selected, and in such a case
there would be little to no reason to expect much similarity in evolutionary
outcomes.
2.4.2 The Random Walk Argument
Trends in the maximum of some measure (such as complexity) do not
have to be caused by any single mechanism. They can also result from a
random walk. This is the core of Daniel McShea’s distinction between a
passive and driven trend. Driven trends show a marked bias towards an
increase of complexity during speciation events (represented by the nodes
on the graph in Figure 6). By contrast, passive trends arise when the
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Figure 5: The dotted line represents maximal disparity; after disparity
reduction, diversity increases along a select few lineages, but previous level
of disparity is never reached. (Reproduced with permission from Gould
1989.)
offspring lineages after an event of speciation will equally tend to decrease
or increase in complexity. However, despite this lack of bias, the maximum
of complexity will increase regardless, simply by virtue of the expanding
variation due to random walk.8
Gould uses this distinction to argue that the increase in complexity
in evolutionary history is not the result of a selective bias for increased
complexity, but simply what Gould calls a ‘diffusion from a left wall’ of
minimum complexity (Figure 7). Another way of putting this is that an
increase in maximum complexity (or any trend in some measure) simply
could result from a random exploration of evolutionary possibilities.
Besides pointing to how a random walk could have led to the increased
complexity we observe, Gould offers two reasons for being skeptical of a
driven trend in complexity. First, there is little empirical evidence for a
driven trend in complexity (McShea 1996). Second, there is little to no
theoretical reason to believe complexity should be any more favoured than
simplicity by natural selection. In particular, natural selection is an evolu-
tionary mechanism that produces adaptations to particular environments,
and in this sense is a local mechanism with no sense of overall direction-
ality. As the environment changes, a previously complex adaptation may
8McShea (1994) further distinguishes between strongly driven trends – where the
minimum does increase – and weakly driven trends – where it does not. This distinction
is not important in this context.
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Figure 6: Passive, weakly driven and strongly driven trends.
become useless, and like cave fish having lost the use of their eyes, it may
be advantageous that the complex structure loses functionality or even
disappears. In fact, Gould holds (1996: 200-1) that there is a good rea-
son to suspect simplicity may be generally favoured by natural selection:
parasitism is often a successful strategy, and this involves discarding many
organ systems (most parts of the digestive system, the sensorimotor sys-
tem, etc.).
In this way, Gould argues that, even if there are evolutionary trends,
such as a trend in complexity, this trend is likely the result of a random
exploration of biological space. In this way, Gould is not denying that
there are evolutionary trends – he recognizes that they exist – but he is
in effect denying that such trends reveal anything significant about evo-
lutionary history, for two reasons. First, the trends are a consequence of
mathematics, and characterize diffusive processes in general – and so do
not reveal anything particularly unique to the causal structure of evolu-
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Figure 7: The increase in complexity may be the result of a diffusion from
a left wall. (Reproduced with permission from Gould 1996)
tionary history9. Second, (following from the first reason) the diffusion
from a left wall characterizes any trend in any measure – height, weight,
pitch of shrieks, number of nervous tics, etc. There is nothing particularly
interesting about such a trend in complexity.
2.4.3 Anti-anthropocentrism
An aspect of the Gouldian interpretation of evolutionary history that
should be mentioned is the association of trends with a belief in ‘progress’,
namely that more complex organisms are somehow ‘better’ than less com-
plex ones, and that life thus progresses. In Gould’s analysis, this results
from an anthropocentric fixation on the right tail of complexity. By con-
trast, if anything, the bacterial ‘mode’ of life should be deemed the su-
perior: the number of bacterial organisms and species still far outweighs
the number of more complex organisms, and on the whole bacteria have
been extraordinarily successful in biological evolution, across numerous
measures. To consider more complex organisms an ‘improvement’ is to
mistake their marginal importance in life as a whole, simply because we
are the ones doing the observation.10
9This is not to say that mathematical explanations have explanatory value in their
own right (see Kitcher 1989, Rice 2011); however, they explain by subsuming a phe-
nomenon under a mathematical pattern, and do not reveal anything interesting about
the idiosyncratic causal structure of the phenomenon.
10A reader might recognize that Gould here is drawing on what is called observer
selection effects, which occur when the patterns one observes in data are correlated
with the existence of the observer. This will be discussed later on.
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Concerning the evolution of human beings in particular, while Gould
acknowledges that a trend in complexity is inevitable, he points out that
this does not imply that any specific evolutionary outcome – such as the
Homo sapiens – should be inevitable. While the existence of right tail is
perhaps an inevitable development in evolutionary history, its composition
is anything but inevitable: “utterly unpredictable, partly random, and en-
tirely contingent – not at all foreordained by the mechanisms of evolution”
(Gould 1996: 174-5). In this way, to conclude the inevitability of humans
from the inevitability of increasing complexity is to fall prey to another
fallacy born of anthropocentrism: mistaking the small part of the space of
biological possibility that we happen to inhabit for a much larger part of
that space.
2.4.4 Progress and Distrust of Directionality
The Gouldian interpretation has been very influential, especially among
philosophers. Along with its positive claims about the shape of evolution-
ary history, it is also often seen as grounding a general skepticism towards
those who propose directional trends in evolution. Part of this skepticism
has to do with the disparity reduction and random walk arguments; how-
ever, part of it lies in how biologists who propose some directional trend are
distrusted as harbouring a ‘surreptitious’ belief in evolutionary progress.
A good definition of progress is that it is a directional change plus an
evaluative judgement about that change, one life form being ‘higher’ or
‘better’ than another (Ayala 1974). The Gouldian distrust then leads to
a suspicion of biologists who propose directional trends are motivated by
evaluative judgements.
The most elaborate development of this scheme is Michael Ruse’s From
Monad to Man, where Ruse traces how the concept of progress has in-
formed biologists, up to the present day:
Progress broadly understood continues to shape the thinking
of some of the most professional of evolutionary biologists. The
mature science has cultural undertones. (Ruse 1996: 484)
So while the claim that the idea of progress influenced some 19th and
20th century biologists is uncontroversial, Ruse goes further and believes
one can recognize it in some contemporary work as well.
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Some biologists, such as Normal Rockwell and Anthony Hammam,
overtly believe in some form of anthropocentric progressionism. For ex-
ample, consider Hammam in a 1991 interview:
I think that man is definitely a success story - but you’ve got to
define your criteria. Consciousness and the ability to analyze
the rest of the world and ourselves in the way that we do. The
gift of language - all the usual things - is amazing. In those
senses, yes, we certainly can be regarded as a pinnacle. (Hallam
1991, quoted in Ruse 1996: 493-4)
While such statements are in need of little interpretative imagination,
Ruse makes a leap to find similar implicit assumptions (‘sliding’ towards
progress) in the work of Van Valen and Vermeij. Ruse finds “hints” of
“slides from the comparative to the absolute” in the following passage by
Vermeij:
It is possible, however, that species have improved in their
capacity to survive in the physical environment. Many of the
characteristics associated with competitive and defensive superiority-
large body size, high body temperature, parental care of the
young, and a tightly sealing exo-skeleton, for example-also buffer
individuals against short-term fluctuations in temperature and
other physical factors (Vermeij 1987: 421, quoted in Ruse 1996:
493).
The implication is clear: biologists, such as Vermeij, while highly trained
and knowledgeable, are still subtly informed by primitive and outdated
notions of progress. It is similar to the functioning of implicit racist or
sexist biases: even though we may not be consciously aware of these biases,
our judgements are still influenced by them.
Commentators such as Ruse seize on such research as evidence of an on-
going anthropocentric bias in the interpretation of patterns in macroevolu-
tion. Despite the considerable progress in evolutionary biology, Ruse writes
‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’ (Ruse 1996: 494): despite ex-
tensive scientific training, even professional scientists hold fast to the idea
of progress, and sometimes even to some form of anthropocentrism.
However, there is an argument to be made that Ruse misinterprets
Vermeij. After the quoted passage, Vermeij continues:
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Consequently, individuals are able to carry on normal activity,
or at least to survive, when conditions are temporarily unfa-
vorable. Without such characteristics, individuals would be
able to persist in a much smaller range of physical conditions.
(Vermeij 1987: 421)
While Vermeij’s general analysis can be argued to be flawed in other
ways (see chapter 6), it is safe to say that his point does not concern in-
creases in lifespan (or other changes in life-history structure, for that mat-
ter). Instead, Vermeij points out that there may be a trend in adaptations
that allow an organism to be viable in an increasing range of physical envi-
ronments. Vermeij’s argument is considerably more nuanced than simply
introducing an absolute measure of progress; instead, he is working en-
tirely within the framework of the local nature of natural selection, and
proposes only a trend in adaptations that expand this locality. There is no
jump towards the absolute, merely an expansion of the comparative. Thus
it is at least uncharitable and even arguably wrong to accuse Vermeij of
‘sliding’ from comparative to an absolute sense of progress.
Further, in Ruse’s eagerness to see a ‘slide’ to Progress whenever an
evolutionary biologist proposes an evolutionary trend, Ruse himself is com-
mitting a ‘slide’ towards the belief that the scientist must be informed by
some cultural belief and must be therefore biased. In a review of Ruse’s
book, Hull notes that “when he [Ruse] turns to modern biologists, he weaves
his conceptual net so finely that almost no one can avoid being classed as
a progressivist” (Hull 1997:497).
Such a fine net can also be harmful, if, to use another metaphor, it leads
to the baby being thrown out with the bathwater. Theoretical and empir-
ical investigation into large-scale macroevolutionary patterns is valuable
scientific work, both because it deepens our understanding of evolution as
a whole and because of its philosophical consequences. From this perspec-
tive, an oversubscription to the Gouldian interpretation may actually stifle
scientific investigation by placing a taboo on certain research11.
11Ironically, Gould himself has been accused of smuggling cultural values into his sci-
entific pronouncements. Conway Morris pointed to certain libertarian beliefs influencing
Gould’s views on contingency:
In brief, his assessment of Man as an evolutionary accident is to lead us
20
3 Minimal Characterization of an Interpretation
of Evolutionary History
If interpretations are simplified representations of evolutionary history, the
preceding discussion suggests they are simultaneously quite multifaceted:
influenced by ideological presuppositions and yet grounded in biological
theory, explanatory of large-scale features in evolutionary history and yet
subject to many exceptions. In this section we will give a minimal charac-
terization of the most important elements involved in such interpretations,
and we will use this characterization to unify some of their various prop-
erties, most notably their peculiar explanatory nature.
There are some precedents to the concept of an ‘interpretation of evo-
lutionary history’. Sterelny, when discussing the clash between Gould and
Dawkins, refers to ‘perspectives’ on life (Sterelny 2001). Powell has re-
ferred to the ‘Gouldian view of life’ when discussing Gould’s views on evo-
lutionary contingency (Powell 2009, 2012). However, it is unclear to what
extent these authors intend ‘perspectives’ or ‘views’ merely as metaphors,
for they never precisely stipulate what constitutes a perspective or view.
For example, Gould and Dawkins have different opinions about evolution-
ary contingency, but in what way precisely is this difference in opinion
simply a matter of opinion? There is also no sustained engagement with
obvious skeptical stances towards whether a unified perspective or view of
life is even possible.
As already explained, the working assumption of this dissertation is
that these are not mere metaphors, and constitute legitimate efforts to
into a libertarian attitude whereby, by virtue of a cosmic accident, we, and
we alone, have no choice but to take responsibility for our own destiny and
mould it to our desire. (Morris 1998: 14).
For the sake of completeness, we should also mention that Conway Morris has been
accused of smuggling in religious beliefs. For example, in a review of Conway Morris’s
book Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe, Donald R. Prothero
writes:
One wonders if he [Conway Morris] is writing for the judges of the Tem-
pleton Prize, which is awarded to those who try to reconcile science and
religion, rather than for an audience of people interested solely in scientific
questions. (Prothero 1997: 57)
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interpret biological theory in order to arrive at a general conclusion about
the contingency of evolutionary outcomes. The two parts of the disserta-
tion will be a sustained testing of this working assumption, but in order
to begin, I need to stipulate a characterization that at least is prima facie
plausible and that can be used for the purposes of the present discussion.
Note that what seems like a prima facie plausible definition proves al-
most never to be so upon further reflection and analysis, and doubtless
this will also be the case here. However, I do not wish to engage in a
philosophical investigation of the type ‘What is X’, with X being an inter-
pretation of evolutionary history. I wish only to capture the main features
of the interpretations of evolutionary history described in the preceding
section. Perhaps this minimal characterization does not cover all particu-
lar instances, but this is a line of investigation that is not necessary for the
purposes of the dissertation. I wish merely to use the minimal characteri-
zation as a basis for reflection on how interpretations relate to contingency,
and how evolutionary dynamics relate to interpretations.
In the view I will take, interpretations of evolutionary history attempt
to specify some set of evolutionary trajectories that is somehow represen-
tative of all possible evolutionary histories. Actual evolutionary history is
a complex and intractable mass of evolutionary trajectories; an interpreta-
tion of evolutionary history cuts through this complexity and selects only
a few trajectories which are then claimed to be present in most if not all
possible evolutionary histories.
It is this simplification of actual history, and placement within a space
of possible evolutionary histories that allows for contingency claims to be
made. For example, if a convergence of evolutionary trajectories is deemed
representative for all possible evolutionary histories, then the outcome of
that convergence is not contingent. Without comparing the actual to the
possible, claims about the contingency of an actual (or possible) evolution-
ary outcome cannot be made.
As we will see in chapter 3, not all biologists are equally explicit about
this aspect of their interpretation. Conway Morris is more explicit about
the nature of possible evolutionary histories than Gould is, and the Goul-
dian interpretation needs more reconstruction. However, this contrastive
aspect of an interpretation – contrasting actual evolutionary trajectories
with other trajectories that could have been taken – is crucial, and forms
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the basis for claims about the contingency of individual outcomes.
Metaphors of life’s history often reflect interpretations. Most obvi-
ously, the ladder of life reflects an interpretation of evolutionary trajec-
tories either as converging on a particular outcome (the human being),
or as characterized by a strict directionality (for example, pointing to-
wards increased complexity or intelligence). However, also the more recent
metaphor, the tree of life, captures how evolutionary history typically di-
verges with a steadily increasing expansion in variation between species.
Yet the metaphor of the tree has been criticized as still too directional
and underestimating contingency, since it does not capture the number of
evolutionary dead-ends there have been. Hence the metaphor of the bush
was a short-lived alternative to the tree (most notably touted by Gould),
given that it captured phenomena such as disparity reduction. Finally, in
light of how interlinked evolutionary trajectories are, the most common
metaphor today is that of a web.
In this way, interpretations of evolutionary history imply a certain
shape or topology of evolutionary trajectories: they tell us what direc-
tion, if any, evolutionary trajectories tend to take in possibility space;
they tell us how paths cluster together and how they spread out over time.
Ladders, trees, bushes and webs are all different ways of synthesizing a
complex topology into a single image.
At a finer level of analysis, the evolutionary trajectories are determined
by two elements: a possibility space (which at least defines what the ini-
tial states are and what the outcome states are) and causal transitions
between states in that possibility space. Possibility space and transitions
together define a causal network, and in this way the representative set
of evolutionary trajectories can be thought of as a representative causal
network.
The transitions in evolutionary history are all relations of descent with
modification; however, interpretations of evolutionary history make claims
about what the key mechanisms are that drive these transitions. For Con-
way Morris and Bonner, the key mechanism is natural selection; for Gould,
there is an absence of any driving mechanism (unless one wishes to count
drift as a mechanism12; this is not what Gould intends when using Mc-
12We discuss the relation of selection to drift in chapter 6. Note that I use the
term ‘mechanism’ loosely (following common biological practice), and not as a technical
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Shea’s concept of a passive trend), but developmental biases do play an
important role in constraining transitions. Other mechanisms (some of
them now discredited) have been included in other contemporary and his-
torical interpretations of evolutionary history that we have not here dis-
cussed: mutational bias (Louis 2016), orthogenesis (Eimer 1898), creative
force (Bergson 1911), self-organization (Kauffman 1993), entropy-increase
(Brooks and Wiley 1988).
It is in this respect that interpretations of evolutionary history are not
simply typical ‘narrative explanations’ of history. A narrative explanation,
as it is often understood, explains a particular outcome in terms of a path
leading to that outcome (i.e., in terms of the outcomes preceding states),
sometimes contrasting the particular path to other paths that could have
been taken. In specifying a representative causal network, interpretations
resemble narrative explanations.
A narrative explanation is often contrasted to law-based explanations,
which explain an outcome in terms of a universal law and the conditions of
application – thus allowing for prediction. Narrative explanations do not
allow for prediction. In specifying a limited number of key mechanisms that
cause the shape of the representative causal network, interpretations allow
for a certain degree of prediction. For example, an interpretation such as
that of Conway Morris would make certain predictions about how life on
alien planets would look. Bonner’s interpretation would make predictions
that possible evolutionary histories would be characterized by a trend in
size.
Even the Gouldian interpretation, by emphasizing the ‘utter’ contin-
gency of evolutionary outcomes, would predict that life on alien planets
would look radically different to life on our planet. In fact, an observation
of similarities in outcomes despite difference in evolutionary trajectories
would count strongly against the Gouldian interpretation.
A metaphor for this aspect of interpretations of evolutionary history,
deepening the connection between laws and narrative, would be the plot of
a story. A good story has properties that are remarkably similar to good
explanation. This old insight goes back to Aristotle, who in his Poetics
philosophical term. I do not wish to engage in the current debate whether or not drift
and selection can be understood as mechanisms (e.g. Skipper and Millstein 2005, Barros
2008).
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argued that a good plot shows how the crucial events in the story “must
come from the structure of the plot itself, so that, from what has happened
before it turns out that these things would necessarily or probably happen”
(Aristotle 1997:87). Interpretations of evolutionary history, in searching for
the key mechanisms that hold together important features in the shape of
life’s history, can in this regard be seen as searching for the ‘plot’ of ‘life’s
story’.13
Summary
From this perspective, ‘interpretations of evolutionary history’ can be de-
fined by the following three elements:
(1) A possibility space, which determines how evolutionary states
are to be characterized – most importantly, the initial states
and the outcome states.
(2) A hypothesis about what key mechanisms determine the tran-
sitions in possibility space.
(3) A representative causal network, consisting of a set of possible
evolutionary trajectories connecting up the different states in
possibility space.
These three elements are not necessarily sufficient for characterizing a
global view; particular interpretations may be characterized by additional
elements. Hence this proposal may be understood as a minimal character-
ization of global views of evolutionary history. In particular, (1) and (2)
are grounded in biological theory; and questions concerning contingency
can be analyzed solely as structures inherent in the representative causal
network.
13Not all good stories – especially Modernistic ones – have a plot of course, and hence
contemporary narrative theorists loosen the requirement of a tight plot, and require
only ‘thematic unity’ of a good narrative (Currie 2010). This would probably be a more
accurate description of the function that the key mechanisms play in interpretations of
evolutionary history, but we are more interested in the metaphor, and the metaphor
should not be driven too far either. After all, here is little to no equivalent of the
predictive aspect of interpretations in storytelling.
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Further, these elements correspond to different aspects of the peculiar
explanatory character of an interpretation of evolutionary history (includ-
ing how they can be influenced by ideological concerns):
(i) Interpretations have some predictive value: they extrapolate
to possible evolutionary histories, based on element (2), the
hypothesis of what the key causal mechanisms are.
(ii) Interpretations are also narratives: they explain an outcome
by tracing a path that a system (an individual lineage, or
evolution as a whole) has followed.
(iii) Interpretations can be influenced by ideological presupposi-
tions: because the reasoning process leading to (3) is often
blackboxed, it can be influenced by religious/political beliefs.
4 Two Skeptical Stances
If we consider how prominent scientists, with access to the same theoreti-
cal knowledge and to the same empirical data sets, can arrive at diametri-
cally opposed views of evolutionary history, and never resolve this conflict,
a skeptical stance towards the plausibility of such global views becomes
tempting. According to such a skeptical view, Gould and Conway Mor-
ris engage in unfalsifiable speculation and hence it is not surprising that
this leads to an irresolvable conflict. In reality, it is not possible to have
a coherent ‘global view’ of evolutionary history that brings together our
understanding of evolutionary states and mechanisms in order to inform
claims about evolutionary contingency. Perhaps claims about the contin-
gency of particular outcomes could be legitimately made, but definitely
not claims about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes in general.
There are two main ways of filling out this general skeptical response,
and each will form a major issue that we will engage in this dissertation.
The first skeptical response would be to point to conceptual confusion at
the heart of the disagreement. As we will see, Conway Morris is inter-
ested only in the occurrence of certain properties in evolutionary history,
such as perception, locomotion, intelligence and culture, while Gould is
interested in the occurrence of species in their full detail. Put differently,
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Conway Morris is interested in constructing some kind of ‘periodic table’
of convergent structures, where the Homo sapiens might be one particular
representative of the slot ‘intelligent, cultural being’. Gould is interested
in Homo sapiens in its full detail, and hence it is not surprising that Gould
concludes that the occurrence of the human being is more contingent than
does Conway Morris.
This skeptical response points to the description-dependence of contin-
gency: contingency comes in degrees, and you get different answers ac-
cording to how you describe the process. There is description-dependence
of the outcome, where a fine-grained description seems to go hand in hand
with greater contingency, but there is also description dependence of the
initial conditions. How far back in time do we have to go to judge the
contingency of human beings? Back to the last common ancestor with
the chimpanzees, or back to the trilobites of the Cambrian, or back to the
very first living being? And once we have decided on the general type of
initial condition, how precisely do we specify the initial condition? Must
we only specify the phenotype of the initial species, or also the genotype,
developmental processes and environmental states?
In this way, the skeptic may simply say that questions about evolu-
tionary history ‘as a whole’ are simply hopelessly vague. They do not have
a single answer: it depends how you describe the evolutionary outcomes
and the initial conditions. Without specifying precisely that to which we
are referring , irresolvable clashes such as that between Gould and Conway
Morris are not surprising. They use terms with ambiguous reference, and
hence the conflicts might well be pseudo-conflicts that can be dissolved
through conceptual clarification.
A second, related, way of filling out a general skeptical response would
be to show how general claims about evolutionary history always turn
out to be false. This response piggy-backs on an influential view in the
philosophy of biology, namely that there are no universal generalizations
in biology, only contingent generalizations: either a generalization is based
on mathematics or laws of physics and is universally valid, or it depends on
the existence of some contingent entity originating in evolutionary history
(Beatty 1995). For example, even Mendelian genetics, with its elegant
rules, depends on the origin of the DNA molecule and thus would not
necessarily reveal anything about an evolutionary history where DNA had
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never emerged. At best, one can obtain generalizations that are locally
true, i.e., true for particular entities given particular conditions. However,
for evolutionary histories where these conditions do not obtain, or these
entities do not exist, such generalizations are inapplicable.
Hence arises a skepticism towards generalizations about all possible
evolutionary histories (excepting generalizations that are based on mathe-
matics or the laws of physics). A global view generalizes about large-scale
tendencies in evolution, and uses such generalization for further general
claims about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes. Such general-
izations themselves are necessarily contingent: limited to parts of actual
evolutionary history, but not necessarily open to extrapolation to all of
evolutionary history or to possible evolutionary histories.
This skeptical response is related to the first response in that the lack
of reference of generalizations can be avoided by reducing the scope of the
claim. General claims about evolutionary history as a whole are indepen-
dent of initial conditions, and all such claims turn out to be false. Hence,
by introducing a specific characterization of initial conditions (and of the
outcomes), we can obtain true claims about parts of some evolutionary
histories.
5 Structure of the Dissertation
The overall purpose can be reframed as a sustained engagement with these
skeptical responses, in order to obtain more robust conceptual foundations
for such global views of evolutionary history. Dealing with the first skepti-
cal response, I will be asking how claims about contingency in evolutionary
history change as the phenomena are described differently. Dealing with
the second response, I will be investigating the relation between natural se-
lection – the mechanism which many prominent global views draw on – and
contingency. To what extent does natural selection give rise to directional
evolution, and to what extent are such trends contingent on environmental
circumstances?
It is important to emphasize that the goal of the dissertation is not
to provide an interpretation of evolutionary history. Such an endeavour is
arguably not the task of a philosopher, but of a practising biologist, who
would be able to flesh out a conceptual framework with a deep knowledge
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of empirical details. Instead, by analyzing fundamental concepts such as
contingency and natural selection, the goal is to outline the boundaries of
possible interpretations of evolutionary history that are not vulnerable to
the skeptical responses outlined above.
This project fills something of a lacuna in the philosophy of biology
literature. As mentioned, authors have alluded to perspectives and views
of evolutionary history, but there is currently no dedicated analysis of
the conceptual foundations of global views of evolutionary history, and
how they do not necessarily succumb to the skeptical responses described
above.
While the work hopes to break new ground, it will be drawing heav-
ily on a number of directly relevant literature. Of prime importance is
the literature dedicated to the analysis of the concept of contingency in
macroevolution (e.g. Beatty 2006, Beatty and Desjardins 2009, Desjardins
2012), and in dialogue with this literature, I will be offering a novel analy-
sis of the concept of contingency, in terms of symmetries and breakings of
symmetries in causal networks. However, in the context of the dissertation,
the ultimate purpose of this analysis will not be just to achieve clarity on
the meaning of contingency for its own sake, but to map the different ways
that claims about contingency can be drawn from global views of evolu-
tionary history. Along the way I hope to point to some common errors in
the way this is done.
In other words, I will not be analyzing what role contingency ‘objec-
tively’ plays in empirical evolution. This would entail a detailed analysis of
the latest theories of developmental processes, and their relation to natural
selection and to gene networks. This question is, arguably, intractable in
its full generality, and in any case is a task for a biologist rather than a
philosopher. In this way we need not be primarily concerned with related
debates, such as issues in experimental evolution (such as Richard Lenski’s
Long Term Evolution Experiment), or certain aspects of the adaptation-
ism debate, such as the question whether natural selection can overpower
developmental constraints or not.
Instead, my ‘raw data’ will be the interpretations of evolutionary his-
tory that various biologists, such as Bonner, Gould or Conway Morris,
have arrived at through long and pain-staking grappling with the empir-
ical phenomena. I will take their views for granted as starting points,
29
Introducing Interpretations of Evolutionary History
and, through a renewed clarification of what contingency means, examine
what their views imply about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes.
This is a worthwhile inquiry, since biologists have sometimes overstated
conclusions about contingency, or have confused contingency with related
concepts such as probability.
The second main body of literature I will be drawing upon is that on
large-scale trends in evolution. There is a long-standing tradition in evolu-
tionary biology that searches for tendencies that hold universally across all
possible evolutionary histories, tendencies that sometimes are even termed
‘laws’ of evolution (such as the Red Queen Hypothesis by Valen 1973).
Such universal tendencies do not necessarily need to be driven by natural
selection (e.g. McShea and Brandon 2010), but natural selection has played
the key role in many of the most prominent proposals: trends towards
increased size, and towards increased energy-intensiveness (e.g. Vermeij
1987, Bonner 1988). Bonner and Vermeij take large-scale trends driven by
natural selection as a basis for a view of evolutionary history, and draw
conclusions concerning the contingency of evolutionary outcomes.
However, there has also been an equally long-standing skepticism to-
wards such trends (Dawkins 1986, Ruse 1996, Gould 1996), and I focus on
a particular aspect of this skepticism concerning whether the outcomes of
evolution by natural selection can be anything other than contingent. In
re-analyzing the relation between natural selection and contingency, I will
take into consideration recent advances in the Extended Synthesis, which
highlight previously ignored aspects of the relationship between environ-
ment and phenotype (plasticity and niche construction).
Analogous to the first part of the dissertation, the purpose in the sec-
ond part will not be to propose a rival candidate to the large-scale trends
in size, energy-intensiveness or complexity. Rather, taking theories about
the causal structure of natural selection as our ‘raw data’, I will be inquir-
ing as to what conclusions about the contingency of outcomes of natural
selection could be drawn. In particular, I will outline the possibility that
the tendency towards increased plasticity is non-contingent – in the sense
that it is common to all possible evolutionary histories – but this will not
constitute a claim about actual evolutionary history, where the tendency
could be counteracted by other evolutionary mechanisms.
30
Part I
Analyzing Contingency Claims

Chapter 1
The Challenge of Description
Dependence
In order to answer the skeptical challenge of description dependence in
particular, the first part will adopt the following argumentative structure.
In the current chapter I explain the skeptical challenge in more detail by
inserting it both into a broader philosophical perspective as well as into
the specific debate about the role of path-dependence in explanations. As
will become clear, this debate provides the ideal context for a systematic
analysis of claims about evolutionary contingency.
The second chapter aims at providing just this analysis. In particular,
I will propose that contingency claims can be analyzed in terms of symme-
tries in causal networks. While this is a novel analysis that solves some out-
standing problems within the specialized literature on path-dependence,
the analysis will also provide the ideal tools with which to analyze inter-
pretations of evolutionary history. The third chapter will attempt to show
how this can be done with proper precision. To that end, I analyze the
Gouldian and convergence-centric interpretation in terms of causal net-
works, with special attention to how it can help clarify some important
ambiguities inherent in those interpretations.
This is the argumentative arc followed by the whole first part. Focusing
on the structure of the current chapter, we will begin in the first section by
situating the challenge of description-dependence by zooming out to the
broadest (though yet relevant) philosophical horizon: the issue of Hegelian-
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type interpretations of history. Such interpretations bear significant resem-
blances to interpretations of evolutionary history, and it will be instructive
to connect the skeptical stances (not only description-dependence, but also
causal complexity) with skepticism towards Hegelian-type philosophies of
history. In particular, we will discuss Danto’s skepticism towards what he
calls ‘substantive’ philosophies of history.
In the second section, we will continue with Danto’s account of ‘narra-
tive explanations’ as his preferred account of explanations of history, and
contrast it with Hempel’s and Oppenheim’s law-based model of scientific
explanation. Both Danto and Hempel thought that narrative explanations
as such were not scientific (in Hempel’s perspective, narrative explanations
were simply incomplete scientific explanations). If philosophy of science
had not evolved from its status in the 1960s, it would have been difficult
to give a thoroughgoing analysis of how biologists interpret evolutionary
history, since the type of explanations they look for are neither Danto’s
narrative explanation, nor Hempel’s law-based ones.
However, developments subsequent to the 1960s in philosophy of sci-
ence have cast considerable doubt on this dualism between what I call
nomothetic and narrative poles of explanation. In particular, the causal
approach can be seen as integrating some elements that are typical of nar-
rative explanation. This causal approach is also where path-dependent
explanations are to be situated: path-dependent explanations are, in some
respects, fully elaborated causal explanations. In this way, interpretations
of evolutionary history can integrate both narrative and law-based ele-
ments (as outlined in the introduction), and yet escape Danto’s dismissal
of such combinations as an “intellectual monster” (Danto 1965:15).
The third section will focus on the diverse manifestations of path-
dependence, in order to develop intuitions concerning what precisely path-
dependence is (and how it relates to contingency). Then, in a final section,
we will formulate the challenge of description-dependence as a three-fold
challenge that any account of path-dependent explanation must meet.
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1 Background: Skepticism towards Substantive
Philosophy of History
Disciplines such as paleontology and anthropology, but also political sci-
ence and sociology do not seek grand unifying laws, but instead try to
reconstruct past sequences of events. An important element in this recon-
struction involves categorizing past events. A specific example of this (cf.
Falk 2011): when Raymond Dart found a fossil skull in 1925, he needed to
decide whether to categorize the fossil as belonging to an ancestor of mod-
ern humans, or to an independent lineage of ape. Based on the evidence
(e.g. the morphological properties of the skull), he made the judgement
to categorize it as an ancestor of modern humans, and named this genus
Australopithecus. In this way, Dart made a different reconstruction of past
events (a different ‘narrative explanation’) than his critics, who, by con-
trast, categorized the fossil as belonging to an ape.
In general, evolutionary biology is, to a significant degree, a historical
discipline, in the sense that it, unlike physics, is not concerned with eternal
and universal laws, but with actual sequences of events. This historical
character of science was recognized early on by philosophers of science (in
the 1940s through 1960s), but it was seen as a problem, primarily because
narrative sequences, in contrast to laws, do not allow for predictability.
This predictability, especially for the post-logical empiricist philosophers of
science such as Hempel, was seen as a sine qua non for scientific explanation
(distinguishing science from pseudoscience), and much effort during this
time was expended in trying to analyse the ‘logic’ of narrative explanation
(e.g. Hempel 1942, Gardiner 1952, Scriven 1959).
However, interpretations of evolutionary history go further than sim-
ply reconstructing actual sequences of events. They make additional judge-
ments as to how possible sequences of events converge on similar end points
(Conway Morris), as to how possible sequences tend to evolve along cer-
tain directions (Bonner) – or as to how possible sequences do not either
converge or tend in certain directions (Gould). And, as mentioned in the
introduction, they have predictive implications, for example concerning
what general properties alien life might be expected to have. This aspect
of interpretations of evolutionary history, provokes, if anything, even more
skepticism, not least because it has Hegelian undertones.
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1.1 The Hegelian Shadow
There are some striking similarities between the Hegelian approach to his-
tory and interpretations of evolutionary history. For Hegel, history unfolds
according to the principle of dialectics, which refers to a pattern consisting
of three interrelated stages of a system: an initial state where the parts
of a system are relatively uniform and undifferentiated, an intermediary
state characterized by tensions and oppositions between the various parts,
and a more holistic final state where previous oppositions are integrated
into a complex whole consisting of differentiated parts.
How precisely this dialectical principle should be interpreted need not
concern us here1; what is important is that dialectics characterizes the
important transitions in history, but not necessarily all transitions. As
Danto notes, “Nothing that happened in Siberia, for instance, was consid-
ered by Hegel to be part of history” (Danto 1965: 14). In the parlance
of this dissertation, this is reminiscent of how an interpretation of evolu-
tionary history conveys a representative causal network, which does not
necessarily correspond to the totality of evolutionary trajectories in actual
evolutionary history. The dynamics of dialectics dictates which transitions
in history are to be ignored, and which can be integrated, in order to ex-
plain the overall shape of history (which for Hegel entails a directionality
towards self-actualization and freedom, but what precisely the shape of
history is for Hegel is of less interest to us than his general approach to
history).
Hegel made a number of controversial assumptions, for example, his
identification of the dialectics of history and the dialectics of thought.
Nonetheless, as a general approach to interpreting history, Hegel had a
profound impact on subsequent thinkers. For instance, Marx and his fol-
lowers in the 20th century adopted dialectics as a principle of the dynamics
of history while at the same time rejecting its idealistic nature (instead
reconceiving it as class struggle).
1It is not a ‘causal mechanism’ in the way natural selection is, but rather some kind
of abstract pattern that is instantiated across diverse phenomena. Another complicating
factor is that it is not only a pattern that characterized the dynamics of history, but
also the dynamics of thought. This identification of the dynamics of history with the
dynamics of thought is an important factor underlying his dictum ‘the Real is the
Rational’ (Aboulafia 1980, Hegel 1996).
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By contrast, in early analytic philosophy, history became a relatively
marginalized topic, partially in reaction to Hegel. The Hegelian philosophy
of history was seen as encroaching on lines of investigation that belonged
to other disciplines and was seen as excessively speculative. The analytic
philosophy of history had a period of flourishing in the 1950s and 1960s,
and it is instructive to consider the criticisms of one prominent exponent,
Arthur Danto.
1.2 Danto’s Skepticism
The first thing Danto does, in his central work Narration and Knowledge
(1964), is to explicitly distance his approach to the explanation of history
from what he calls a substantive philosophy of history. According to Danto,
a substantive philosophy of history – represented by exponents such as
Hegel or Marx – aims to interpret the whole of history, in such a way that
future events can be predicted. Such a philosophy of history, Danto writes,
is
An intellectual monster, (. . . ) which is neither history nor
science, though it resembles the one and makes claims for itself
which only the other can make. (Danto 1965: 15)
As we will see, for Danto, a substantive philosophy of history is a category
mistake: it attempts to achieve the historian’s perspective on the present,
and this is impossible. The historian’s perspective is only epistemically
accessible when the events lie in the past; an actor in history has no way
of knowing the ‘historical significance’ of present events, since the events
that make the present ‘historically significant’ may still lie in the future.
If we dig deeper, we can identify two key motivations underlying Danto’s
claims, each of which bears an interesting resemblance to the two skep-
tical stances we have identified in the introduction. First, the issue of
description-dependence:
There is an unexpungeable factor of convention and of arbi-
trariness in historical description, and this makes it exceed-
ingly difficult, if not impossible, to speak, as the substantive
37
CHAPTER 1. THE CHALLENGE OF DESCRIPTION
DEPENDENCE
philosopher of history wishes to, of the story of the whole of his-
tory, or, for that matter, the story of any set of events. (Danto
1965: 15, first two emphases mine)
And, second, the challenge of causal complexity – manifested through a
failure to predict: “Existing philosophies of history are unspeakably inept,
with almost no power to predict.” (Danto 1965: 5) Danto supports this
conclusion with some kind of pessimistic meta-induction: perhaps actors
in history, armed with a powerful substantive philosophy of history, might
be able to predict which of the current events will turn out to be significant
on a historical scale. However, all substantive philosophies of history in
the past have failed to provide this kind of predictive power.
By contrast, an analytic philosophy of history – the type of philosophy
of history that Danto wishes to outline in his account of narrative explana-
tion – is not concerned with the subject matter of history itself, but rather
with the logical structure of the claims made by historians.
1.3 Hempel and Danto: Nomothetic and Narrative Expla-
nation
In Danto’s view, a historian setting out to explain the occurrence of the
First World War will not be content with theories obtained from anthro-
pology and sociology about what antecedent conditions tend to encourage
warfare between groups of humans. The historian will want to explain the
First World War in its idiosyncratic detail.
Yet, the historian will not simply want to list all possible details. Danto
imagines the ’Ideal Chronicle’ of the whole past to be an enumeration of all
past facts in exhaustive detail. This Ideal Chronicle is like some Humean
mosaic: a collection of particular facts. For example, the Ideal Chronicle
of the French Revolution would enumerate the thoughts and deeds of every
single person involved in the event.
What then is involved in historical explanation that is missing from
simply describing the Ideal Chronicle? According to Danto, it is the view-
point of the historian, of a person who looks back onto historical events.
The Ideal Chronicle may convey the thoughts and deeds of every single
person at the time, but what a historical explanation attempts to target
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is not how some historical event was experienced at the time, but rather
how its significance is to be gauged in light of subsequent events.
This retrospective nature of historical explanation is closely related
to the non-verifiability of ‘narrative sentences’. For example, a historian
might claim ‘Petrarch climbing the Mt. Ventoux was the start of the Re-
naissance’. Against Ayer, who believed that only verifiable propositions
are meaningful, Danto argued that, even though this proposition is mean-
ingful to historians (it is not nonsense), it is not verifiable. A contemporary
might have gone out and observe whether Petrarch was in fact climbing
the Mt. Ventoux, but they would not have been able to observe whether
this act was the start of the Renaissance.
The retrospective character of narrative sentences means they do not
refer to events localized in time, but instead to many events extended
over time. Narrative sentences are not listed in the set of propositions
contained in the Ideal Chronicle. Another example Danto frequently uses
is the proposition ‘The Thirty Years’ War began in 1618’: the meaning
of this proposition cannot be determined simply by reference to the start
of the Thirty Years’ War, but must be evaluated by subsequent events.
Narrative sentences do not refer in the same way as propositions such as
‘snow is white’, but instead derive their meaning from the larger temporal
structure of which they are a part (Danto 1965: 8).2
According to Danto, a historical explanation consists of a sequence of
such narrative sentences (p1, p2, . . . , pn) with a certain contrastive struc-
ture. In particular, Danto proposes that the form of an explanandum can
be represented as: x is F at t− 1 and x is G at t− 3. The other narrative
sentences involved in the historical explanation then serve to explain this
change. In this way, the basic structure of historical explanation is:
(1) x is F at t− 1
(2) H happens to x at t− 2
(3) x is G at t− 3
2It is this structure that substantive philosophies of history disobey: “There is a
certain sense in which we can tell only true stories about the past. It is this sense which
is somehow violated by substantive philosophies of history.” (Danto 1965: 11)
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Further, (1) and (2) do not necessarily entail (3): the explanatoriness of
historical explanations is entirely independent of any predictive power it
may or may not have. It also has nothing to do with Hempel’s ‘method of
empathic understanding’ – the method by which the historian supposedly
“. . . imagines himself in the place of the persons involved” (Hempel 1965:
239). Instead, historical explanations carry the indelible mark of the par-
ticular perspective of the historian who, looking back over time, selects
the events that are deemed significant to explain certain historical changes
that are of interest to him or her, in order to create a story or ‘narrative’.
This lack of predicative power casts doubt on the scientific character
of historical explanations. This is a consequence Danto was happy to
accept: he saw narrative explanations as closer in nature to art and fictional
narratives than to scientific explanations, and wished distinguish sharply
between narrative and scientific explanation. However, others were less
happy to accept a dichotomy between narrative and scientific explanation,
especially given the historical character of some scientific disciplines.
One of those who wished to avoid a dichotomy was Hempel, who tried
to reduce narrative explanations to his deductive-nomological (D-N) model
of explanation, formulated together with Oppenheim in 1948. In this for-
mulation, the structure of an explanation is conceived as a deductive ar-
gument, where a given empirical phenomenon (the explanandum or E)
is deductively inferred from the conjunction of general laws (Li) together
with certain conditions (Ci). These conditions identify certain relevant
facts concerning the initial conditions that guide how the laws are to be
applied. Schematically:
C1, C2, . . . , Ck
L1, L2, . . . , Lr
E
Part of the intuitive force behind the deductive model of explanation is
that it clarifies why explanation and prediction seem to go hand in hand.
If A explains B, then knowing A should allow B to be predicted.
Many explanations in physics recognizably follow this pattern. For
example, in Newtonian gravitational systems, only two laws are needed
(the gravitational law and the second law), and the conditions Ci specify
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the masses, and initial positions and momenta of the particles of the sys-
tem. Given these two sets of premises any later state of the system can
be deductively inferred. This explanatory structure is repeated in gener-
alized classical mechanics and quantum mechanics (where the laws are,
respectively, Lagrange’s equations and the Schrödinger equation).
When Hempel turned towards the subject of explanations of history
– both natural history and human history3 – he attempted to make such
explanations fit the mould of D-N explanation:
Historical explanation, too, aims at showing that the event in
question was not “a matter of chance,” but was to be expected
in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The
expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but ra-
tional scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of
general laws. (Hempel 1965: 235).
Curiously, Hempel recognizes but is puzzled by the fact that not only do
there not seem to be any general laws in history, but historians seem to
deny even their possibility:
If this view is correct, it would seem strange that while most
historians do suggest explanations of historical events, many of
them deny the possibility of resorting to any general laws in
history. (Hempel 1965: 235)
To resolve this apparent contradiction, Hempel introduces the notion of
explanation sketch (Hempel 1965: 238). Historians do not offer full D-N
explanations, but rather sketches of such explanations, where the general
law and initial conditions are only vaguely or incompletely stated. For ex-
ample, a historian attempting to explain why Dust Bowl farmers migrated
to California would invoke the drought and the better living conditions in
California. According to Hempel, this is a sketch in need of “filling out”
(Ibid.: 238) in order to become a “full-fledged explanation”: for example,
it could be filled out with the universal hypothesis that “populations will
tend to migrate to regions which offer them living condition” ’ (Ibid.: 236).4
3Human history is of course a natural phenomenon, but, because of free will, perhaps
not a merely natural phenomenon analyzable by scientific investigation.
4Why then do historians not do the filling out for us? Hempel gives two reasons.
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2 The Causal Approach: Between Nomothetic and
Narrative Explanation
Hempel’s notion of an explanation sketch is an awkward attempt to bring
historical explanations into the D-N fold – awkward because the type of
universal laws that Hempel would need for the D-N logic are simply un-
available in disciplines such as biology or social science (see chapter 4).
However, philosophy of science moved away from the D-N model for other
reasons, and has largely (though by no means universally) adopted a causal
approach, which is, as we will see, a much more natural general framework
in which to situate both narrative explanations in science, as well as inter-
pretations of evolutionary history.
Ironically, the main counterexamples to the D-N model of explanation
all involve some feature typical of narrative explanations. The three most
well-known problems (which are stated here without much explanation)
are (1) non-generality of the explanans in some explanations, (2) direc-
tionality in some explanations, and (3) criteria of ‘relevance’ in selecting
the explanantia. An example of (1), offered by Scriven (1962), is the expla-
nation ‘the vase fell because it was knocked down by the curtains’. There
is no general law concerning curtains and vases; moreover, such an expla-
nation does not even implicitly involve universal laws, such as the laws
governing electrostatic forces. Instead, according to Scriven, this type of
explanation involves ‘singular causation’ rather than a general law doing
the explanatory work.
An example of (2) lies in how we intuitively judge the length of a pole
to explain the length of the shadow cast by the pole, but not vice versa –
even though the length of the shadow cast deductively entails the length
of the pole. Finally, concerning (3), if a male takes a birth control pill
and fails to get pregnant, we judge his maleness to be relevant and not
his taking a birth control pill for explaining why he fails to get pregnant –
even though both entail the explanandum according to D-N criteria.
The first is that historians rely on common-sense hypotheses relating to individual and
social psychology. The second is that it would be ‘very difficult’ to formulate the tacit
hypotheses in a way that would be both precise and in agreement with relevant empirical
evidence. However, Hempel never delves into why it should be difficult for historians
to formulate such tacit universal hypotheses – and into whether this difficulty is a sign
that such tacit hypotheses might not exist.
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Given these problems, causality became an increasingly attractive no-
tion with which to analyze the structure of scientific explanation (instead
of universal laws). Causality had been largely repudiated by the logical
empiricists (with some exceptions, such as Hans Reichenbach) as causality
was thought to be a mere metaphysical construct, unnecessarily interpolat-
ing empirical data. For example, at one point Russell pronounced causality
to be “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because
it is erroneously supposed to do no harm” (Russell 1912:1).
Nonetheless, causality deals fairly naturally with the problems men-
tioned above. Causation runs from cause to effect, so a causal explanation
of the length of the shadow will cite the length of the pole, but not vice
versa. Further, irrelevant explanantia are simply those that make no causal
difference to the explanandum: there is no causal path that connects taking
a birth control pill to a male getting pregnant. Finally, the causal account
of explanation integrates some of the virtues of the D-N account: while a
cause may not always be sufficient for the explanandum to occur, it does
allow for a certain degree of predictability (often in terms of ‘statistical
relevance’: see Salmon 1971).
There have been numerous accounts of causal explanation (Salmon
1971, 1984; Dowe 2000; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008), and a prolif-
eration of notions of causality (the main ones being causal production
and causal difference-making5). Old Humean concerns have never entirely
disappeared: for example, it is an ongoing concern how to distinguish
causation from correlation, or whether causal relations are simply regular
patterns of succession6.
5Causal production refers to spatiotemporally contiguous processes that connect
events (Salmon 1984, Dowe 1990). A problem with this is that for many explananda,
there are many processes causally linked to the explanandum without being explanato-
rily relevant. If Joe kicks a football at a window and the window shatters, mentioning
that Joe was at the time performing a difficult curve ball seems superfluous to explain-
ing why the window shattered – his having kicked the ball is sufficient. Not all causal
detail is relevant, and this is why a number of the most prominent accounts of scien-
tific explanation are spelled out in terms of causal difference-making (Woodward 2003,
Strevens 2008).
6An influential approach (among philosophers as well as computer scientists) has
attempted to resolve this problem by defining causality in terms of certain types of
correlations that can be cleanly manipulated by surgical interventions (Spirtes et al.
2000; Pearl 2000; Woodward 2003).
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We need not go into further detail; some contemporary issues in the
literature on causality will be discussed in the context of the causality of
natural selection in chapter 5. What is more important to note here is that
the main motivations for a causal approach – the specificity, directionality
and selectiveness of explanations – are precisely the features that Danto
referred to in order to distinguish narrative explanation from law-based
predictive explanations. First, historians are concerned with idiosyncratic
detail, not with generalities; second, due to the chronology of events, nar-
ratives have a clear directionality; and finally, narratives do not represent
the totality of past events (the Ideal Chronicle), but make a selection.
Explanations that use the concept of path-dependence can be seen as
further elaborations of the causal approach to explanation. Instead of
the explanans being a single cause (or a pair of contrastive causes), path-
dependent explanations will cite a causal pathway (a series of antecedent
causes) and will contrast that pathway to pathways that could have been
taken. In what follows I will give a broad overview of phenomena that
are usually explained as path-dependent. This will allow the challenges of
description-dependence to be formulated as challenges for an account of
path-dependent explanation.
3 The Phenomenon of Path-Dependence
Path-dependent phenomena occur across all domains of inquiry, from the
study of topological defects in solids to the adoption of technologies. A
paradigm case of path-dependence is often taken to be the adoption of
the QWERTY keyboard (David 1985). Originally, the QWERTY layout
was designed so as to to prevent typewriters from jamming; however, it
subsequently became entrenched, even though the typewriter itself be-
came obsolete, and even though there are more efficient ways of organizing
an English-language keyboard for a computer. Thus, to explain why the
present state of keyboards is as it is, one needs to integrate information
about past states.
In the broadest sense, path-dependence merely implies that the path
followed by a system is explanatorily relevant for its final outcome. In
this sense, the term is simply another way of saying ‘past states matter’.
However, once this ‘explanatory relevance’ is given a more precise char-
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acterization, narrower and more technical accounts of path-dependence
emerge. Such accounts were originally proposed in economics and the so-
cial sciences (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2004), but more recently the issue has
been receiving increasing attention from philosophers of science (Szath-
máry 2006; Ereshefsky 2012; Desjardins 2011a,b, 2015).
In the philosophy of science literature, the notion of path-dependence is
closely related to two other ways of understanding historicity: ‘sensitivity
to initial conditions’ (Ben-Menahem 1997; Powell 2012) and ‘contingency’
(Beatty 2006; Beatty and Desjardins 2009). Contingency is particularly
important for the purposes of this dissertation, and while an outcome
can be contingent without being path-dependent (see chapter 2), such
outcomes are of negligible importance for evolutionary history. The precise
relation between path-dependence and contingency, and between path-
dependence and sensitivity to initial conditions will become clearer over
the course of this and next chapter.
A description of some salient properties of path-dependent explanations
of processes7 will help develop some intuitions concerning the phenomenon.
I will loosely group these properties according to whether they are future-
oriented or past-oriented.
Among the past-oriented aspects, a key distinction is that between
information-preserving and information-destroying processes (Sober 1983,
1988; Desjardins 2011b). The latter is exemplified by what happens when
a marble is released from the rim of a bowl: the marble will roll down
and rock back and forth until it comes to a stop in the middle of the
bowl. Given information about the final state alone, it is impossible to
reconstruct its initial state, since no matter where precisely on the rim the
marble is released, it will invariably come to rest at the middle point. This
is an example of path-independence, as the precise path followed by the
7I primarily take path-dependence to be a property of an explanation or represen-
tation of a process, not a property of the process itself. While some processes lend
themselves more naturally to a path-dependent representation than others, as we will
see processes can be represented as both path-dependent as well as path-independent ac-
cording to the grain of analysis adopted (this is in fact the whole problem of description-
dependence). Hence attributing path-dependence to an explanation is the only way to
avoid ambiguity. For the sake of brevity, I will often refer to representations of processes
simply as ‘processes’, and explanations that represent processes as path-dependent as
‘path-dependent explanations’.
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marble makes no difference to the final state. In other words, the past of
the marble is ‘erased’ and does not matter for the explanandum.
One of the most basic path-dependent processes is movement with
friction. If one slides a block of wood from point A to point B, then it
matters whether the shortest path between the points is chosen, or some
more indirect route. In the latter case, more heat will be generated due to
friction between the block of wood and the surface. Thus, some information
about the past (i.e. the length of the path followed, or the speed with which
the block was pushed) is preserved in the final state.
In general, most real processes have both information-preserving and
information-destroying aspects, and in this way can only be said to be
partially path-dependent. For example, the morphology of the whale shows
remarkable similarities with the morphology of fish, yet there are significant
differences as well. Some information about the past is destroyed due to
the convergent evolution towards the streamlined morphology. However, a
whale has lungs instead of gills, and its fins are exapted from fingers, and
thus some information about its land-based past is preserved.
A second group of properties of path-dependence concerns how the past
makes a counterfactual difference for the present: if the past were different,
the outcome would also be different. For example, if humanity had skipped
the technology of typewriters, and gone straight to computers, there would
likely be no QWERTY keyboard. The phenomenon of sensitivity to ini-
tial conditions — how a small change in initial conditions can lead to
a large change in outcomes — concerns this aspect of path-dependence
(Ben-Menahem 1997; Powell 2012). An example is the nonlinearity of the
weather, so that, so to speak, a butterfly can flap its wings in Paris and
cause a storm in New York. The outcome could not have occurred if the
past were different.
An underlying notion here is the contingency of the explanandum,
where ‘contingency’ refers not to the modal structure of the explanandum
(i.e. whether or not it is true in all possible worlds), but to the structure
of its causal history. The outcome is contingent if, given what we know
about its causal antecedents, it could not have occurred.8
8This is partially why historical explanations do not fit the mould of deductive (or
even inductive) explanations. The explanandum cannot be deduced from a general
principle, or inductively inferred with high probability, but maintains some degree of
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It is helpful to distinguish between two types of contingency: ‘causal-
dependence contingency’ and ‘unpredictability contingency’ (Beatty 2006).
Causal-dependence contingency refers to the counterfactual dependence of
the outcome on some prior state. Thus A is ‘contingent upon’ B if, and only
if, were B not present, A would not obtain. Causal-dependence contingency
is thus a very broad notion, and also covers deterministic processes where
there is dependence on initial conditions, such as the Newtonian dynamics
of individual particles.
Unpredictability contingency refers more specifically to indeterminism
in a process, or at least, a modelled indeterminism in the explanatory
structure9. It is insufficient to know the prior states in order to ‘predict’
the outcome state. Beatty describes this as ‘contingency per se’ (Beatty
2006: 38-40), thus indicating that contingency can also be used as a one-
place predicate attaching to an explanandum.
These two notions of contingency capture two different senses in which
the outcome could not have occurred, given the initial state. Unpredictabil-
ity contingency is not necessary for path-dependence, as some perfectly
predictable processes (e.g. Newtonian dynamics) depend on initial condi-
tions, and thus the outcome is dependent on which causal path had been
taken10. This has led some to refer to dependence on initial conditions
as ‘weak’ path- dependence, and the cases where the process depends on
multiple past states as ‘strong’ path-dependence (Ereshefsky 2012).
These two orientations, future-directed and past-directed, are in no
way mutually exclusive, and most real examples involve both perspectives.
Consider the phenomenon of positive feedback, where the system is initially
balanced between two basins of separate attractors, and where any initial
fluctuation will snowball and result in a large, self-reinforcing change. A
classic example of this is the emergence of the VCR videocassette tech-
nology (Arthur 1994). Initially, the videocassette market was precariously
poised between two competing technologies, VCR and Beta; however, a
slightly greater adoption of the VCR technology by consumers led to it
becoming more widely available in video outlets, in turn precipitating fur-
‘contingency’.
9Many processes in statistical physics and the special sciences are modelled as prob-
abilistic, even though the underlying causal processes may be deterministic.
10We will see later that unpredictability contingency is not sufficient either: some
probabilistic processes are ahistorical.
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ther adoption by consumers. Thus VCR came to dominate the market.
In this example, there is unpredictability contingency (the initial greater
adoption was purely contingent) and sensitivity to initial conditions, but
also some information-preservation, as given the outcome of VCR domi-
nance, we can extract some information about some of the past states.
Another interesting combination of both orientations occurs in instances
where the initial state neither snowballs nor is erased, but where it sim-
ply constrains future evolution. For example, developmental mechanisms,
such as the processes determined by the Hox genes, constrain possible
body-plans and thus the adaptations that are possible (Young et al. 2005).
There is a counterfactual dependence in the sense that past states (like
a certain configuration of the Hox genes) preclude some possible future
states. When the past constrains the outcome to the extent that only a
single outcome becomes possible, the phenomenon is known as ‘entrench-
ment’ or the ‘lock-in effect’. There is also some information-preservation
here, as it is possible to reconstruct the past to a certain extent.
4 Description-dependence: Three Challenges
With these phenomena in mind, three challenges face any account that
attempts to uncover the more formal structure of path-dependence. The
first is to account for how path-dependence is a matter of degree. While
some measures have been intuitively suggested in the literature (e.g. Des-
jardins 2011a), a more rigorously developed account is lacking. This is
partly due to the fact that the literature is relatively new. However, per-
haps it is partly due to some confusion about two ways in which ‘degree’
can be understood.
The first way is when the past matters at multiple moments instead of
a single instant. Thus, insofar as the evolution of the whale is represented
as depending on at least two moments (the transition from fish to land-
based animal, and from land-based to aquatic reptile) instead of just one
in the case of VCR history (the instant when VCR happened to become
more frequent than Beta), the evolution of the whale can be considered
more path-dependent than that of the VCR. The outcome state gives more
‘information’ about the past in the first case than in the second.
The second way the past matters ‘more’ is when a difference in the past
48
leads to a ‘greater’ difference in outcome. For example, the past matters
‘more’ when a butterfly flapping its wings leads to a hurricane than when
the flapping would merely lead to a small displacement of air. Note that
these two types of degree are not necessarily equivalent: for example, if
the hurricane happens to be some attractor state, in such a way that many
other kinds of small disturbance would likewise have led to the hurricane,
the fact of a butterfly flapping its wings is not very relevant to explain
why the hurricane occurred. The background conditions (pressure, tem-
perature differentials) would be more informative; what actually triggered
the hurricane would be relatively unimportant. In this way, while the first
measure of path-dependence concerns how informative the past is for ex-
plaining the present, the second measure compares the ‘distance’ between
the outcome states of given initial states.
I will be leaving this second sense of degree aside, mainly because the
information-focused sense of degree is more fundamental and leads to in-
teresting connections with information theory. However, another reason
is that formalizing this second sense of degree would not be worthwhile
for the purposes of this dissertation. Allow me to briefly sketch why. The
distance-focused degree can either refer to nonlinearity or discontinuity.11
If one takes it to be discontinuity, it is a discrete property of a process and
hence not a good candidate for a gradualist degree of path-dependence.
If one interprets it as nonlinearity, then one would need to detail what it
means for one outcome to be ‘very different’ from another. Which metric
is one to use, for example, on the space of possible videocassette technolo-
gies? It seems impossible to introduce any metric without relativizing it to
explanatory interests. Thus, if taken as nonlinearity, this distance-based
degree of path-dependence seems to mainly depend on what explanatory
interests are at stake rather than on the nature of path-dependence.
Besides accounting for how path-dependence comes in degrees, a second
challenge is that the evolution of a system may be path-dependent at only
11In brief, a function is linear when f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y); thus when a function
is nonlinear a slight change in input will lead to an effect that is not linearly propor-
tionate, and could potentially be very large. When a function is discontinuous, some
modifications of the input, no matter how slight, will lead to relatively large effects.
If a process is nonlinear but continuous, small changes will still lead to small effects;
however, in a discontinuous process, some changes, no matter how small, will lead to
large effects, even if the process is otherwise linear.
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certain times, or only with regard to certain outcome states. Thus path-
dependence seems to have different scopes, some more local, others more
global.
A third, final challenge concerns the way in which path-dependence
seems to depend on the grain of analysis adopted to describe the process.
For example, the evolution of the whale is path-dependent when one dis-
tinguishes between the two states ‘fish’ and ‘marine mammal’; however,
path-dependence disappears when the outcome state is more coarsely de-
scribed (e.g. ‘aquatic animal’). What counts as an adaptation or a con-
straint is to some extent dependent on the grain of analysis (see Wilkins
and Godfrey-Smith 2009). In general, introducing a more fine-grained de-
scription of the explanandum seems to make it more path-dependent, and
an account of path-dependence should be able to integrate this fact.
Illustration: Homoplasy and Homology
Particularly relevant for our purposes is how to disentangle the relative
roles that natural selection, development processes and genes play in caus-
ing two lineages that share a similar trait. If the similarity in the trait is
due to common descent, the similarity is said to be homologous12; if it is
derived ‘independently’ (not due to common descent, but for instance, due
to natural selection), it is said to be homoplastic.
However, traits can be described at different levels of analysis: at the
levels of function, structure, underlying developmental processes and un-
derlying genes or gene networks that ultimately code for the phenotypic
trait. Two traits in separate evolutionary lineages may be similar at the
level of function while being dissimilar at the level of structure, or similar at
the level of structure while possessing dissimilar developmental processes.
In this way, the question, ‘Is the similarity due to common descent or
not?’ is ambiguous as such, and admits of different answers. For example,
there is often some common descent at play even in cases that are cate-
12Some (e.g., Ramsey and Peterson 2012) have defined homology in terms of same-
ness instead of similarity, since similarity leads to a number of definitional ambiguities.
However, also in Ramsey and Peterson’s account of homology, description-dependence
remains an issue, since they distinguish between three levels of analysis: the genes cod-
ing for the developmental programme, the developmental programme, and the product
of the programme, i.e., the morphological trait itself (Ramsey and Peterson 2012: 262).
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gorized as convergent evolution. A well-known example is how the Pax-6
gene is present in the developmental programmes controlling for both ver-
tebrate and cephalopod eyes; yet because the developmental programmes
are so different, the similarity between vertebrate and cephalopod eyes is
usually categorized as convergence. At the level of genes there is some
common descent; at the level of phenotypic structure, similarity is not en-
tirely explained by the common Pax-6 gene (even though without Pax-6
there would likely be no similarity).
In general, the phylogeny (causal network) that traces the evolution of a
trait across different lineages is complex and highly description-dependent.
This complexity allows for different permutations of convergence and diver-
gence at the different levels, including for example: ‘convergent evolution’
(homoplasy at the level of structure without homologous developmental
programmes), ‘parallel evolution’ (homoplasy with homologous develop-
mental programmes), or ‘deep homology’ (no homoplasy at either the level
of developmental programmes or structures, and yet homology at the level
of genes: see Ramsey and Peterson 2012). Another consequence of this
complexity is that the labels do not necessarily cut the causal network ‘at
the joints’. For example, there may be similarity at the level of a structure,
but the developmental programmes may only be partially homologous.
Conway Morris uses the ubiquity of homoplasies in order to argue that
convergent evolution is ubiquitous – and hence that many evolutionary out-
comes are inevitable. However, the description-dependence of traits means
that in practice it is difficult to establish that a homoplasy is the result
of convergent evolution and not, for example, parallel evolution. Powell
(2012) uses this fact to argue against the convergence-centric interpreta-
tion of evolutionary history, and argues that many instances of homoplasy,
being the result of homologous developmental programmes (such as the
programmes controlling for body plan), actually support the Gouldian in-
terpretation of life.
In chapter 3 (and in part II in more detail) we will see how Powell’s
analysis of convergent evolution, while not wrong, is incomplete and over-
looks the fact that even convergent evolution does not support the case
that evolutionary outcomes are non-contingent.
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Chapter 2
The Symmetry Framework
In this chapter we argue in more detail why various types of contingency
should be analyzed in terms of path-dependence, and in particular in terms
of symmetries of causal networks. The specific approach in this chapter
will be to follow recent developments in the philosophy of science and to
analyze narrative explanations in terms of path-dependence – this idea is
not new, and has already a large following in historical sciences such as
political science and sociology, but has only recently been introduced into
the philosophy of science. I will present a novel understanding of narrative
explanation in terms of symmetry-breaking.
While this endeavour can be pursued as a stand-alone project within
the literature on path-dependence (see Desmond 2016), the purpose of this
dissertation will be to find the tools with which a more nuanced hypothe-
sis concerning evolutionary contingency can be formulated – more nuanced
than the hypotheses associated with the Chardinian and Gouldian narra-
tives.
1 The Attractor Landscape and Branching Tree
Models
Among the more technical accounts of path-dependence, two classes of
model can be discerned. The first characterizes path-dependence as oc-
curring when a system could possibly evolve towards one of multiple lo-
cal stable equilibria or attractor states (e.g. Bassanini and Dosi 1999;
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Pierson 2004; Szathmáry 2006). In this way certain key aspects of path-
dependence, such as nonlinearity and sensitivity to initial conditions, can
be modeled as an evolution on what I call an attractor landscape with mul-
tiple attractor states. Such a model, like the adaptive landscape metaphor
in evolutionary biology, has serious limitations, the main one being that
in systems with high dimensionality the topology of associated landscapes
tend to be ridged and holey. As we will see, this means that the dynamics
of such systems cannot be modeled as simply maximizing some scalar vari-
able, and this precludes (or at least seriously limits) a general formulation
of path-dependence in terms of landscape topology (see Gavrilets 2004;
Kaplan 2008).
The second broad class of model has represented path-dependent pro-
cesses as a branching causal tree (Kaplan 2008). However, branching
trees also have limitations when the causal structure becomes too com-
plex, in particular when there are multiple possible initial states, or when
there is a significant number of non-tree events, or ‘reticulations’, where
branches converge (Moret et al. 2004). For example, an area where the
tree metaphor has received significant criticism is phylogenetics, where
phenomena such as hybrid speciation or lateral gene transfer cannot be
captured in tree models.
To address these limitations, the first purpose of this chapter is to in-
troduce the notion of causal networks in some formal detail, and show
how they are generalizations of both landscapes and branching trees. Net-
work models are already well established in the causal modeling literature
(following Pearl 2000) and in phylogenetics (e.g. Moret et al. 2004; Ve-
lasco and Sober 2010), but in the literature on path-dependence they have
been underutilized. Causal networks allow complex causal relations to be
represented when both tree or landscape metaphors fail.
An attractor is an equilibrium set of states towards which the system
evolves when it is in a given neighbourhood (the ‘basin’), and once in
the attractor state, the system will tend to return there if perturbed. Its
usefulness as a concept primarily lies in allowing for some long-term pre-
dictability, even in dynamics that are nonlinear and chaotic. An attractor
is global when its basin covers all of state space, or local, when the basin
is a subset of state space. In what I call an ‘attractor landscape’, each
state is assigned a scalar variable (on a two-dimensional landscape, this
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is the height), with the attractors being local maxima (or minima), and
the system tending towards maximizing (or minimizing) the scalar vari-
able. Examples of such landscapes are potential energy landscapes, where
valleys in the landscape correspond to minimal-energy states, or adaptive
landscapes, where the peaks represent states with maximal fitness.
Landscapes can be used to systematize some aspects of path-dependence,
for example, the distinction between information-preserving and information-
destroying processes. Reconstructability becomes impossible when the ex-
planandum (the outcome state) is a global attractor state, because any
possible initial state tends towards the attractor state. When there are
multiple attractors present, the process is partially information-preserving,
as one can extract some information about the past (namely, in which basin
the system was initially located) from the outcome.
With this in mind, one could formulate path-dependence in terms of
the following negative condition:
Definition (Path-dependence - attractor formulation). An explanation of
an outcome is path-dependent if and only if that outcome is not explained
as a global attractor.
Note that ‘global’ is always defined relative to the state space under con-
sideration. The middle of the bowl is a global attractor when the state
space is confined to the positions of the marble on the hollow surface of the
bowl; it (obviously) is no longer an attractor when the marble is placed
next to the bowl. Thus, when an attractor is deemed global within the
scope of the explanation, then what precise initial state obtains does not
make any difference for the outcome, as the system will be in the attractor
state. Conversely, when there is no global attractor, then there are at least
two initial states that lead to different outcomes.
The accounts of Bassanini and Dosi (1999) and Szathmáry (2006) im-
plicitly draw on this criterion. Szathmáry distinguishes between ‘strong’
and ‘weak’ path-dependence (not to be confused with Ereshefsky’s dis-
tinction). Strong path dependence occurs when the process is irreversible
and when there are multiple stable attractors. This is straightforwardly
covered by the attractor formulation.
However, what Szathmáry calls weak path-dependence could seem prob-
lematic for this definition. An outcome may not be a global attractor, and
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yet have occurred path-independently in the weak sense, as long as the
causal-dependence on initial conditions is ‘effectively’ eliminated as time
goes to infinity.1 This type of weak path-dependence will tend to occur in
high-dimensional state spaces, when the number of possible states is ‘much’
greater than the number of states actualized over the course of a system’s
history, so that the asymptotic convergence of possible trajectories will
tend not to occur (Szathmáry 2006).
Nonetheless, weak path-dependence is also covered by the attractor
formulation, because the asymptotic convergence that Bassanini and Dosi
describe concerns the convergence of the average position of a trajectory.
Even though the actual instantaneous positions of two possible trajecto-
ries will in general be very different at any given time, when a system is
weakly path-dependent, the long-run average position converges to a global
equilibrium state.2 Thus, whether or not the past matters in weak path-
dependence depends on what precisely the explanandum is: the average
position over a long period of time (past does not matter), or the actual
position at a specific time (past does matter). By contrast, strong path-
dependence implies that both the instantaneous and the long-run average
position converge to a single attractor state.
The landscape framework has serious limitations. An area where it
has already received significant criticism is in its application to biolog-
ical evolution in the short- to middle-term (i.e. adaptive landscapes).3
One important criticism concerns how landscapes change when the di-
mensionality of state space is increased. Landscapes imply that a system
1Effective elimination is what Bassanini and Dosi (1999: 15) call asymptotic path-
independence, which occurs when two possible trajectories come arbitrarily close within
a finite time-span, and for an infinite number of times thereafter. (If the dynamics
is Markovian, then this condition reduces to the following: two possible trajectories
intersect in finite time, because once there is a single intersection, it is expected that the
paths will overlap for all subsequent times.) If this condition is met, then the difference
an initial condition makes on a subsequent history is eliminated in finite time. In this
way, weak path-independence is a form of ergodicity.
2Compare with Doeblin’s theorem in the theory of Markov processes (e.g. Stroock
2005).
3Note that while some have argued in their defence that they are best used as an
explanatory template, as a heuristic for hypothesis generation (Ruse 1990; Skipper
2004), others have questioned their adequacy even as metaphor (Pigliucci and Kaplan
2006; Kaplan 2008; Plutynski 2008).
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can evolve smoothly to a neighbouring state; Gavrilets (2004) has shown
how the topology of high-dimensional adaptive landscapes tends to con-
sist of‘ridges’, ‘rugged peaks’ and ‘holes’ rather than of smooth hills. The
likelihood increases of a (nearly) neutral network forming, and of the num-
ber of local peaks increasing (see Gavrilets 2004: 45-80). The absolute
scalar difference (in this case, fitness) between any two states becomes in-
creasingly meaningless for predicting whether one state will evolve into the
other or not.
What this suggests is that according as one needs more variables to
characterize a particular outcome, the less likely one will be able to ana-
lyze the occurrence of that outcome as some kind of optimum of a single
scalar quantity (e.g. fitness). While the attractor formulation of path-
dependence may remain true, it becomes increasingly empty, as simple
global attractors tend to not occur at all in complex systems. As land-
scapes become increasingly ridged and holey, the basins of local peaks
shrink, and the system likely does not exhibit any global optimizing be-
haviour.
In this way, attractor landscapes may have limited applicability. Fur-
thermore, they cannot represent many interesting path-dependent pro-
cesses; they are best suited to represent convergent processes, or processes
where there is a choice between multiple local attractors.4 Causal trees are
better suited for evolutions in high-dimensional spaces, where the proba-
bility that causal paths intersect is very low, and thus where every state
actualized is unique.
1.1 Causal Trees
In the following I will briefly outline a formal characterization of trees, and
then (drawing on the work of Desjardins) consider how path-dependence
can be formulated within this framework. I will try to show that this
framework is in a sense the opposite of attractor landscapes: best suited
for high-dimensional state spaces, but weak at representing convergent
causal structures.
A tree is a causal graph rooted in a single point, from which branches
4Compare this with the analysis of conservative vector fields: if a dynamics can be
represented as the gradient of a scalar, then it is path-independent.
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split off but never join as one moves from past to present. The states of
a tree form a partially ordered set of states, where every state has only
a single immediate predecessor, but can have any number of successors.
Thus not every pair of states can be connected by a forward-directed causal
chain, even though every state in a tree is indirectly causally linked through
a common ancestor.
Figure 2.1: Path depen-
dence in a causal tree (Re-
produced with permission
from Desjardins 2011a)
A causal tree maps out the possible paths
an individual entity can follow. If the sys-
tem consists only of a single entity, only a
single path will actually be followed; if the
system is an ensemble of individual entities,
there will be a distribution over the possi-
ble paths according to the probabilities of the
paths. The branching events or nodes, which
connect a single state to two or more possible
descendant states, can be thought of as ab-
stractions of contingent events with causal im-
pact on the path of the system. For example,
in macroevolutionary phylogenetic trees the
nodes abstractly represent speciation events,
where a given biological population diverges
to two or more distinct species.
With this in place, one can formulate path-dependence in the following
way (adopted from Desjardins 2015)5:
Definition (Path-dependence - causal tree formulation). An explanation
of an outcome is path-dependent if 1/ a given initial state branches off into
at least two paths, 2/ these paths lead to at least two possible outcomes (with
non-zero probability), and 3/ following different paths affects the probability
of a given outcome state.
5For a more mathematical characterization, see Desjardins (2011a).
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Figure 2.2: Path
dependence in a
causal network
This formulation of path-dependence captures
some crucial properties, such as unpredictability con-
tingency and causal-dependence contingency. It can
also be used to capture the information-preserving
aspect of path-dependence, and the way in which it
can come in degrees (Desjardins 2011a). However, I
would like to point to three limitations. The first and
foremost is that, in contrast to attractor landscapes,
causal trees cannot capture causal relationships where
branches join. This is a problem for even the formula-
tion of path-dependence, as path-dependence presup-
poses that there are alternative paths leading to the same outcome, and
thus some convergence. This can be seen more clearly by redrawing Figure
2.1 so that the same states are represented by the same points; then the
causal model becomes Figure 2.2, which, strictly speaking, is no longer a
causal tree.
Figure 2.3: Path-
dependent or not?
Putting this problem aside (for example, by ex-
panding the notion of tree to allow for some reticula-
tions), it remains unclear how to analyze cases with
multiple possible initial states. For example, in Figure
2.3, none of the paths leading to o1 affect the probabil-
ity of o1 occurring, and thus the occurrence of o1 does
not seem to be path-dependent in the sense that its
occurrence is not affected by the choice of path. Yet,
there is a clear dependence on initial conditions, for if
one knows that the initial state is s∗0, the probability
of o1 occurring is .4, as opposed to .8, if s0 were to be
the initial state. The example in Figure 2.3 thus seems
to involve some combination of path-dependence and path-independence
that is not captured by the causal tree formulation.
A second, related limitation is that the causal tree formulation concerns
only whether the occurrence of an outcome is path-dependent, but it is
unclear how it can be applied to a set or distribution of states, or how
path-dependence is something that can change over time. In other words,
the tree formulation does not seem to allow for different scopes of path-
dependence. For example, in a more complex model such as Figure 2.4,
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there seem to be pockets of path-independence, even though the process
may be globally path-dependent. The origin of this limitation lies less
in the specific formulation of path-dependence, but rather in the causal
tree framework itself; this is one important reason for representing causal
relationships by causal networks (directed acyclical graphs).
Figure 2.4: Path-
dependent or not?
Finally, it remains unclear how precisely the de-
gree of path-dependence should be defined. Des-
jardins (2011a) suggests two types of metric that
roughly correspond to those mentioned in section
II. The first is the degree of divergence or conver-
gence, where maximal divergence is maximal path-
dependence and maximal convergence is maximal
path-independence. The second is the degree of ‘sim-
ilarity’ between outcomes: a causal tree is more path-
dependent when the different outcomes are more dis-
similar. However, it would be desirable to introduce
a more precise, quantitative measure.6 It is not clear, within a causal tree,
what ‘similarity’ between outcomes could mean without introducing some
independent scalar metric.
1.2 Causal Networks
As done with causal trees, I will now construct causal networks with some
more formal detail. Besides allowing for increased generality when describ-
ing path-dependence, there are two further advantages in doing this. The
first is that it will become clear how a model can be coarse-grained to ob-
tain either a causal tree or an attractor landscape, thus showing how the
two frameworks are limiting cases of causal networks. The second is that
it places path-dependence within the context of graph theory, to which the
tools of information theory can be readily applied, and this will allow for
a quantitative measure of path-dependence to be proposed.
A causal network is a directed, acyclical graph represented by the
ordered pair (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges
connecting the nodes. In this dissertation, causal networks are taken to
6Also, it can be shown that maximal divergence is, perhaps surprisingly, a case of
maximal path-independence (see Figure 2.8).
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be formalizations of causal explanations, and hence certain nodes are of
particular interest, namely the outcome states and the initial states. For
this reason it will be useful to think of the ordered pair (V,E) as a 3-tuple
(O, I,R) where O is the set of outcome states, I the set of initial states,
and R : O → I a web of causal relations between initial and outcome
states. The causal relations themselves may be productive or difference-
making — the precise nature of causality will not be of concern here. In
general, causal networks will contain intermediate states, between the sets
of initial and outcome states. Letting these intermediate sets of states
be represented by Oi = Ii+1, with I = I0, O = On, the relation R can
be decomposed in n + 1 instants: R = R0 ◦ R1 ◦ · · · ◦ Rn, where each
Ri : Ii → Oi is a simple mapping relation.
Three basic causal patterns will be of interest. In a parallel struc-
ture, the outcome would not have obtained if a particular initial state had
not been present. Thus, there is at most one initial state associated with
a given outcome, and in this way the parallel structure corresponds to
causal-dependence contingency. By contrast, in a divergent structure,
multiple outcomes are associated with a single initial state. This means
that, given the initial state, the descendant state cannot be predicted: this
is unpredictability contingency. When the structure is neither parallel nor
divergent, it is convergent, and this occurs when multiple initial states
converge on a single outcome state. A path-dependent explanation, as
actually used in scientific practice, is almost invariably a complex combi-
nation of these basic structures.
The probability of an outcome in a particular explanatory frame-
work can be calculated by means of the probability distribution over ini-
tial states, and the probabilities of the different paths between an initial
state and the outcome. By the law of total probability we get P (o) =∑
i P (i)P (o|i). Each conditional probability P (o|i) can be written as
P (o|i) =∑p P (pio) =∑p∏i≤j≤o pi(j → j + 1), where the pio are the dif-
ferent paths connecting initial state i to outcome o, and where pi(j → j+1)
represents the transition probability connecting two past states. Thus the
probability of an outcome is ultimately reducible to the initial probabil-
ity distribution and the structure of the causal pathways leading to the
outcome.
In general, the causal structure changes by fine-graining or coarse-
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graining the degree of analysis. Fine-graining can be thought of as intro-
ducing a new variable to characterize the initial or outcome states, and in
this way states that were previously identical become differentiated. More
explicitly, a state may be characterized by n variables, s = (x1, x2, ..., xn),
and one example of fine-graining is to introduce m new degrees of freedom,
defining a new state s′ = (x1, x2, ..., xn, ..., xn+m). So a single state s in n-
dimensional space corresponds to an m-dimensional set in the fine-grained
(n+m)-dimensional space. In this way fine-graining can be thought of as
a one to many mapping, where a single state is replaced by a set of states.
Figure 2.5: Parallel,
divergent and conver-
gent structures.
The inverse operation is coarse-graining, and
this is done by means of an equivalence relation
∼, which allows one to express that multiple states
are ‘similar’ in some way. The equivalence relation
defines an equivalence class on the states, O/ ∼,
where all the states that are ‘similar’ are repre-
sented by a single state. One way this can be done
is by abstraction, where certain degrees of freedom
are dropped, so that only the other features of a
state are considered.
This offers a first step in making sense of how
path-dependence is sensitive to the grain of anal-
ysis adopted in a causal model. Going back to
the example of the evolution of the whale, what
is striking here is that there is both convergence towards a fish-like mor-
phology, and a divergence in other respects (such as bone-structure or
respiratory system). One way to analyze this is the following: the evo-
lutionary process can be represented as convergent evolution when the
aquatic mammal state (AM) and fish state (F) are characterized by a sin-
gle variable — their overall morphology; however, when the two states are
characterized by additional variables (bone-structure, respiratory system,
etc.), the evolutionary process is divergent. In the first case, the paths
F −M −AM and F −F −F converge; in the second, fine-graining intro-
duces path-dependence in the representation of the evolutionary process
(figure 2.6).
One can summarize the effects of the grain of analysis on causal struc-
ture by means of the following (a proof is provided in the appendix):
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Figure 2.6: Two representations of the evolution of the whale. The right
side representation models the evolutionary process in detail, and is path-
dependent. The left side one coarse-grains over the aquatic mammal state
(AM) and fish state (F), and represents the evolution of AM as (relatively)
path-independent.
Theorem 1. A coarse-graining of the explanandum makes an explanation
increasingly convergent and a coarse-graining of the explanans makes an
explanation increasingly divergent.
This theorem gives some deeper insight into why attractor landscapes
and causal trees are limited. In any attractor landscape, there is a count-
able number of privileged outcomes (attractor states), and each of these
outcomes will have an associated subset of the initial states (the basin).
When state space is described at a finer level of detail — e.g. when more
variables are needed to adequately describe each state — the convergence
of each basin on its respective attractor state will tend to decrease. A
given attractor state will be disambiguated between two different states,
each with its own basin. Ultimately, when the outcome states are de-
scribed with sufficient detail, there will be no convergent structures any
longer, only parallel structures, and the landscape metaphor disintegrates.
By contrast, the causal tree framework tends to be adequate as long
as the number of possible states is much greater relative to the number of
realized initial states, so that the probability of reticulations occurring is
small. For example, this occurs when the dimensionality of the state space
is relatively large. Taking the number of variables necessary to describe
an entity to be a proxy for the complexity of that entity, this can also
be formulated in terms of complexity. The dynamics of an individual,
complex entity is likely to be path-dependent. By coarse-graining the
state space (representing the complex entity abstractly) while keeping the
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number of initial states constant, the convergence of the network increases
monotonically, and the ‘tree-ness’ of the network decreases. In this way a
causal tree can be seen as the limiting case of a causal network when the
state space is much larger than the set of initial states.
2 The Symmetry Formulation
In this section I will propose how the concept of symmetry breaking can be
used to characterize path-dependence and historicity in causal networks.
The motivation for this proposal comes from the two main ways symmetry
is used in physics (see also Brading and Castellani (2007)). The first,
and most intuitive application of symmetries is to properties of a system,
usually spatial configurations. A spatial configuration is symmetrical when
it remains the same under some distance-preserving permutation of the
elements (reflections, inversions and rotations). For example, a snowflake
has some rotational symmetries (its appearance is unchanged when you
rotate it by a multiple of 30°), reflection symmetries and a point symmetry.
Similarly, a liquid has a maximal spatial symmetry: no matter how one
would rotate, invert or reflect it, it would look the same. Such symmetry
is broken during the transition to a solid: a particular molecular structure
arises which will typically only have a limited number of symmetries.
Symmetries are also applied to the dynamics of a system, i.e. the way
in which two subsequent states of a system relate to each other. Thus, in-
stead of transforming the physical elements of the system, the variables in
the laws of motion are transformed, and a symmetry is said to be present
when the laws of motion remain invariant. In other words, the transfor-
mation is a symmetry of the dynamics if the transformed variables are
related to each other in the same way as the untransformed variables are.
One well known example is the time symmetry of Newtonian dynamics:
because the second law gives a relation between the force and the second
time-derivative of position (i.e. the acceleration), it is invariant under the
transformation t → −t. Thus, if one were to see an animation of a group
of interacting particles, one could not tell by Newtonian dynamics alone
whether the animation was being played forwards or backwards. In ther-
modynamic phenomena this time symmetry is broken: heat flows from
warm to cold (the entropy increases), but never from cold to warm. A
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rewound heat flow does not obey the second law of thermodynamics.
Here I will extend the notion of symmetry to the space of possible
causal paths between past states and a particular outcome. A network
will be symmetrical when the different past states can be permuted with-
out affecting the causal structure of the network. Just as the snowflake
remains unaffected by rotations, path-independent causal networks remain
unaffected by permutations of past states (both initial and intermediary
states). In itself, this basic idea is not much more than a reformulation of
path-independence in the broad sense; however, it offers the resources to
deal with some of the shortcomings of the tree and landscape frameworks.
2.1 Symmetry
More formally, let Ps be the probability distribution over the outcomes
given that the system is in state s. One way to think of Ps is as the
probabilities of the different possible outcomes as ‘viewed from’ s. The
probability of any particular outcome o as viewed from s can be written as
the sum of the probabilities of the different possible paths between s and
o:
Ps(o) = P (o|s) =
∑
p
P (pos)
where the variable pos represents the possible paths between o and s. When
there is only a single initial state s0, one can assign an unconditional
probability to an outcome P (o) = Ps0(o). This is the case in causal trees;
however, in a general causal network, there is no unique way of specifying
the unconditional probability of an outcome.
Note that these probabilities need not imply any fundamental inde-
terminism. For example, in ecological systems of foraging rabbits, the
dynamics of how rabbits move around may not be fundamentally indeter-
ministic, and may be perfectly predictable if, for example, the position,
visual cues and neural states of the rabbits are perfectly known. Yet, we
may choose to ignore such details, and to characterize the state of a rab-
bit in terms of position only. This is obviously an underdetermination,
and multiple outcomes will be possible given the same position. In this
way, coarse-graining and even ignoring certain variables can give rise to
probabilistic causal relations (see Strevens 2003; Matthen 2009). For the
65
CHAPTER 2. THE SYMMETRY FRAMEWORK
purposes of this chapter the precise nature of these probabilities need not
concern us further, and we will treat them simply as given.
The notion of causal symmetry can be assigned different scopes, some
more local, others more global:
Definition (localized to time and outcome). A causal network is causally
symmetric towards outcome o at time t when the biases of any two
states s and s′ at time t towards o are equal: Ps(o) = Ps′(o).
This notion of symmetry is relevant for the question as to whether a
particular instant in the past matters for a particular outcome. When the
explanatory interest concerns the question whether any past state mat-
ters for a particular outcome, the following scope of symmetry is more
appropriate:
Definition (localized to outcome). A causal network is causally sym-
metric towards outcome o when the biases of any two states s and s′
towards an outcome o (at any time t) are equal: Ps = Ps′.
This type of symmetry corresponds most closely to how path-dependence
was formulated in the causal tree formulation, except that now an al-
lowance is made for multiple possible initial states. Symmetry can also be
localized to time alone:
Definition (localized to time). A causal network is causally symmetric
at time t when the biases of any two states s and s′ at time t (towards
any outcome o) are equal: Ps = Ps′.
Finally, a properly ‘global’ notion of symmetry can be formulated, as
to predicate path-dependence about an explanation as a whole, not just
an outcome: a network can be said to be causally symmetric when it is
causally symmetric at every time t (or equivalently, towards any outcome
o). This concept of global symmetry entails the three local notions of
symmetry, and the most localized notion of symmetry is implied by the
three others.
The transformation group associated with global symmetry is the group
of permutations of the past states at any given time. Global symmetry
arises when the conditional probability distribution over the outcomes re-
mains invariant under permutation of the past states at any given time.
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Figure 2.7 illustrates how these four scopes of symmetry can diverge.
First, the network is not globally symmetric, since, for example, P (o1|s4) =
1/2 6= 0 = P (o1|s5). Thus, in order to explain why o1 occurred, it is
relevant that s4 and not s5 occurred. However, the network is symmetric
with regards to some outcomes at some particular times. For example, at t5
the network is symmetric towards o2 as P (o2|s3) = P (o2|s4) = P (o2|s5) =
1/2. It does not matter what state the system is in at t5 to explain why
o2 occurred. Similarly, the network is symmetric towards o3 at t3.
Figure 2.7: An illustration of how the different notions of symmetry come
apart. Each state branches out in an equiprobable way.
Concerning the two other notions of symmetry, the network is sym-
metric at t3, as the biases of s1, s2 and s3 are equal towards any of the
outcomes oj . In an explanation of any outcome, it will not matter what
state the system was in at t3. Finally, the network is symmetric towards
o3. To explain why o3 occurred, it will not be necessary to integrate any
information about the past. Regardless of the path the system took, o3
would have occurred with probability 1/3.
Deepening the parallel with spatial symmetries, causal symmetry can
be given a geometric interpretation within a causal network. A network
is symmetric at time t if every state at that instant t branches out to all
descendant states in an identical way. Thus the branching pattern emitted
by one state must be mirrored by all other possible states at that time.
This basic pattern is represented in Figure 2.8, where the thickness of the
lines is a measure for the probability of the different transitions. Some
descendant states may be very improbable while others may be heavily
biased; what matters is that the biases are symmetric across the differ-
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ent initial states. At a symmetric instant in the network, the different
states can be exchanged and permuted without the causal structure being
affected.
Figure 2.8:
Fundamental
pattern of
symmetry.
This basic pattern of symmetry is both maximally di-
vergent and maximally convergent. It is maximally diver-
gent because each state branches out towards all possi-
ble descendant states; it is maximally convergent because
each descendant state is converged upon by all possible
predecessor states.
Anticipating the next section, where symmetry is
linked with path-independence, this fact suggests that
path-dependence is to be sought between the extremes of
perfect predictability and perfect unpredictability. Both
the perfectly predictable network — where all paths con-
verge onto a single outcome — and the perfectly unpre-
dictable network — where all states diverge maximally —
are ahistorical. Path-dependence requires some degree of
unpredictability, but maximal unpredictability contingency implies path-
independence. This is a concrete result that precludes any subsumption of
unpredictability contingency under historicity (e.g. Beatty (2006)).
An additional effect of the basic pattern of symmetry is one of eras-
ing history. In Figure 2.7, the network up until t3 could be replaced by
any arbitrary causal network without any difference being made to which
outcome obtains. This effect is encapsulated in the following result:
Theorem 2. If a causal network is symmetrical at t, it is also symmetric
at all prior instants. The bias of any state towards a given outcome is
shared throughout the states at any given time, and is preserved over time.
Thus a sufficient condition for global symmetry is that only the last causal
transition is symmetrical, i.e. each direct parent of the outcome states
branches out to all outcomes. Note that, given such a symmetrical struc-
ture, none of the past states affects the outcome, and hence there is no
history to erase, strictly speaking. History matters only to which interme-
diary states occur, and before the occurrence of the symmetrical pattern,
it is possible to reconstruct the past. Once a symmetrical pattern occurs,
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such reconstruction is impossible.7
A concrete example that could be represented by such a causal struc-
ture is mass extinctions. To the extent that one can idealize mass extinc-
tions as the random selection of certain phenotypes (without regard to
fitness), it is impossible to reconstruct the distribution of phenotypes be-
fore the mass extinction given the distribution after the extinction.8 Even
though non-symmetric processes may have dominated up until the point
of the mass extinction, once the mass extinction has taken place, the effect
of these processes on history is wiped out.
2.2 Symmetry Breaking
These different notions of symmetry are different ways in which the past
does not matter, different ways in which the system is independent of the
path taken. Path-dependence itself can be formulated as the breaking of
symmetry, and thus has different scopes as well.
Definition (Path-dependence - symmetry formulation). A causal network
is path-dependent relative to a certain scope if and only if the symmetry
relative to that scope has been broken.
In this way, a network may be globally path-dependent even though at
certain times it may be path-independent, or even though certain outcomes
may emerge in a path-independent way.
The attractor and causal tree formulations of path-dependence can be
seen as special cases of this more general definition. If a causal network
converges onto a global attractor, this means that any two states s and s′ at
any time t will lead to the outcome with probability 1: Ps(o) = P ′s(o) = 1.
Conversely, if the outcome is not a global attractor, there is at least one
possible state that is not in the basin of that outcome. In this case there
are at least two states s or s′ that have a different bias towards the outcome
at some time t: the symmetry towards o is broken.
7Another implication is that while history may matter for the occurrence of some
intermediary state, it is impossible for history to matter for an outcome at some time
in the past but not ultimately (compare with Desjardins 2015).
8In this way, while mass extinctions introduce contingency into evolution (as fa-
mously emphasized by Gould 1989), to the extent that they make the reconstruction of
the past more difficult, they actually remove some degree of historicity.
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Figure 2.9: Unconditional probabilities of outcomes vs. path-dependence.
In the tree-framework, path-dependence was limited to comparing pos-
sible paths leading to one of a number of possible outcomes. The require-
ments of the causal tree formulation of path-dependence – there must be
multiple possible outcomes (i.e. so that convergence can only be partial),
and that paths towards some outcome affect the probability of the out-
come – are captured within the negation of symmetry (localized to time
and outcome). These requirements can be deduced by the condition that
at least two states on different paths have a different bias towards the
outcome.
The significance of this definition may be further illustrated by point-
ing out what it does not entail. First, it does not entail that no outcome is
probabilistically privileged. Some outcomes may be more likely than oth-
ers, and yet the network is symmetrical; all outcomes may be equiprobable,
and the network path-dependent (Figure 2.9). The unconditional proba-
bility of an outcome is irrelevant; what matters is whether the conditional
probabilities are equal or not.
A second orthogonal distinction is between path-dependence and the
probabilities of the paths. The occurrence of an outcome may be path-
independent, even though some paths may be heavily biased. For example,
on the left side of Figure 2.9, there are three possible paths towards o1.
Even if the system may be much more likely to pass by s1 than the other
intermediary states (e.g. x = 0.98 and y = z = 0.01), P (o1|si) = 1/2 for
each intermediary state si. History does not matter: it makes no difference
whether the system takes the s1 path or the s2 path, in each case o1 will
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Figure 2.10: Symmetry towards o2 is broken, even though all paths to o2
equiprobable.
obtain with probability 1/2.
Thus, in a path-independent network it may be possible to recon-
struct the past; conversely, retrodictability may be impossible in a path-
dependent network. Such is the case in Figure 2.10, where the two possible
paths towards o2 are equiprobable, but yet where the symmetry is broken
at the intermediate states since P (o2|s1) = 2/3 6= 1/3 = P (o2|s2).
There is no retrodictability here since, given that the system is in o2,
it is equiprobable that the system passed through s1 as through s2.9 The
relation between retrodictability and path-dependence will be taken up
again in the final section, but since this result may seem puzzling here,
one can illustrate it with an example. Say that s1 represents ‘financial
crisis’ and s2 represents the avoidance of a financial crisis. The outcome
state o2 is a state of revolution. A financial crisis may be very improbable,
but yet, once it occurs, revolution may be very likely. Conversely, a revo-
lution may occur spontaneously with a very small likelihood. Even though
these two paths may be equiprobable, if society actually were to undergo
a financial crisis, any historian could integrate this information to explain
the outcome.
9By Bayes’ rule, P (s1|o2) = P (o2|s1)P (s1)P (o2) =
2/3·1/3
4/9
= 1/2.
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Figure 2.11: Weak global attractor: convergence and path-dependence.
2.3 Symmetry Preservation and Restoration
An additional advantage of the symmetry formulation is that it can dis-
tinguish between different scopes of path-dependence. Certain parts of a
causal network may behave in a path-independent way, even though the
network as a whole is path-dependent. The past may not matter in the
causal explanation of a particular outcome, but yet may matter in the ex-
planation of the set of outcomes. Or, the evolution of the system may be
path-independent until a certain moment in time, after which the causal
network becomes path-dependent. Path-dependence (localized to time)
can emerge at a particular instant in the causal network.
Two combinations are of particular interest: cases where symmetry
towards a particular outcome is preserved, despite global symmetry being
broken, and cases where global symmetry is restored for a subset of the
causal network. An example of the first is represented in Figure 2.11. Here
the outcome o is a global attractor in the sense that all possible initial states
can evolve towards o, and the occurrence of o is path-independent as all
prior states are equally biased towards o. Yet global symmetry is broken
in the network as a whole.
Such a state o can be termed a weak global attractor : a state that
remains a possibility with a fixed probability regardless of the path the
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Figure 2.12: The ancestral monkey population (AM) branches into
quadrupedal monkey (QM) and ape (A). The latter state has the ca-
pacity to evolve any limb ratio; the former can only keep the 1:1 ratio.
system takes. When a weak global attractor is present in a network, a
local symmetry is preserved, even though the global symmetry may be
broken.
The second case of particular interest concerns states that branch out
towards all possible descendant states in an equiprobable way. Evolvability
would be a concrete example of this causal structure.10 For example, in
most mammals, forelimb and hindlimb are locked by certain developmental
constraints in a 1:1 ratio. A species can evolve longer hindlimbs only
if the forelimbs grow by the same amount. However, in ancestral ape
populations, a proper subset of quadrupedal monkeys, this constraint was
relaxed, to allow for different possible ratios. A more formal representation
would look something like figure 2.12.
Once the intermediary state A is realized, which outcome state (limb
ratio) actually reached depends on the environment. In an extreme case, if
absolutely no information about A’s environment is available, all possible
outcomes are to be modelled as equiprobable. This means that once A
occurs, it no longer matters for the outcome what preceded that state. The
causal network emanating from A constitutes a symmetrical causal tree.
To the extent some outcomes can be privileged over others, symmetry
is only restored to a certain degree (see next section). In either case,
the state A can be thought of as a ‘flexible’ state: it partially restores
10The analysis given by Brown (2014) can be seen as dealing with this causal structure.
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symmetry, limited to a subset of the whole causal network. Thus, while
global symmetry once broken cannot ever be restored, global symmetry
can be locally restored (to a certain degree).
3 Degree of Path-dependence
No account of path-dependence can be considered complete without giv-
ing some criterion of how history matters more in some processes than in
others. We will focus only on how to quantify path-dependence according
to how informationally relevant the past is for the outcomes. As already
mentioned, a possible alternative way to measure path-dependence could
be by quantifying how much an outcome changes if past states are changed.
This would require the introduction of a separate metric (presumably de-
pendent on explanatory interests) of what it means for outcomes to be close
or distant, with associated problems (see section II). Instead, the focus will
be on quantifying the degree of information given by the past in such a
way that is consistent with the account of path-dependence presented thus
also far.
3.1 Prediction and Retrodiction
In this approach, path-dependence is closely related to predictability and
retrodictability in the following sense. An outcome is more predictable if
a past state contains more information about which outcome will occur.
Likewise, the past is retrodictable from the present if the outcome contains
information about which causal path had been followed.
However, path-dependence precludes both perfect predictability and
perfect unpredictability. Recall how a convergent network is perfectly pre-
dictable but path-independent, and a maximally divergent network is un-
predictable but is also path-independent. In deciding then whether or not
a network is path-dependent , it is thus irrelevant whether the outcome
can or cannot be predicted from a past state.
The same point can be made about retrodictability. Thus it may be
possible to know with fair certainty what causal path the system has
followed, but for the network still to be symmetrical and hence path-
independent. In Figure 2.9, we can know with fair certainty, given o1,
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that the system passed through s1, even though passing through s1 did
not affect the probability of o1. Retrodictability is possible despite path-
independence towards o1. Conversely, the outcome state may not contain
any information about which causal path was followed, and yet the net-
work can be path-dependent. This is the case in Figure 2.10, where both
paths leading to o2 are equiprobable, but where the choice between s1 and
s2 affects the probability of the outcome.
The relation between predictability (retrodictability) and path-dependence
can be made more precise by observing that the amount of information the
past contains about the present is not relevant for path-dependence, but
rather that the past contributes to predictability. Thus, in a network con-
verging on a single outcome, the outcome is perfectly predictable regardless
of whether the precise past state is known. However, knowing the past does
not contribute any information not already contained by the structure of
the causal network. Neither does it matter how much information the
present contains about the past, but only how much the present affects
retrodictability. In Figure 2.10, knowing which of the two intermediary
states is reached helps to predict which of the three outcomes is likely to
occur, whereas knowing which outcome occurred affects retrodictability.
One may wonder here if contribution to predictability and contribution
to retrodictability are equivalent. If they were not equivalent, one would
need to distinguish between two measures of path-dependence: a forward-
oriented and a past-oriented measure. However, it is straightforward to
show that they are equivalent.
Assume the past does not affect predictability, then the probability
of an outcome conditional on an earlier state is simply the unconditional
probability: P (oj |s) = P (oj). Thus, in a network where the past does not
contribute to predictability, the conditional probability of an outcome is
equal to the unconditional probability. Similarly, it is the contribution of
the present to the retrodictability of the past that matters. It does not
matter when P (s|oj) = P (s) for every previous state s of a given outcome
oj . We would want to show that if P (oj |s) = P (oj) for every outcome oj
and intermediate state s, then P (s|oj) = P (s) (and vice versa).
From Bayes’ rule,
P (s|oj) = P (oj |s)P (s)
P (oj)
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and the desired result follows from the assumption that the past does not
affect predictability. Thus it is impossible for the past to affect predictabil-
ity without the present affecting retrodictability, and vice versa.
3.2 Mutual Information
Predictability is the lack of uncertainty of what the outcome state will
be. Thus maximal unpredictability corresponds to a uniform probability
distribution over the possible outcomes; maximal predictability assigns
probability 1 to a single outcome and zero to the rest. In this way the
conditional entropy of a set of outcome states O given a past state s,
Hs(O) = −
∑
o
Ps(o) logPs(o) = −
∑
o
P (o|s) logP (o|s),
is a good measure for how predictable the outcomes seem from the per-
spective of past state s. It has a number of desirable properties: it is
maximal for a uniform distribution, and zero when one of the outcomes is
certain. A different conditional entropy, of O given a set of past states S
at time t is obtained by taking the weighted average over the states in S:
H(O|S) =
∑
s
P (s)Hs(O).
If it is known with certainty which state s ∈ S occurred, then H(O|S) =
Hs(O).
The extent to which uncertainty is reduced by knowing which past
states s ∈ S occurred — the quantity, we have argued, relevant to path-
dependence as symmetry breaking — is measured by the mutual infor-
mation between the outcome states O and the set of past states S at some
instant t:
I(O;S) =
∑
o,s
p(o, s) log
p(o, s)
p(o)p(s)
(2.1)
Note that this formulation of mutual information is a measure of path-
dependence localized to a particular instant in the causal network. Analo-
gous measures can be formulated for the other notions of symmetry (both
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local and global); however, the measure 2.1 is sufficient to extract the
philosophically interesting properties.
Mutual information is consistent with the symmetry account of path-
dependence in many different respects. First, mutual information is non-
negative I(O;S) ≥ 0, and zero if and only if the causal network is sym-
metric at s ∈ S. This can be seen as follows. If the network is symmetric
at s, then for any given outcome state o and s∗ ∈ S: p(o|s) = p(o|s∗) .
From this and Theorem 2 can be deduced that these conditional probabil-
ities are equal for all ancestor nodes, including any of the initial states s0:
p(o|s) = p(o|s0) = p(o). In this case p(o, s) = p(o|s)p(s) = p(o)p(s) and
hence
I(O;S) =
∑
o,s
p(o)p(s) log 1
= 0
The mutual information is zero. The opposite also holds true: if mutual
information is zero between O and S, then p(o, s) = p(o)p(s) for every
s ∈ S.11 This implies symmetry.
Second, the claim that path-dependence is to be measured by information-
contribution rather than information-content is underlined by the relation
between mutual information and Shannon entropy.12 Mutual information
represents the information gain represented by an intermediate state:
I(O;S) = H(O)−H(O|S) (2.2)
Thus, the degree of path-dependence is measured by the reduction in the
uncertainty of the outcome states when information about later interme-
diary states S is integrated. Path-independence arises when there is no
change in entropy content.
This suggests another way of viewing this aspect of path-dependence,
in terms of the divergence of probability distributions. Mutual information
can be expressed as the degree by which the unconditional p(O) and the
11For the derivation, see e.g. Cover and Thomas 2006, Ch. 2.
12See Cover and Thomas 2006.
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conditional distribution p(O|S) diverge.13 When there is no divergence,
p(O|S) = p(O) and the outcome states are independent of the past states
S. Thus also in this respect, mutual information seems to be a natural
operationalization of the symmetry formulation of path-dependence.
Third, mutual information is symmetric, i.e. I(O;S) = I(S;O). This
means that the present is relevant for the past in exactly the same way that
the past is relevant for the present. This allows the previous arguments
about the relation between path-dependence and predictability to be rep-
resented more formally. Here follows the case for predictability; identical
reasoning can be applied to retrodictability (where Ho(S) is the relevant
measure for retrodictability). Perfect unpredictability means that the con-
ditional entropy of the outcome states O is maximal, at any given set of
past states S. This means that the unconditional entropy H(O), which,
in our framework, is the conditional entropy given the initial states S0,
is also maximal. Hence the mutual information I(O;S) is zero, implying
path-independence. Perfect predictability implies that the unconditional
entropy Hs(O) is zero at every past s; hence I(O;S) is likewise zero.
This operationalization allows for information-theoretic analyses of path-
dependence. Two interesting lines of inquiry for further research can be
pointed to. A first concerns how mutual information changes as the grain
of analysis changes. Thus, in the introduction we outlined how the path-
dependence of a process depended on how both the initial states and the
outcome states were described. The same process could be described as
path-dependent and as path-independent. We already showed how fine-
graining and coarse-graining had an effect on the convergence and diver-
gence of a network; hence, one would expect the fine-graining of the out-
comes to increase mutual information and thus path-dependence. With
this in mind, we can conjecture that describing the outcome states at a
more detailed grain of analysis increases the degree of path-dependence:
13The technical expression is that mutual information is the expectation, given S,
of the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distribution p(O) and the conditional
distribution p(O|S):
I(O;S) = ES [DKL(p(o|s)||p(o)] .
This is simply a quantitative expression of the how much the conditional probability
distribution is expected to diverge from the unconditional distribution, ‘from the per-
spective’ of some time in the past.
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In a given causal network (O, I,R), if O = {o1, o2, . . . , on} is
fine-grained toO′ = {o11, . . . , o1k1 , o21, . . . , o2k2 , . . . , on1, . . . , onkn},
then I(O′;S) ≥ I(O;S).
The second line of inquiry would be to investigate how mutual infor-
mation changes over time, and how it is affected by symmetry breaking.14
For example, an interesting consequence of the nonnegativity of mutual
information is that, through equation (2.2), the conditional entropy at
some set of past states is never greater than the unconditional entropy:
H(O) ≥ H(O|S). The entropy H(O) can be thought of as the uncertainty
on the distribution of outcome states without knowing anything about the
past (i.e. the difficulty in reconstructing the outcome distribution). In this
way the inequality means that ‘information never hurts’: knowing some-
thing about past states may turn out to be useless, but will never increase
the uncertainty over the outcome states.
What is of interest is how the conditional entropy evolves over time
H(O|S). While a analysis in full generality is beyond the scope of this
chapter, two simple cases can be mentioned. The first concerns the case
where a network remains symmetric until some intermediate set of states
S, after which the symmetry is broken. From (2) follows that the mutual
information is zero at all past states S∗ before S, and from (2.2), this means
that H(O) = H(O|S∗). Thus the conditional entropy remains constant
until the breaking of the symmetry, after which it monotonically decreases.
This is the same result, derived by different means, as in theorem 2.
A second simple case is when the network is a causal tree. HereH(O) =
H(O|S0) (since there is only one initial state), and each branching even
creates a sub-tree. Hence H(O) = H(O|S0) ≥ H(O|S1) ≥ H(O|S2) . . . ,
and conditional entropy monotonically decreases over time. In a branching
tree, later states always contain more information about the outcome than
the initial states do.
14See Sober and Steel (2011) for a related analysis of entropy change in Markov
models. Since causal networks are Markovian, many of their results would also be
applicable here.
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Figure 2.13: Decrease
of entropy, despite
uniformity.
Such a result may seem counterintuitive at
first. Cannot a network start off with a bias to-
wards some outcomes, and then evolve towards
a uniform distribution, such as in Figure 2.13?
Would this not increase the conditional entropy?
The answer is that the network does not evolve
towards a uniform distribution over all possi-
ble outcomes. The evolution towards uniformity
is outweighed by the fact that any branch will
have some inaccessible outcomes. Thus, while s0
branches out to four different outcomes, s1 and s2
branch out to only two different outcomes. The
entropy of four equiprobable outcomes is log 4, whereas the entropy of
two equiprobable outcomes is log 2. In this case, H(O|S) = log 2 and
H(O|S0) = 23 log 3 + 13 log 6 > log 2. In this way, entropy also decreases
here over time.
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Appendix
Theorem 1. A coarse-graining of the explanandum makes an explanation
increasingly convergent and a coarse-graining of the explanans makes an
explanantion increasingly divergent. s
Proof. We will prove it for an explanation that is purely parallel, thus
neither convergent nor divergent. The generalization for a random expla-
nation holds analogously.
Assume a deterministic explanation (O, I, f), so that f is a bijection
f : I → O. Define an equivalence relation ∼ on O such that o1 ∼ o2 iff
o1, o2 ∈ A for some A (dependent on theoretical interests) with #A > 1.
Because f is a bijection there exists a uniquely defined B ∈ I such that
f(B) = A. Call B the ‘basin’ and A the ‘attractor’ of f on I.
Then O/A represents a coarse-graining of the explanandum and I/B a
coarse-graining of the explanans. So define an associated function Rc : I →
#O/A : i 7→ f(i) and relation Rd ∈ I/B×O = (f−1(o), o)|o ∈ O. Because
f is a bijection, #I = #O > #O/A and #O = #I > #I/B, and hence
Rc will be a non-injective surjection, and Rd a non-function. Hence the
number convergent structures has increased in explanation (O/A, I,Rc),
and the number of divergent structures has increased in (O, I/B,Rd).
Theorem 2. Let (O, I,R) be symmetrical at some instant in time. Then
(O, I,R) is symmetric at all prior instants.
Proof. Assume (O, I,R) is symmetric at time t, corresponding to the set
of intermediate states S. Let S′ represent some earlier generation of states.
From the local symmetry of (O, I,R) at S we can deduce that P (o|s∗) =
p ∈ [0, 1] for all s∗ ∈ S.
Take a random predecessor state s′ ∈ S′. Assume it branches out to a
number of states s∗ ∈ S. Then
P (o|s′) =
∑
s∗
P (o|s∗)P (s∗|s′)
= p
∑
s∗
P (s∗|s′)
= p
81
CHAPTER 2. THE SYMMETRY FRAMEWORK
since the sum of the probabilities of all paths leaving s′ is 1. Thus the
network is symmetric at S′.
This also means that the bias p towards outcome o is preserved as long
as the network remains symmetric.
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Chapter 3
Ambiguity in Contingency
Claims
In the previous chapter we saw how structures of path-dependence could
be analyzed in causal networks; we will now outline how this could be
applied to interpretations of evolutionary history. Interpretations of evo-
lutionary history draw on hypotheses concerning causal mechanisms and
possibility space in order to argue for a certain representations of evolu-
tionary history, which then in turn ground claims about the contingency
of evolutionary outcomes. The purpose of this chapter will be to show
how these representations, which often remain only implicitly stated, can
be explicitly formalized as causal networks. However, even then, causal
networks may remain underdescribed, so that different claims about the
contingency of outcomes may remain possible.
In the first two sections I will argue that the Gouldian and convergence-
centric interpretations are ambiguous and that their contingency claims
are insufficiently supported. This will require a certain reconstruction of
Gould’s and Conway Morris’s arguments, since neither is explicit about
their precise assumptions, or systematic about how precisely they under-
stand the structure of evolutionary history (even though Conway Morris,
in situating evolutionary history within hyperspaces, makes this recon-
struction easier). I will try to carry out this reconstruction as neutrally as
possible, and thus support it with textual evidence where relevant.
Once reconstructed with some more formal precision, I will then show
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how both Gould’s and Conway Morris’s interpretations of evolutionary
history do not support the claims they make about the contingency of
evolutionary outcomes. Further assumptions would be needed, and these
assumptions are controversial.
In a final section I will further systematize this critical analysis, and
point to two general errors in drawing conclusions about the contingency
of evolutionary outcomes. The first stems from using the probability of
an outcome as a surrogate for the contingency of an outcome; the second
from specifying the space of initial states with insufficient precision.
1 The Gouldian Interpretation
1.1 The Disparity Reduction Argument
Let us recapitulate the two informal arguments that we took in the intro-
duction to underpin the Gouldian interpretation. The first – termed the
‘disparity reduction’ argument – is that certain developmental constraints
that occurred early on in evolution affected all subsequent evolution; in par-
ticular, the selection of body plans without regard to adaptiveness during
the mass extinctions of the Paleozoic constrained all subsequent evolution-
ary trajectories. In this way the initial large degree of disparity (number of
distinct body plans defining a phylum) was irreversibly diminished, despite
the increase in diversity of species later on in evolution.
The second is that there may be large-scale trends in measures such
as complexity, but that this is simply the result of random exploration
of biological possibilities, not of a causal bias towards higher complexity.
Life started out from minimal complexity; hence it is inevitable that, given
enough time, living organisms with higher complexity emerge. This trend
can be expected even if evolutionary trajectories only randomly explore
the space of possibilities. I call this the ‘random walk’ (from a left wall)
argument.
Gould himself provides us with a phylogeny that illustrates the phe-
nomenon of disparity reduction (Figure 3.1). He also illustrates the phe-
nomenon with the following metaphorical characterization of evolutionary
history (‘Life’): “Life is a copiously branching bush, continually pruned by
the grim reaper of extinction, not a ladder of predictable progress” (Gould
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Figure 3.1: Disparity is at its maximum at the dashed line, and reduces
thereafter due to a mass extinction event, or a sequence of such events.
Diversity recovers to previous levels; disparity does not. (Reproduced with
permission from Gould 1989.)
1989: 35).
What is crucial here is that the increase in disparity corresponds to an
initial divergence in paths, mass extinctions cause most of these paths to
stop at a certain point in time, and the few lineages that survive the mass
extinctions go on to branch out once again (Figure 3.2).
However, by itself Figure 2 is insufficient to draw precise conclusions
about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes. For that, we would need
to know what would have happened if disparity reduction had occurred
differently. What if different body plans had survived? Gould is very
clear here: “any replay of the tape would lead evolution down a pathway
radically different from the road actually taken” (1989: 51).
The only way this is possible is if the number of possible outcomes
that living entities can conceivably attain is vastly larger than the number
outcomes actually attained by evolution – a view so common as to be
almost uncontroversial (Wright 1932; Kauffman 1993; Lenski 2004; Louis
2016; Smith 1970). The same view seems to underlie various statements
made by Gould, for example, on the number of possible trajectories (1989:
50) or the long time it took for multicellularity to develop as evidence for
“a vast realm of unrealized possibilities” (1989: 310).
In this way, we can place actual phylogeny (represented by Figure 3.1)
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Figure 3.2: Disparity Reduction: an initial divergence is followed by subse-
quent divergences in a small fraction of lineages (with perhaps some limited
convergences, such as the convergence towards o)
into the space of possible evolutionary paths (Figure 3.3), thus obtain-
ing a representative causal network that condenses the disparity-reduction
argument.
Note that Figure 3.3 is an interpretation of Figure 3.1 in the sense
that it entails decisions about the degree of overlap between the possible
divergences of evolution (shaded areas) with the actual divergence of paths
(solid black area). If the space OP was much smaller, one would expect
an overlap to be more likely, but this is not necessary. As long as OA is
a proper subset of OP , even a small possibility space would result in a
similar causal network to that in Figure 3. Nonetheless, assuming there is
no overlap is very plausible in the absence of convergent dynamics and if
OP is vastly larger than OA – as is the case by multiple estimations, see
below.
In this way, the step from Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.3 involves two assump-
tions: (1) biased branching towards OA is unlikely since natural selection
will not be able to overcome the developmental constraints obtained dur-
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Figure 3.3: An initial divergence to maximum disparity is followed by a
reduction in the number of actual lineages, followed by renewed divergence.
Given the vast size of the set of possible outcomes (OP ), the set of actual
outcomes (OA) is likely to have no overlap with the sets of outcomes that
could have evolved had the reduction in disparity occurred differently.
ing disparity reduction, and (2) the size of OP is vastly larger than OA,
so that unbiased branching into is OA also unlikely. Given these two as-
sumptions, Figure 3.3 serves as an interpretation of Figure 3.1, in the sense
that it places actual evolutionary history within a causal network of pos-
sible evolutionary histories. It is the latter that allows claims about the
contingency of outcomes to be made.
More specifically, Figure 3.3 allows the nature of the contingency of
outcomes to be read off from the symmetries present. At the initial state
there is a symmetry towards all outcome states. This means that given
the initial state of life, there is no favoured or privileged state. However,
this symmetry is broken during disparity reduction, and the symmetry is
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never restored. A bias towards OA emerges. In this way, in the Gouldian
interpretation, an initially uniform probability distribution over outcomes
gives way to a probability distribution that is spiked in favor of OA. Or,
in information-theoretic terms, the mutual information between outcome
states and states after reduction in disparity is positive.
Some nuances can be added to this paradigmatic causal network. First,
this pattern of symmetry-breaking can be repeated again and again after
the disparity-reduction event. This means that the intermediary state (or
states) reached after disparity reduction could again function as initial
state, from which a structurally similar evolutionary pattern could result.
In other words, the pattern of symmetry-breaking could repeat itself over
time in a self-similar way, at increasingly fine-grained levels of analysis.
Gould focuses on disparity reduction, since a body plan – determined
by a number of factors, such as number of limbs, body segmentation,
symmetry (see e.g. Gilbert 2000) – represents a major developmental
constraint, and is difficult or impossible for selection to entirely overcome;
however, there is a great variety of possible developmental constraints (and
other types of constraint) which could induce further breaks in the sym-
metry. Such symmetry breaks could be less dramatic as a choice between
body plans, and instead of making an area of possibility space inaccessible,
they could merely make it less probable.
Second, Figure 3.3 does not preclude the possibility of convergent evo-
lution. Within the solid black area, a number of evolutionary trajectories
could independently arrive at a single outcome in OA. However, such con-
vergence is clearly limited, and does not diminish the contingency of the
convergent outcome by much: evolutionary trajectories passing through
the shaded areas could not converge on that outcome in OA.
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1.2 The Random Walk Argument
Figure 3.4: Symmetrical
network diverging from
single initial state.
Gould’s argument about large-scale trends can
be formalized in different ways. The first
would be to represent the diffusive process
as a perfectly symmetrical network emanat-
ing from a single initial state, and steadily ex-
panding to include the entire space of possibil-
ity. Such an expanding symmetrical network
would trace all the possible paths a given lin-
eage could take (simplified in Figure 3.4). A
second, more coarse-grained representation of
the range of expected evolutionary paths could
be represented by some diverging cone over
time1 (Figure 3.6).
In itself, the causal network implied by
Gould’s ‘diffusion from left wall’ argument is
not very informative: a lot of information
about the complexity of outcome states is not represented in the figures
above. Hence, a third representation that captures some of the more in-
teresting features would be to use the measure of complexity to induce
an equivalence class on the outcome states, and hence another way of
representing the evolution of complexity over time would be to count the
number of lineages at a given quantity of complexity at a given time2. This
gives a frequency distribution that both rises in height over time as well
as becomes increasingly right-skewed (see introductory chapter).
What would change in Figure 3.5 if the tape of life were to be replayed
1This assumes that an initial state is more likely to branch out towards states ‘closer’
to the initial state. In a random walk – the simplest model of a diffusion process – the
system is defined by a single variable, and the initial state can only branch out to its
direct neighbours. Gould never goes into detail as to how precisely he understands
the dynamics of a similar diffusive process in evolutionary history, but he assumes an
‘expanding variation’. Representing this as an expanding cone can be seen as Gouldian
in spirit.
2Note that we pass over how precisely ‘complexity’ should be defined – a contentious
issue that we do not need go into here. Whatever the definition, the important thing
the definition should do is to allow the different degrees of complexity to partition the
space of possibility into different non-overlapping zones.
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Figure 3.5: A diffusive process where variation steadily expands over time.
(from the same initial condition, but with different intermediate states)? In
keeping with the disparity-reduction argument, assume symmetry-breaks
lead to something like the following figure:
Note that this causal network is structurally identical to the one repre-
sented in Figure 3.3, and can be taken as the causal network that represents
both of Gould’s arguments.
Further, the divergence between the cones in Figure 3.6 masks the fact
that degrees of complexity are similarly represented in the range of actual
outcome states (OA) as they would have been in some alternative range of
outcome states (OALT ). This is an illustration of how the contingency of
an outcome is description-dependent: defined solely in terms of degree of
complexity, the outcomes states are not contingent on past trajectories. In
other words, there is a convergence of the totality of evolutionary trajecto-
ries onto an ensemble of trajectories where the degrees of complexity follow
a right-skewed frequency distribution. This convergence is represented vi-
sually in the figure below (where ONP = OP × OP × · · · × OP represents
the possibility space for N lineages).
Note, however, that according to Gould the convergence onto ORSD
is not due to any bias towards higher complexity in individual evolution-
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Figure 3.6: The range of actual outcome states (OA) covers all degrees
of complexity, even though a range of alternative outcome states (OALT )
would do so as well.
ary trajectories. There is no evolutionary mechanism causing individual
trajectories to evolve towards higher states of complexity3. Rather, the
convergence onto ORSD is simply due to the fact that it is the most prob-
able outcome state for the ensemble of trajectories undergoing a diffusive
process. Roughly, on the space of possible outcomes (OP ), ORSD occupies
the most volume, and hence any random path will likely end up OP .4
3It is a result of “random motion from a simple beginning, not directed impetus
toward inherently advantageous complexity” (Gould 1996: 173).
4This way of representing it draws on how diffusion is represented in microcanonical
ensembles. The diffusion of gas molecules throughout a container occurs spontaneously
because the number of ways in which gas molecules can be uniformly distributed across
the whole container, is much greater than the number of ways in which gas molecules
may be non-uniformly distributed, for example by being compressed into some subset of
the container. In this way, the zone in phase space corresponding to uniform distribution
of gas molecules occupies by far the most volume in phase space, and hence the system
will evolve towards this zone with overwhelming probability.
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Figure 3.7: Gould’s diffusion-from-a-left-wall argument implies a conver-
gence from the set of initial states of minimal complexity (IMC) onto the
set of outcome states with right-skewed distributions over degrees of com-
plexity (ORSD).
Summary
In this way, the Gouldian interpretation of evolutionary history has two
complementary elements: first, the continual breaking of symmetries by
the emergence of ‘frozen accidents’ which constrain evolutionary trajecto-
ries, and second, an increase in complexity by diffusion from a left wall. As
Gould notes, the inevitable increase in complexity allows for considerable
contingency in the evolution of individual lineages:
The right tail had to exist, but the actual composition of crea-
tures on the tail is utterly unpredictable, partly random, and
entirely contingent—not at all foreordained by the mechanisms
of evolution. If we could replay the game of life again and
again, always starting at the left wall and expanding there-
after in diversity, we would get a right tail almost every time,
92
but the inhabitants of this region of greatest complexity would
be wildly and unpredictably different in each rendition (Gould
1996:175).
In other words, the precise outcome of OP is maximally contingent
while the evolutionary outcome in (which represents the evolutionary out-
come of all N trajectories) is not so contingent and converges onto ORSD.
For this reason, Figures 3.6 and 3.3 are perfectly compatible, and for pur-
poses here, may be considered the representative causal network of the
Gouldian interpretation.
We may further map the assumptions of the Gouldian interpretation
according to how the initial and outcome state spaces, and the transition
biases are specified. The only transition biases Gould integrates are biases
arising from evolutionary constraints (such developmental constraints5) –
biases arising from the mechanism of natural selection do not significantly
affect the contingency of the outcome6. For this reason, the only dynam-
ical principles underlying Gould’s representation of evolutionary history
are either (1) constraints which are themselves contingent occurrences in
evolution, and, in the absence of constraints, (2) a random walk or diffu-
sion.
Further, Gould has a double characterization of outcome space: (1)
as morphological space (OP ), and (2) as the space of possible frequency
distributions of lineages over degrees of complexity (ONP ). In the disparity-
reduction argument, he assumes that OP is so vast that constraints im-
posed early on will likely not lead to any convergence in the attained set
of outcomes. In the random walk argument, he assumes that ORSD is so
large that it occupies most of ONP . In this way, any given attained set of
outcomes will most likely have a right-skewed distribution in degrees of
complexity.
5See chapter 4 for a more in-depth discussion of the variety of evolutionary con-
straints.
6Even though Gould does not deny the possibility of convergent evolution, he plays
down its significance for the contingency of evolutionary outcomes.
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1.3 Ambiguity in Outcome Space
We will now argue how these assumptions are ambiguous, and in fact allow
for different conclusions concerning contingency to be drawn. According to
how details are filled in concerning outcome space – pertaining to the size
of OP , and to the size of ORSD relative to OP – we obtain contradictions,
and claims about the contingency of outcome states (and contingency of a
trend in complexity) are left insufficiently supported.
First, in arguing that the distribution of complexity for all species
should get an increased skew over time, Gould reasons that “since space re-
mains available away from the left wall and toward the direction of greater
complexity, new species occasionally wander into this previously unoccupied
domain” (Gould 1996: 171, my emphasis). However, it is not uncontrover-
sial to assume that new species may occasionally wander into unoccupied
domains of complexity. If the number of existing species is vastly smaller
than the number of species that could exist at minimal complexity, it is
possible that all of evolutionary history would take place entirely within
the domain of minimal complexity.
Slightly simplifying the problem, assume that m1 represents the maxi-
mal occupancy for the first degree of complexity, m2 for the second, and so
on. Hence, as the number of species N increases over time, once N > m1
there will necessarily be a ‘spill-over’ effect, and the second degree of com-
plexity will no longer be unoccupied. This shows that the increase of
complexity is inevitable as the number of species increases over time.
However, what is the value of m1? As an illustration, it is also a
mathematical truth that, given enough time, a pot of boiling water will
spontaneously freeze, as a thermodynamic ensemble explores all the pos-
sible microstates available to it. However, there is a catch: one will need
to wait several times the expected lifetime of the universe for this to occur
even once. Similarly, who is to say that m1 is not so high that we could
still be waiting – some 4 billion years after life began – for life to exit the
bacterial mode? (Of course, then there would have been no observer to
get impatient in the first place: see the discussion on observer selection
effects.) Gould is entirely silent on this crucial issue. In fact, if m1 turned
out to be astronomically high, this would constitute good evidence for the
hypothesis for a non-random exploration of the possibilities.
Analyzing the increase in complexity in terms of maximal occupancy
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may capture the main idea but is somewhat simplistic. Gould is not claim-
ing a spill-over into increased complexity, but a probabilistic increase in
complexity. A particular zone of complexity need not be fully occupied
before some lineage starts exploring the zone of higher complexity. How-
ever, even then, the volume that the minimal complexity zone occupies
in possibility space is inversely related to the probability of a lineage ever
exiting that zone.
As an example, consider protein folding, the process by which a pro-
tein changes the angle between amino acids in order to settle on a spatial
configuration.7 Such protein folding is necessary for proteins to carry out
biological functions, and has a vast outcome space, with roughly 10150
possible spatial configurations for a protein of length of 150 (Louis 2016,
Levinthal 1969). Louis notes that, at a sampling rate of 1013 tries per
second, it would take 10120 times the age of the universe (1017 seconds) to
sample all possibilities. Yet, in experiments, proteins settle on a particular
spatial configuration within microseconds. He dubs this ‘Levinthal’s para-
dox’, after its originator, and locates the origin of the paradox in a false
assumption:
Taking for granted that searching through the space of protein
configurations is like looking for a needle in a haystack or like
finding a hole on a very large flat golf course: each configuration
is equally likely to be scrutinized. (Louis 2016: 112)
This argument assumes that certain life forms are ‘adjacent’ to com-
plexity increases while others are no. This assumption is based on the
thought that the dynamics of a true random walk should consist of a ran-
dom permutation of the organismic structure of a lineage. This permuta-
tion is indifferent to complexity: some permutations will lead to complex-
ity increases, others to decreases, and most permutations will presumably
entail no change in complexity. Further, some structures need more per-
mutations from others to achieve complexity increase; i.e., some structures
7In estimates of the number of possible organism configurations, protein spaces are
often taken as surrogates, since their size is easier to estimate. Spaces of possible
organism configurations are assumed to be vastly larger than these protein outcome
spaces (see discussion between Salisbury 1969 and Smith 1970, but also Dennett 1996;
Morris 2003; Louis 2016).
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would need more random walk than others to increase in complexity. In
this way, if the dynamics is a true random walk, some structures should be
considered ‘closer’ to complexity increases than others. Conversely, if any
possible structure may undergo a complexity increase, this suggests a dy-
namics other than a random permutation of organismic structure. In such
a case, every state would have an equal probability of leading to a com-
plexity increase, and we would obtain a weak attractor structure, where
there is a convergent evolution onto states of increased complexity.
Another possible way out of this argument would be to deny that the
volume of each complexity zone is vastly larger than the volume actually
occupied by evolution, so that the probability of complexity increase is
small but not negligible. However, since the degrees of complexity parti-
tion OP , this means that the vast majority of ‘complexity zones’ remain
unexplored, and that actual evolution remains limited to the lower com-
plexity zones. However, since it is also possible that evolutionary histories
start out in the minimal complexity zone, and remain constrained in a
relatively small space (relative to OP as a whole), this contradicts the ar-
gument that a divergence in developmental constraint early on precludes
convergence later . In other words, outcomes would no longer be contingent
as the disparity-reduction argument claims.
A second problem, compounding the first, is the observation of an
acceleration in the maximum degree of complexity attained in evolution.
First, note that there would seem to be more possible ways of organizing a
more complex organism than there are of organizing an organism of lesser
complexity. In terms of pigeon-holes, this means thatm1 < m2 < m3 . . . If
the increase of N were to remain constant, one would expect a deceleration
instead of an acceleration in the degree of complexity, as it takes longer
to ‘fill up’ each container. Unless, of course, evolutionary history should
not be understood simply as randomly exploring biological possibilities –
for example, this could be taken as evidence that that there are in fact
evolutionary mechanisms that bias lineages towards complexity increase8.
One potential response is that the number of lineages accelerates at a
greater rate than the variousmi. The acceleration of evolution is due to the
8Such a mechanism need not necessarily be based on natural selection; for example,
Kauffman (1993) uses the vastness of possibility space to argue for self-organization.
Louis argues for biases in how phenotypic variation appears.
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great increase in the number of lineages, which speeds up the exploration
of possibility space, despite the fact that the number of ways of realizing
a degree of complexity increases with complexity.
However, this response underestimates the degree to which the size of
possibility spaces may increase with complexity. The number of possible
proteins compositions where 100 amino acids are picked from among a pool
of 20 possible amino acids is 20100 ≈ 10130, vastly greater than the number
of protons in the observable universe (the Eddington number), which is
estimated at around 1080. The typical protein in the human body has 476
amino acids, and of this vast number only 20-50.000 different proteins are
estimated to be present in the human body. At higher levels of complexity,
estimating the number of possibilities quickly becomes intractable, more so
because we often have no idea of the redundancy (the number of microcon-
figurations corresponding to a single macroconfiguration) – for example,
presumably a large number of possibilities at the microlevel corresponds
to nonfunctioning macroconfigurations.
A third incompatibility between disparity-reduction and random-walk
arguments is that developmental constraints are problematic for concep-
tualizing the evolution of complexity as a random walk. Developmental
constraints assumed by the first lead to ‘generative entrenchment’ (Schank
and Wimsatt 1986) and irreversibility in evolution. This irreversibility –
sometimes referred to as Dollo’s law9 – introduces an arrow of time differ-
ent to the arrow implied by driven trends.
In this way, as a lineage embarks on certain paths rather than others, a
large portion of the space of possible paths becomes effectively closed off.
This consideration presents a problem for Gould’s general view of evolu-
tion as an effectively random exploration of the different possibilities. As
evolution unfolds it erects barriers to its own future evolution through de-
velopmental constraints10. In this way, Gould’s argument about the effect
9An organization never exactly takes a former state again, even if it is placed under
conditions of existence identical to those which it has crossed (Dollo 1905).
10Gould actually acknowledges this in a discussion of Seilacher’s work, that organisms
could have evolved body plans of “threads, ribbons, sheets, or pancakes so that no
internal space lies very far from the outer surface” (1989: 311-312), with the result that
internal complexity would never have been advantageous or even possible. However, in
his later work (1996) he does not acknowledge the problems this poses for this random
walk argument.
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of body plans on evolutionary history can be turned against his view of
a diffusion from a left wall: some body plans may have represented con-
straints against increases in complexity. This means that the increase in
complexity turns out to be more contingent (contingent on certain devel-
opmental constraints not occurring) or less contingent (despite develop-
mental constraints, complexity has nonetheless increased) than presented
in Gould’s view of a diffusion from a left wall.
2 Convergence-Centric Interpretation
2.1 Attractor Hyperlandscapes
The representative causal network to be associated with the convergence-
centric interpretation is more difficult to represent visually, but Conway
Morris gives us a more direct indication as to how precisely it is to be
understood, so its reconstruction is more straightforward.
Conway Morris understands the possibility space within which evolu-
tionary history unfolds as a vast ‘hyperspace’ with a very larger number of
dimensions, and a very large range of possibilities. All evolutionary prod-
ucts, from the most simple to the most complex, can be situated in this
hyperspace: “hyperdimensional boxes, based on the combinatorial immen-
sity of the relevant variables that together encompass all the alternative
possibilities (. . . ), range from protein ‘hyperspace’ to intelligence and even
societal ‘hyperspace’ ” (2003: 308). From amino acid to human brains
and societies, each outcome of biological evolution can be situated in this
possibility space.
The dynamics within this possibility space is largely defined by conver-
gent evolution – natural selection – which means that most regions of this
hyperspace will never be accessed by evolutionary lineages because these
regions are maladaptive. These regions – the “howling wildernesses of the
maladaptive, the 99.9% recurring of biological space where things don’t
work” (2003: 309) – serve to severely reduce the ‘effective’ size of possibil-
ity space. By calculating the ways in which amino acids can be combined,
the space of possible protein configurations is, by any estimation, vast
(and similarly for other aspects of outcome space); however, most of these
outcomes remain mere combinatorial possibilities, and are not accessible
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given evolutionary dynamics.
In effect, Conway Morris is defining an attractor hyperlandscape, upon
which evolutionary history unfolds11. As discussed in the previous chapter,
attractor landscapes are limited for modeling dynamics of systems when
the dimensionality of outcome space is very high. The importance of high
dimensionality is that it tends to lead to large neutral networks on the
landscape – so that evolution can occur without differences in the scalar
(in our case, fitness) – and to a non-smooth topology, rugged peaks and
holes – so that a relative difference in the scalar (fitness differences) has
little to no predictive value for how evolution will occur.
In positing modeling evolutionary history as occurring on a hyperland-
scape, Conway Morris is effectively stating that these potential difficulties
associated with large dimensionality will not play a significant role, as least
insofar as the contingency of evolutionary outcomes is concerned. Various
examples of convergent evolution – legs, wings, hearing, seeing, smelling,
cognitive functions (humans and dolphins) and even culture – are indica-
tive of how most, if not all, evolutionary outcomes evolved.
In this way, the outcome space can be understood as mostly maladap-
tive, except for a limited number of attractor zones, which represent general
biological traits, such as legs or seeing, but also “mammal-ness” and “ape-
ness”12. Conway Morris’s vision of evolutionary history could be thought of
as a temporalized version of that of the pre-Darwinian Rational Morphol-
ogists (e.g. Goethe, Cuvier, Geoffroy St. Hillaire), who were preoccupied
with finding the unchanging laws of organismic form. The space of bio-
logical possibility is surprisingly empty: there are only a few good ways of
structuring life forms, and evolution hits on them again and again.
Finally, by limiting the outcome space in this way, most of these attrac-
11Conway Morris returns again repeatedly to the parallels with attractors, e.g. “Con-
vergence occurs because of ‘islands’ of stability, analogous to ‘attractors’ in chaos theory”
(2003: 127).
12“Life has a peculiar propensity to ‘navigate’ to rather precise solutions in response to
adaptive challenges. I would suggest that one such solution is manifested in a biological
property that we choose to call ‘mammal-ness’. So, too, within this ‘zone’ there are more
localized solutions, one of which is ‘ape-ness’. (. . . ) Although any history is necessarily
unique, the resultant complex end form is not simply the contingent upshot of local
and effectively random processes. On any other suitable planet there will I suggest be
animals very like mammals, and mammals much like apes. Not identical, but similar,
perhaps surprisingly similar.” (2003: 308)
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tor zones are inevitably realized in evolution given enough time – simply
because the number of attractor zones is relatively small:
First, what we regard as complex is usually inherent in simpler
systems: the real and in part unanswered question in evolu-
tion is not novelty per se, but how it is that things are put
together. Second, the number of evolutionary end-points is
limited: by no means everything is possible. Third, what is
possible has usually been arrived at multiple times, meaning
that the emergence of the various biological properties is effec-
tively inevitable. Finally, all this takes time. What was im-
possible billions of years ago becomes increasingly inevitable:
evolution has trajectories (trends, if you prefer) and progress is
not some noxious by-product of the terminally optimistic, but
simply part of our reality (Morris 2003: xii-xiii).
If this were to be represented formally, one could discern two parts to
the convergence-centric narrative. The first is that natural selection cuts
down the space of possible outcome states to a limited number (Figure
3.8)
Figure 3.8: The reduction of the size of possibility space (OP ) by means
of attractor zones.
The second is that, given a small number of outcome states, and given
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enough time (on the order of billions of years13), all outcome states are
likely to be visited. This can be represented either in analogy to Figure 3.6
(convergence onto the same range of outcome states), or Figure 3.7 (con-
vergence onto the same type of distribution of convergent phenotypes over
all lineages, i.e. a distribution where all the attractor zones are realized in
at least one lineage): see Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Alternative representations of the representative ensemble of
possible trajectories implied by the convergence-centric interpretation. In
the left figure, initial divergence is erased, since each evolutionary path
leads to subsequent divergence in paths, and convergence to the attractor
zones. In this way, the ‘range’ of attained outcomes (defined in terms
of attractor zone) is the same. In the right figure, each initial condition
converges to an effectively identical distribution of evolutionary outcomes
(one where each attractor zone is realized in at least one lineage).
Because this representation of evolutionary trajectories is the one that
Conway Morris draws on in order to ground his claims of inevitability
(absence of contingency), we can take this to be the representative causal
network of the convergence-centric narrative.
13Of course, given infinite time, it would not matter how many outcome states there
were, as long as there were only finitely many.
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2.2 Description-dependence in Outcomes?
Conway Morris defines evolutionary outcomes differently to Gould. The
outcomes Conway Morris is interested in are outcomes such as ‘seeing’,
‘mammal-ness’, or ‘ape-ness’ – outcome-types that, to varying degrees14,
could be realized by a vast number of specific organisms (outcome-tokens,
if you will). By contrast, Gould is interested in outcome-tokens when he
claims that each replay of life’s tape would lead to vastly different outcomes
(an exception is when he is talking about distributions of complexity). At
one point Conway Morris acknowledges that he and Gould are targeting
different evolutionary outcomes (Morris 1998: 14), and thus talking past
each other to a certain extent:
What we are interested in [in contrast to Gould] is not the
origin, destiny, or fate of a particular lineage, but the likelihood
of the emergence of a particular property, say consciousness
(Morris 1998: 14).
However, it is doubtful that this disparity alone can explain the dif-
ference between Gould’s and Conway Morris’s interpretations. Gould and
Conway Morris were fully aware of this disparity, and yet their opposing
interpretations remained unresolved.
Consider how Gould, following Darwin, acknowledges the distinction
between “laws in the background” and “contingency in the details” (Gould
1989: 290). As examples of the first, Gould mentions the “laws of surfaces
and volume”, which constrain the shapes that larger organisms can take if
they wish to preserve a similar surface to smaller organisms. Alternatively,
there is bilateral symmetry in many organisms, which is a near-necessary
consequence of cell division (1989: 289). Nonetheless, Gould states:
Ultimately, the question of questions boils down to the place-
ment of the boundary between predictability under invariant
law and the multifarious possibilities of historical contingency.
(. . . ) I envision a boundary sitting so high that almost every
interesting event of life’s history falls into the realm of contin-
gency (1989: 290).
14Presumably some types possess more possible relations than others (e.g., ‘mammal-
ness’ vs. ‘ape-ness’).
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In other words, Gould would also include outcome-types such as in-
telligence or ‘mammal-ness’ within the realm of contingency. The only
outcomes he seems to exclude from the realm of contingency are those
resulting from constraints imposed by mathematics (such as the relation
between surface and volume as dimensions increase) or by physics (for ex-
ample, the way in which the strength of gravity places a constraint on the
minimal thickness of bones and other biomechanical properties).15
In this way, the different understandings of outcome space are already
integrated within Gould’s and Conway Morris’s interpretations. Pointing
to this type-token distinction among outcomes does not alter the con-
clusions that either of them reaches concerning the contingency of out-
comes. Nonetheless, there is another ambiguity that goes unrecognized
in the convergence-centric interpretation: an ambiguity in how the initial
conditions are defined.
2.3 Description-dependence in Initial Conditions
A more important ambiguity in Conway Morris’s interpretation of evolu-
tionary history lies in how the set of initial conditions is determined.
Two alternative counterarguments to Conway Morris’s view can be for-
mulated. The first is that instances of convergent evolution do not imply
that the outcome of convergent evolution is not contingent. Humans may
be the result of convergent evolution in the way Conway Morris describes,
but if the tape of life had been replayed in very different environments,
very different instances of convergent evolution would have occurred. The
reason for this is that natural selection produces local adaptations only:
adaptations that are optimal in a given environment. If the environment
changes, the same structures will no longer be adaptive. Hence natural
selection can only select particular ‘good moves’ in design space when the
environment is stable; when the environment changes, natural selection
will change direction and what was previously a good move is no longer
one entirely. This means that any structure that arises through natural
selection remains contingent on a particular environment. If our planet
were dark, eyes would never have evolved. One can only presume that the
15In this respect, Gould’s notion of the ‘realm of contingency’ occupying most of
biological possibility space is strongly reminiscent of Beatty’s evolutionary contingency
thesis (or vice versa: see next chapter).
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evolution of a specific species of certain complexity, such as the Homo sapi-
ens, would only be much more contingent on what environments occurred
in the past. Thus, it does not matter how ubiquitous convergent evolution
was on our planet, with our environments; it does nothing to show how
the tape of life would have unfolded on a different planet.16
Turning to the second counterargument, let us assume that convergence
in our biosphere was also a sign of convergence in all possible biospheres.
In such a case convergent evolution would indeed establish inevitability.
However, that would still not be very illuminating as to why a particu-
lar biological trait or organism evolved at all. Many different biological
structures may be inevitable, so much so as to perhaps allow the formula-
tion of a ‘periodic table’ of possible biological structures – but the number
of inevitable biological structures would presumably be very large. As
Schulze-Makuch et al. (2015) note,
The last hundreds of millions of years of evolution on Earth pro-
vided us with a rich biodiversity of organisms, which explored
a huge set of biochemical possibilities. Yet, our biosphere and
the adaptations we observe are probably only a small subset of
what is possible in biology. Life is intrinsically interwoven with
its environment, so we can assume that during billions of years
of natural history, many or nearly all of the biochemical pos-
sibilities were explored that are possible on a terrestrial planet
with an average surface temperature of 15 C, 1 bar pressure
and an oxygenated atmosphere (in the later part of Earth’s
natural history). (Schulze-Makuch et al. 2015: 1481)
Given enough time, life cycles through various combinations of these
inevitable structures. This results in an interpretation of evolutionary
history that is fundamentally identical to Gould’s interpretation of large-
scale trends: given enough time, a finite number of possibilities will be
visited. In this way, the convergence-centric view of life only seeks to
constrain the space of biological possibility, but it is possible that, even
16One way to counter this argument would be to show how certain structures are
adaptive in a broad range of environments – some moves are ‘good moves’ everywhere,
or almost everywhere. I call such structures ‘general adaptations’, and consider them
in detail in chapter 6.
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given the constraints of convergent evolution, the space of possibility is still
vast so that evolutionary history is still effectively a random exploration
of possibilities.
Conway Morris does not specify this wider space of possible outcomes,
and assumes that the instances of convergent evolution on Earth establish
inevitability and non-contingency. However, according to how the outcome
space is construed, the convergence-centric interpretation may result in a
view that is structurally identical to the Gouldian view.
3 Conclusion: Two Errors
3.1 Confusing Probability with Contingency
We can condense and systematize the discussion above by pointing to two
common errors when reflecting about the role of contingency in evolution-
ary history. The first lies in using an estimate of the size of possibility
space to draw conclusions about the probability of evolutionary outcomes,
and then using these probability estimates as a basis for a claim about the
contingency of evolutionary outcomes. Size of possibility space does not
determine the probability of outcomes, and probability of outcome does
not determine contingency.
Contingency is a concept that reflects the causal dynamics leading up
to an outcome, whereas probability reflects the position of the outcome
within possibility space. Probability and contingency are related, and
both are description-dependent. Yet degree of probability cannot be used
as a measure for the degree of contingency. We discussed this in chapter
2, but it is worth applying it to this context.
Two broad classes of cases may be distinguished where probability and
contingency diverge. The first is when possibility space and effective pos-
sibility space are non-identical, for example, when large parts of possibility
space are inaccessible, or if there is a bias towards certain areas in possi-
bility space. Accessibility is a consequence of the dynamics in possibility
space: an outcome state may be possible, and yet not realizable given
the nature of the dynamics. The dynamics may also act to merely bias
the system towards particular states (instead of to preclude certain areas).
Certain outcomes – attractors – may be much more likely to occur than
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others given certain initial conditions, or may even be more likely to occur
given any initial condition.
Thus, estimates of the size of the space of possible genotypes pro-
vide little information about the relative contingency of various genotype-
outcomes. Such arguments are variations on the following observation by
Wright:
Estimates of the total number of genes in the cells of higher
organisms range from 1000 up (. . . ) With 10 allelomorphs in
each of 1000 loci, the number of possible combinations is 101000
which is a very large number. It has been estimated that the
total number of electrons and protons in the whole visible uni-
verse is much less than 10100. (. . . ) The population is thus
confined to an infinitesimal portion of the field of possible gene
combinations (Wright 1932: 356).
The ‘error’ may of course be easily avoided by reducing possibility space
to effective possibility space, so that the probability of an outcome calcu-
lated as part of outcome space is identical to the probability calculated in
terms of transition probabilities between states (see chapter 2). However,
in order to do so, one must integrate information regarding evolutionary
dynamics.
Some commentators take the size of possibility space as evidence that
there must be mechanisms that help navigate possibility space (e.g. Den-
nett 1996 (‘cranes’ and search algorithms), Louis 2016 (bias in how vari-
ation is created)). However, for others, such as Gould, who hold that no
evolutionary mechanisms introduce biases on a macroevolutionary scale,
the size of possibility space is taken as a sign of the contingency of out-
comes. The point here is not that either one of these possibilities is wrong;
rather, it is that one needs certain assumptions about evolutionary dy-
namics to go from probability to contingency.
A second way in which contingency and probability diverge is when
there is redundancy in outcome space: different outcomes that are treated
as separate should actually be treated as ‘equivalent’. This relates to the
way in which Gould distinguishes between states (token outcomes) that
Conway Morris would treat as ‘equivalent’ (outcome types). However, in
his discussion of the large-scale trend in complexity, Gould does intro-
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duce redundancy: outcomes are equivalent (and thus, in this sense, the
difference between them ‘redundant’) if they possess the same degree of
complexity.
Yet, Gould does not specify this redundancy with sufficient precision:
how many outcomes are to be treated as equivalent given a fixed degree of
complexity? He wants the redundancy to be not so big, so that an increase
in complexity can happen spontaneously; yet, not too big so that the token
outcomes are “utterly unpredictable and quite unrepeatable” (Gould 1989:
14). As argued in the previous section, these demands on redundancy are
incompatible.
3.2 Confusing Convergence with Inevitability
If the first error involves lack of precision with regards to the outcome
space, the second – interpreting convergent evolution as evidence for in-
evitability – reflects an ambiguity in the initial state space. Besides the
fact that ‘inevitability’ means that the outcome occurs with probability
1, and thus confuses a question about contingency with a question about
probability, there is also the mistake that evolution by natural selection
does not imply that the outcome was symmetric over all possible paths.
The outcomes that occur through the mechanism of natural selection
depend on the state of the environment in which evolution by natural
selection occurs. Supplementary hypotheses would be needed to reduce the
effective size of the initial state space, for example, hypotheses concerning
the probability of certain environmental states. However, such hypotheses
are not implied by the mechanism of natural selection. Relying on natural
selection alone, one cannot escape the contingency of outcome states on
initial states.
Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed some of the ways that description dependence
influences interpretations of evolutionary history, and we took Gould’s and
Conway Morris’s interpretations as test cases. Both Gould and Conway
Morris describe outcome states differently; however, neither specifies his
‘representative causal network’ with sufficient precision. In Gould’s inter-
pretation there is ambiguity in the structure of outcome space; in Conway
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Morris’s interpretation there is ambiguity in the structure of initial state
space. This chapter has attempted to sketch how these ambiguities en-
tail that their claims about the contingency of outcome states are not
entirely justified given their assumptions. Gould would need additional
assumptions about the number of states associated with a given degree of
complexity; Conway Morris would need additional assumptions about the
probability of environmental states.
What is the appropriate level of precision? The level of precision is dic-
tated by the hypothesis of what the key mechanisms are in evolutionary
history. An interpretation of evolutionary history takes a stand on which
mechanisms play a role in macroevolution; the challenge then is to spec-
ify initial conditions and outcome states in function of that assumption.
Specifically, if natural selection is taken to be the key mechanism, then one
needs to allow for the possibility that any environmental state may occur
– not just those that are common on Earth.
In part II we will consider the causal basis of evolution by natural
selection, and investigate both what ‘representative causal networks’ can
be attached to this, and what claims can be made about the contingency
of outcomes.
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Part II
The Causal Basis for
Interpreting Evolutionary
History

Chapter 4
The Challenge of Causal
Complexity
The first part of this dissertation examined how claims about the con-
tingency of evolutionary outcomes should be analyzed in keeping with
the fact that contingency claims vary according to the way in which the
phenomena are described. Starting with the representative causal net-
works associated with interpretations of evolutionary history, we proposed
in chapter 2 how contingency arises through symmetry breaks in causal
networks. This also showed how speaking about the ‘shape’ of evolution-
ary history is a justified metaphor for evolutionary contingency: this shape
is determined by convergences, divergences, and ultimately symmetries in
the network of possible causal paths. The description-relative character of
contingency has been insufficiently recognized by the proponents of var-
ious interpretations, and in the third chapter we argued that the claims
made by Gould and Conway Morris about the nature of evolutionary his-
tory are insufficiently precise to fix their claims about the contingency of
evolutionary outcomes. For example, their assumptions about the space
of initial conditions or of outcomes are too ambiguous, and their claims
about evolutionary contingency do not follow from their interpretation of
evolutionary history.
The second part of this dissertation will dig deeper, and inquire into
how interpretations of evolutionary history are grounded in biological the-
ory. Biological theory shows up in the way in which interpretations general-
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ize about the nature of causal transitions between evolutionary states. For
example, some interpretations such as Conway Morris’s hold that causal
transitions are dominated by natural selection; others such as Gould’s
deny the dominance of natural selection, and claim that phylogenetic con-
straints are much more important. Conversely, when biological theory
shifts, certain interpretations of evolutionary history may lose plausibility
and relevance. Interpretations such as those of Henri Bergson (based on
the principle of élan vital : Bergson (1911)) or Theodor Eimer (based on
orthogenesis: Eimer (1898)), for example, can no longer be taken literally.
Developments in biological theory necessitate an updating of interpreta-
tions of evolutionary history.
Hence we must look in more detail at the fundamental concepts in bi-
ological theory to examine how these concepts constrain possible interpre-
tations of evolutionary history. Even then, biological theory is a sprawling
patchwork of only partially overlapping concepts and theories. As a whole
it may cover all known biological phenomena, but it is hardly a unified
theory from which conclusions can be drawn for all possible evolutionary
histories. Even the most ‘fundamental’ generalizations in biological theory,
such as the Hardy-Weinberg ‘law’, are very limited in scope and do not
apply to all of actual evolutionary history. Biological generalizations seem
to be irreducibly contingent, and in one line of thought the contingency
of the theory simply reflects the complexity involved in biological phenom-
ena. One should not expect the dynamics of species or ecosystems to be
as neatly describable as the dynamics of point masses.
Nonetheless, this poses a problem for interpretations of evolutionary
history, since they do seek a unified representation of all possible evolu-
tionary histories, despite the obvious complexity involved. Hence, interpre-
tations of evolutionary history face what I call the challenge of causal com-
plexity. The challenge goes roughly as follows: any generalization about
biological phenomena seems to face exceptions because the generalization
merely picks out one causal process (or a limited number of processes)
in a complex totality of interrelated processes, so that there is almost
always some process that was abstracted away from that may interrupt
the target causal process, thus preventing the generalization from holding.
More formally, the causal processes underlying any generalization ‘all Fs
are G’ might be interrupted in many different ways, so that even if the
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generalization is without exception in actual evolutionary history, there
will invariably be a possible evolutionary history where it is only true for
a subset of Fs, or where it is an empty generalization because Fs never
evolved at all.
In the first section below I sketch this general background to the chal-
lenge of causal complexity. The challenge merely serves to orient the dis-
cussion; I regard it as insurmountable in its generality. Hence, in the
subsequent sections, I will specify the scope of the discussion, and focus
only on the fundamental concept of natural selection. In this way, I will
not be examining how biological theory constrains interpretations of evolu-
tionary history, but rather how biological theory constrains interpretations
of evolution by natural selection. Here the challenge of causal complexity
is more manageable, but by no means trivial.
In the second and third sections of this chapter I will consider what a
relatively unified body of theory – the Modern Synthesis – implies about
the contingency of directional trends that occur in evolution by natural
selection.1 This will set the stage for a reformulation of the challenge of
causal complexity within the reduced scope of evolution by natural selec-
tion. The fifth and sixth chapters then are devoted to separate aspects of
this challenge.
1 Contingency of Generalizations in Biology
1.1 The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis
An influential thesis advanced by John Beatty (and for which he explicitly
cites Gould as an inspiration, see 1995: 45-46) states all generalizations
about the living world are either (1) mathematical, physical, or chemi-
cal generalizations (or deductive consequences of such generalizations plus
initial conditions), or (2) distinctively biological, in which case they are
contingent. In other words, while the former may be true in all possi-
ble replays of life’s tape, distinctively biological generalizations never are:
they are merely contingently true. In this way, Beatty intends to capture
and systematize the Darwinian/Gouldian distinction between ‘laws in the
1In Chapter 6, we will examine the theoretical resources present in a successor, the
Extended Synthesis.
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background’ versus the ‘contingency in the details’ by excluding the former
from the ‘distinctively biological’.
To support his thesis, Beatty shows how even generalizations that are
central to the field, such as Mendel’s first law2 and the Hardy-Weinberg
Law3, do not achieve universal applicability, because they depend on the
existence of certain entities or processes which themselves are contingent
products of evolution. For example, gamete formation and sexual repro-
duction are all evolved traits which might not have occurred at all (Beatty
1995). In some possible evolutionary history, some alternative segregation
ratio might have been the most common, so that Mendel’s first law would
have been largely false. In this way, the truth value of even canonical
generalizations in biology is contingent.
Such examples of contingent generalization still seem subsumable un-
der a D-N type model of explanation, except with more limited conditions
of applicability. This is how Sober (1989) and Ereshefsky (1992) had ear-
lier responded to the criticism that there are no noncontingent biological
generalizations: for example, if the Hardy-Weinberg law is conditionalized
upon its conditions of applicability, so that the logical structure of the law
is not ‘all Fs are G’, but ‘give C, all Fs are G’, then this latter conditional
is noncontingently true. In this way, part of Beatty’s thesis can be accom-
modated within what is known as the ceteris paribus strategy, according
to which many generalizations in special sciences may be considered ex-
ceptionless and confirmable as long as their scope is appropriately reduced
(Fodor 1991; Lange 1993; Strevens 2012).
However, according to Beatty, the problem of contingency goes much
further than this. To this end he articulates the difference between ‘weakly’
and ‘highly’ contingent generalizations. The weakly contingent generaliza-
tions are those whose truth is contingent on definite conditions. If these
conditions are incorporated into the generalization, the original general-
ization is transformed into a non-contingent conditional that is true in
every possible evolutionary history. In other words, weakly contingent
generalizations are the type that can be turned into ceteris paribus-type
2Two alleles of a given locus have an equal probability of being represented in the
gamete: a 50:50 ‘segregation ratio’.
3The gist of the Hardy-Weinberg law is thus: in the absence of evolutionary forces,
genotypes of a population follow fixed frequency distributions determined by the relative
frequencies of alleles. See the next chapter for a more detailed discussion.
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generalizations.
By contrast, highly contingent generalizations cannot be transformed
into non-contingent generalizations in this manner. No matter how the
scope of such generalizations is reduced, they remain merely contingently
true. One way in which such contingency can arise is through the multiple
realizability of adaptive functions4. For example, it is impossible to gen-
eralize what type of reproductive contraptions orchids will evolve in order
to fulfill the function of cross fertilization. Referring to Darwin’s research
into orchid reproduction, Beatty notes:
Sometimes this part of the flower had been modified to entice
or trap insects, sometimes another part had been modified to
do the job. Even when the same parts had been modified to
do that job, they did it in very different ways. (Beatty 1995:
58)
In other words, even given the same initial conditions (the same range of
insects, the same need for cross fertilization, the same orchid morphology),
very different outcomes are obtained.
In this way, Beatty is describing a phenomenon we analyzed in chapter
2: while a causal network driven by natural selection may converge on
the same coarse-grained outcome (the biological function), the network
becomes divergent when the outcome is fine-grained according to structure.
At the fine-grained level of analysis, the divergence cannot be avoided by
redefining the initial conditions (which is what the ceteris paribus strategy
does), leading to an unavoidable contingency in outcomes in evolution by
natural selection. This type of contingency precludes any exceptionless
generalization about what precise outcome is to be expected.5
The phenomenon of the multiple realizability of adaptive functions has
an even more far-reaching implication for evolutionary contingency than
recognized by Beatty. The contingency in the realization of an adaptive
function means that in further evolutionary history, evolutionary trajecto-
ries will diverge even further. Say that a function F can be realized by two
different structures, S1 and S2. Yet these realizations may entail different
4Beatty uses the term ‘functional equivalence’.
5Note that Beatty’s notions of ‘highly’ and ‘weakly’ contingent parallel his distinction
between unpredictability contingency and causal-dependence contingency.
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developmental constraints on subsequent evolution. In this way, viewed on
a larger temporal scale, this divergence in fine-grained structure may lead
to divergence in coarse-grained functions later on.
1.2 Contingency of Outcomes and of Generalizations
Before we apply this to the types of generalizations relevant for interpre-
tations of evolutionary history, it is important to analyze the term ‘con-
tingency’ with some more precision, since there are two different uses of
the term here6. The first sense refers to the occurrence of an outcome:
if the outcome does not occur in some possible evolutionary history, it is
contingent (to some degree). This is the type of contingency we primarily
targeted in the first part, and is the type of contingency that interpre-
tations of evolutionary history are concerned with. The second sense of
contingency refers to the truth of generalization in possible evolutionary
histories. A generalization may be thought of a proposition of the form
of ‘all Fs are G’, where F refers to some evolutionary outcome (e.g. some
individual, species or genus) and G refers to be some property instanti-
ated by that outcome. Such a proposition may be true in all or only some
possible evolutionary histories.
It is possible to integrate this second sense of contingency within the
causal-network framework, and thus to show it as a special case of the first
sense of contingency. Note that a generalization such as ‘all F s are G’ can
be used to induce an equivalence class on the set of Fs by dividing the set
into two mutually exclusive subsets: the F s that are G – call this F – and
the F s that are not G – call this F . At a coarser grain of analysis, these
equivalence classes can be represented as points, and thus as higher order
evolutionary outcomes. In this way, the old analysis can be applied: a
6We pass over Beatty’s rather idiosyncratic definition of the contingency of a gen-
eralization in his 1995 paper. There, a generalization is contingent if and only if it
describes a contingent outcome of evolution. By ‘outcome of evolution’, Beatty means
the ‘rule-making capabilities of the agents of evolutionary change’. Further, by ‘agents’
he simply means evolutionary mechanisms, like “directed and random mutation, hy-
bridization, natural and sexual selection, random drift, etc.” (Beatty 1995: 47). By
‘rules’ he seems (somewhat circularly) to refer to generalizations, such as “humans are
relatively hairless”, “the Krebs cycle is present in all aerobic organisms” or Mendel’s
first law. My specification of generalizations as equivalence classes over evolutionary
outcomes captures the essence of Beatty’s definition.
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Figure 4.1: A rough analysis of the generalizations ‘all F s are G’ in the
causal-network framework. I is the set of initial states, three paths (a,b,c)
illustrate three different evolutionary trajectories onto the set of possible
outcomes (OP ). If a is representative of all paths, leading from I to F ∩G,
the generalization ‘all F s are G’ is necessarily true and applicable (given
the initial state and evolutionary dynamics). If there are paths like b or c,
then either some Fs are not G, or F might itself not be realized in evolution.
In that case the generalization is either false (b), or inapplicable (c).
generalization ‘all F s are G’ is contingent if its corresponding equivalence
class F is a contingent outcome of evolution. This latter holds if there is
some initial condition that leads to F .
Analyzed in these terms, the question whether there are any non-
contingent generalizations in biology is the same as the question whether
there are any generalizations that are validly applicable across all possible
evolutionary histories. The ceteris paribus strategy means that the scope
of variation in initial conditions is reduced until there is convergence onto
outcome F .
117
CHAPTER 4. THE CHALLENGE OF CAUSAL COMPLEXITY
1.3 Generalizations concerning Evolutionary History
What applies to biological generalizations applies a fortiori to generaliza-
tions that interpretations of evolutionary history tend to make. Two types
of generalization can be distinguished.
In the first type, ‘all Fs are G’, F refers to a particular evolutionary
history (set of evolutionary trajectories), and G refers to some property
attributable to the evolutionary history as a whole. For example, ‘evo-
lution inevitably converges onto a limited number of adaptive outcomes’,
or ‘evolution is invariably characterized by a tendency towards increase
in body size’, or ‘evolution is utterly contingent’ (which is the denial of
non-contingent generalizations, and could be parsed as: for every F and
G, ‘all Fs are G’ is contingent).
This type of generalization was the subject of part I. There we showed
how G can be analyzed in terms of symmetries in causal networks, and
by associating F with the representative causal network advanced by an
interpretation of evolutionary history. Here we are more concerned with
the second type.
The second type of generalization concerns the nature of causal transi-
tions in evolutionary history. Specifically, in this type of generalization, F
refers to a particular evolutionary state, and G refers to the causal process
connecting F to its preceding and subsequent state along its evolutionary
trajectory. Thus, for example, ‘all significant transitions between states
in evolutionary history are caused by natural selection’, or ‘outcomes in
evolutionary history are caused by natural selection’ would be a gener-
alization that natural selection is a dominant mechanism in evolutionary
history. Note that this second type of generalization – quantifying over
possible evolutionary states – clearly informs the first type of generaliza-
tion, which quantifies over possible evolutionary histories. Further, it is
this second type of generalization that the challenge of causal complexity
primarily targets.
1.4 Causal Complexity
Beatty’s evolutionary contingency thesis describes a property of general-
izations in biology, but does not explain why the generalizations should
have these properties. It analyzes the structure of generalizations, but
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without showing in detail how the generalizations reflect the subject mat-
ter of biology. He does give examples, such as the multiple realizability
of adaptive functions, or the presence of ‘random’ and ‘chance’ mutations
(Beatty 1995: 57-58). However, it is not clear why such seemingly in-
deterministic processes should necessarily occur in biology7, or why the
multiple realizability of functions should necessarily lead to contingency in
evolutionary history.
A detailed investigation into the origin of contingency would lead us too
far. For purposes here, it is sufficient to merely sketch an intuitive case why
contingency should arise from the complexity of biological phenomena. In
order to do so, we will review some arguments formulated by Smart (1963),
Elgin (2006), and Kim (2005; 2012).
Smart originally compared special sciences such as biology and psy-
chology to engineering:
There are not any biological laws for the very same reason that
there are not any laws of engineering. Writers who have tried
to axiomatise biological and psychological theories seem to me
to be barking up the same gum tree as would a man who tried
to produce the first, second, and third laws of electronics, or of
bridge building. (Smart 1963: 52.)
An engineer produces bridges, but bridges are complex constructions, and
causally interact with the environment in a great number of ways that
are relevant for their functioning. If asked how precisely bridges are to be
structured, which materials in which quantities are to be used, and so on,
the best answer an engineer would be able to provide is, ‘it depends’. A
bridge causally interacts in so many ways with its environment (type of soil
underneath, the type of entity that will cross the bridge, the height and
length of the bridge, etc.), that the microstructure realizing the bridge will
be very sensitive to context, so much so that it is not possible to find any
exceptionless generalization about the precise microstructure of bridges
(beyond generic features).
7Some have claimed that the probabilistic character of genetic mutation is ulti-
mately a manifestation of quantum indeterminism (Brandon and Carson 1996). This
does not seem plausible, but even if this were true, it still does not explain why quan-
tum indeterminism should be manifested at such large spatial scales (whereas quantum
indeterminism plays a negligible role in the vast majority of macroscopic phenomena).
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This insight has been restated by Elgin (2006:123), who drawing on
Cartwright (1983; 1995) has argued that the superposition of the multi-
tude of causal processes describing the behaviour of the parts makes it
difficult to simply treat the behaviour of the whole as a simple addition.
Consider the superposition of two ceteris paribus generalizations, each de-
scribing an aspect of a complex system: (i) ceteris paribus, adding salt
raises the cooking temperature of water, and (ii) ceteris paribus, increased
altitude lowers the cooking temperature of water. What if salt is added to
a pot of water and it is brought to a higher altitude? The ceteris paribus
generalizations by themselves do not provide sufficient information to give
any answer to that question.
Thus, Elgin argues, a general argument could be made that, since (1)
each of the parts of a complex kind causally interacts with the environment,
(2) the global behaviour of the complex whole is the superposition of the
behaviours of the parts, and (3) many of the causal processes defining
part-environment interaction make a difference for the global behaviour,
then the global behaviour is not simply an addition of the behaviours of
the parts. One needs not only to weigh the relative importance of each
part-environment causal interaction, but also to take into consideration
that parts may interact among each other as well.
A second argument (Kim 2005, 2012) against the possibility of excep-
tionless generalizations in special science draws not on the complexity in
causal interaction with the environment, but on the complexity of consti-
tution. Kim assumes a connection between complexity and the variability
between the tokens of a special-science kind. This variability, or ‘idiosyn-
crasy’, ensures that strict, exceptionless laws are unavailable.
Going forward, it is important to distinguish between two different
senses of complexity. The first is compositional complexity : biological en-
tities are not point-particles, but are composed of sub-entities. The second
is dynamic complexity : this complexity is a measure of the number of in-
dependent variables needed to describe how a biological entity evolves over
time. It is the latter type of complexity we primarily have in mind when
speaking of ‘causal complexity’.
The challenge of causal complexity can be thus formulated:
Any generalization about the causal nature of transitions in
evolutionary history is necessarily contingent, because there is
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a large number of independent causal processes impacting each
state in evolutionary history, ranging from external processes
(mass extinctions, climate change, invasion of a predator, etc.)
that either change selective pressures or lead to ‘indiscrimi-
nate selection’ (i.e. drift), to internal processes (developmental
constraints, mutation) that alter the phenotypic variation in a
population available for natural selection.
Conclusion
As suggested in the introduction, it is likely impossible to entirely over-
come the challenge of causal complexity. In particular, it is doubtful that
any generalization about the shape of evolutionary history – for example,
that complexity tends to increase over evolutionary history as a whole –
should not be subject to counterexample. This is why interpretations of
evolutionary history often draw on certain fundamental concepts in bio-
logical theory, such as natural selection or developmental constraints. In
this respect interpretations are very elaborate ceteris paribus generaliza-
tions: by focusing only on the consequences of these fundamental concepts
for evolutionary history, they deliberately abstract away from and simplify
the mass of causal details. As empirical hypotheses, they will undoubtedly
succumb to exceptions; however, their deliberate abstraction away from
causal detail does increase their explanatory value, because the abstrac-
tion allows for the shape of evolutionary history to become discernible.
Nonetheless, this abstraction and simplification is not an arbitrary pro-
cess, and is severely constrained by biological theory. As an extreme ex-
ample, it would be difficult to construct an interpretation of evolutionary
history that claimed that the large-scale features of history can be ex-
plained by lightning bolts striking organisms at random (even though this
presumably would not be logically inconsistent with biological theory).
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to an overview of a unified and
very influential body of theoretical work: the Modern Synthesis. The
Modern Synthesis makes key claims about how the space of biological pos-
sibility is to be understood (primarily in terms of gene frequencies), and
about which mechanisms play a dominant in driving transitions between
states (primarily mutation and natural selection). In this way, the Mod-
ern Synthesis contains a number of key tenets that clearly influence how
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evolutionary history can plausibly be interpreted.
2 Elements of the Modern Synthesis
To understand why the different tenets of the Modern Synthesis are not
simply arbitrary stipulations, it is instructive to consider the historical
genesis of the Modern Synthesis, and the way in which these tenets were
painstakingly arrived at as solutions for important problems. In the fol-
lowing we will give a very brief historical overview.
Darwin and Wallace were the first to propose the theory of natural
selection, which however, initially faced a number of objections initially.
A particularly important objection was the ‘Swamping Argument’, formu-
lated in 1867 by Fleeming Jenkin in a review of On the Origin of Species.
According to Jenkin, even if a favourable trait were to arise in a popu-
lation, it would be quickly swamped through breeding between the fitter
individual and other individuals in the population. There could be no
novelty in evolution, and further, one would expect organisms in natural
populations to quickly become uniform.
To properly understand the Swamping Argument, one needs to know
that it relies on the hypothesis of blending inheritance. According to this
hypothesis, the traits of the offspring are the average of the traits of the
parents: for example, a large and a small parent will together produce
a medium-sized offspring. Darwin worked with a particular hypothesis of
blending inheritance that he termed ‘Pangenesis’. Pangenesis is the theory
that every cell in the parent body produces ‘gemmules’ or ‘pangenes’, which
contain the blueprint for how such a cell should develop. These gemmules
subsequently concentrate in the reproductive organs, from where they are
then passed on to the next generation (Darwin 1868). These gemmules
from both parents would then combine in the offspring to produce the traits
of the offspring, even though they could also be passed on in a ‘dormant’
state, and be activated only a number of generations later (see Geison
1969). Further, because such gemmules could be produced by the cells
at any time during development, the offspring would also inherit acquired
characteristics8.
8Hence Darwin was actually committed here to Lamarckian inheritance: the inher-
itance of used traits, and disinheritance of disused traits. Where he disagreed with
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In short, Darwin worked with a rather detailed (but ultimately false)
theory of inheritance, and this led to the Swamping Argument. However, at
the time it was not known that the fault lay with the theory of inheritance,
and not with the theory of natural selection. The argument was seen
as a decisive blow to the theory of natural selection, and contributed to
what Julian Huxley termed the ‘the Eclipse of Darwinism’ (Huxley 1942) –
referring to the period between the 1880s and 1930s when only a minority of
biologists believed natural selection was a major evolutionary mechanism.
Ironically, even before this controversy started, in the 1850s and 1860s
Gregor Mendel had formulated an alternative theory of particulate inheri-
tance, which claimed that traits did not develop from a fusion of parental
traits, but from discrete ‘factors’ inherited from parents. His most famous
experiment demonstrating this involved breeding two pure-line varieties of
Pisum (pea) with regard to binary characteristics, such as the form of the
seed (round or wrinkled) or the colour of the cotyledon or of the inside of
the pea (yellow or green). Mendel bred the two pure-line varieties, resulting
in a hybrid population of pea. This result was perfectly expected under
blending inheritance; however, what was surprising was what happened
when these hybrids were interbred. According to the blending inheritance
the offspring of hybrids would again be hybrids. Instead, Mendel found
renewed variance, following fixed ratios. These fixed ratios could be eas-
ily explained by representing the breeding as crossings between different
‘factors’, whence the diagram in Figure 4.2.
The distribution of traits in the third generation is also known as the
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (it was not explicitly formulated by Mendel,
but independently by G. H. Hardy and Wilhelm Weinberg in 1908). Note
that such an equilibrium would be impossible under blending inheritance:
instead, the equilibrium distribution would be uniformity.
Nonetheless, Mendel’s results were almost entirely ignored. Cultural
barriers may have been partly to blame; however, an important reason
was that ‘Mendelism’, as particulate inheritance became known, seemed
unable to account for quantitative characters (traits that vary continuously,
such as height or hair colour). The continuity of the phenotype seemed at
Lamarck’s view of evolution was in the role of inheritance for the transmutation of
species: Darwin believed natural selection to be a much more powerful cause than
inheritance of acquired characteristics.
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Figure 4.2: The Mendelian ratios.
odds with the discreteness of the ‘factors’ underlying them. Hence, while
particular inheritance worked very well to explain the shape and colour of
pea pods, it was seen as a curiosity instead of a general principle underlying
all inheritance.
This problem was overcome by Ronald Fisher, one of the first architects
of the Modern Synthesis, who showed in a 1918 paper that when multiple
factors were responsible for a single trait (by contrast, Mendel considered
only traits controlled by a single factor), and when environmental varia-
tions are taken into consideration, the result is a bell curve-like distribution
of phenotypic traits. Discrete factors can lead to continuous traits. In a
later paper Fisher also showed how Mendelism can address the Swamping
Argument. He showed how under particulate inheritance, to maintain the
same level of variance in a population, new variations need to occur much
less frequently with particulate inheritance than with blending inheritance.
In this way the work of Fisher both overcame an important obstacle for the
acceptance of Mendelism, and revealed its great advantage over blending
inheritance by showing how it resolved the Swamping Argument.
Many advances were made by applying (and in Fisher’s case, invent-
ing) statistical methods to Mendelism and natural selection. An important
contribution concerned how novel species could arise without presupposing
sudden large changes in phenotype (saltationism). A a model for this was
outlined by Sewall Wright in 1932, which held that species arose when novel
variations avoided extinction through drift by becoming isolated from the
larger population. In this way populations could, by means of drift and
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reproductive isolation, traverse a valley on what Wright called the ‘adap-
tive landscape’ and reach a different adaptive peak – which represented,
by assumption, a novel species.
A final issue, orthogonal to particulate vs. blending inheritance, con-
cerned whether acquired characteristics could be inherited or not (Lamar-
ckian inheritance). Indeed, one of the first scientists who rediscovered
Mendel’s work following a decades-long neglect, Hugo de Vries, used the
ideas to defend a particulate version of Pangenesis: the pangenes arise from
every cell in the body, but instead of fusing, as Darwin had envisaged, they
combine in Mendelian patterns.
It was the work of August Weissman which established the separation
of genetic material from somatic material, preventing the latter from play-
ing any role in inheritance, and thus precluding the inheritance of acquired
characteristics. Famously, Weissman chopped off the tail of mice for five
generations, and not once was a mouse born without a tail. Even though
this experiment strictly speaking does not refute sophisticated forms of
Lamarckism (which claimed only the disinheritance of disused characters,
not of externally manipulated ones), Weissman did introduce an influential
dualistic understanding of life: between genes (or ‘germ-plasm’ as Weiss-
man called it) that exist in perpetuity, handed down through generations,
and the organisms that house them.
In this way, the modern concept of the gene relies both on the Weissman
barrier between soma and germline, as well as on the idea of particulate
inheritance. Another result of these separate advances was a theory that
went on to become a new science – population genetics – that showed how
natural selection acting on genetic variation in a population is sufficient
to drive evolution through gradual steps. The new theory of population
genetics made other theories that posited unknown sources of mutation
superfluous – such as saltationism (evolution occurs in big jumps) or or-
thogenesis (variations tend to occur in certain lines of development).
The synthesis of Mendelism with Darwinism, together with the Weiss-
manian genetic programme, is what is commonly known as the Modern
Synthesis. There is some disagreement among biologists as to what pre-
cisely should be included and what excluded. Often the discovery of DNA
by Watson and Crick and the ‘central dogma’ of molecular biology are in-
cluded. This dogma holds that DNA determines phenotype through tran-
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scription to RNA and to proteins, and that this arrow of determination
cannot be reversed. In this respect the dogma represents a restatement of
the Weissman barrier with more causal detail.
There is also disagreement as to how much of the Extended Synthesis
is not already contained with the Modern Synthesis. For example, Laland,
Wray et al. (Laland et al. 2014) argue that phenomena such as plastic-
ity, niche construction and developmental bias (all to be discussed later
on) can be reduced to the fundamental processes explicitly recognized by
population genetics: natural selection, drift, mutation, recombination and
gene flow.
In the following, we will identify the Modern Synthesis with the follow-
ing five tenets (from Futuyma’s textbook):9
The major tenets of the evolutionary synthesis, then, were (1)
that populations contain genetic variation that arises by ran-
dom (i.e., not adaptively directed) mutation and recombina-
tion; (2) that populations evolve by changes in gene frequency
brought about by random genetic drift, gene flow, and espe-
cially natural selection; (3) that most adaptive genetic variants
have individually slight phenotypic effects so that phenotypic
changes are gradual (although some alleles with discrete effects
may be advantageous, as in certain color polymorphisms); (4)
that diversification comes about by speciation, which normally
entails the gradual evolution of reproductive isolation among
populations; (5) and that these processes, continued for suffi-
ciently long, give rise to changes of such great magnitude as
to warrant the designation of higher taxonomic levels (genera,
families, and so forth). (Futuyma 1998: 12; quoted in Pigliucci
and Muller 2010)
Especially important for our purposes are tenets (1), (2), (4) and (5),
which express a hypothesis of what mechanisms are dominant in evolution,
and how this mechanism shapes evolutionary histories.
9Wray and collaboraters might disagree with identifying the Modern Synthesis with
its historical form, see for example: “What Laland and colleagues term the standard
evolutionary theory is a caricature that views the field as static and monolithic.” (Laland
et al. 2014: 163). The issue as to what precisely the Modern Synthesis and Extended
Synthesis entail is a controversy I do not need to take sides on.
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3 Contingent Directionality
Since the Modern Synthesis entails claims about how states of evolution-
ary history are to be represented (gene lineages), and what mechanisms
dominate the transitions between states, it is a significant theory that
clearly puts constraints on interpretations of evolutionary history. Both
the Gouldian and convergence-centric interpretations are compatible with
the Modern Synthesis (even though Gould emphasizes developmental con-
straints more than the Modern Synthesis typically does). By contrast,
historical interpretations of evolutionary history, such as interpretations
based on vitalistic principles (e.g. Bergson) or orthogenesis (e.g. Eimer),
are, if not incompatible, at least not straightforwardly compatible.
3.1 Trends Driven by Natural Selection
The interpretation that fits perhaps most naturally with the Modern Syn-
thesis is Dawkins’s gene-centered view of evolution. According to Dawkins,
evolutionary history is a story of competition between gene lineages: geno-
types (or ‘replicators’) that engage in an evolutionary arms race in order to
replicate as often as possible. Phenotypes (or ‘interactors’) are produced as
weapons in this arms race, and the result is a view of evolutionary history
as one of continual competition, by various means, between gene lineages
(Dawkins 1982).
This permanent arms race can generate directional trends by causing
predators and prey, or parasites and hosts, to coevolve. Yet, even if such
trends are instantiated, the evolutionary outcomes they result in are con-
tingent. As Dawkins states in The Ancestor’s Tale, focused in particular
on the outcome of the human species, but applicable to outcomes more
generally:
It makes no more sense (and no less) to aim our historical nar-
rative towards Homo sapiens than towards any other modern
species — Octopus vulgaris, say, or Panthera leo or Sequoia
sempervirens (Dawkins 2004: 6).
It makes no sense to privilege one outcome over another, because all are
equally contingent on selection pressures. Thus, while natural selection
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may give rise to directional trends by predator-prey or host-parasite co-
evolutionary dynamics, the actual outcome is contingent on the types of
environment that arise.
In general, the Modern Synthesis allows for two types of directional
trend to be realized in evolutionary history, where both trends are con-
tingent occurrences. The first type of directional pattern is caused by
natural selection. Natural selection occurs when individuals with different
phenotypes reproduce at different expected rates in a population. These
differential reproduction rates are typically caused by certain features in
the organism-environment interaction. For example, if a moth population
is placed in an environment of soot-covered trees, the darker moths will
be less likely to be spotted by predators, and hence will be able, on aver-
age, to produce more offspring than the lighter moths. In this way, after
some generations, the moth population will have evolved to contain only
dark moths, which are camouflaged and in this sense ‘adapted’ to their
surroundings.
Natural selection is often represented as an optimizing process, driving
a population to an equilibrium state. However, this common picture is
controversial. In chapter 5 we will discuss how those skeptical of the causal
nature of natural selection believe that even if natural selection gives rise
to a directional trend, it is a purely contingent occurrence in the sense of
it being the result of a confluence of unrelated causal processes. We will
argue against this view, and show how the challenge of causal complexity is
relatively easily overcome, as long as we assume the organism-environment
to be effectively stable (this assumption is common in population genetics).
When this assumption is dropped, it is much more doubtful whether
natural selection can cause directional trends in evolution. If the same
moth population is placed in a different environment, what was previously
adaptive may no longer be so. In this way, this type of directionality also
depends on contingent initial states, namely the state of the environment.
If the environment changes, so does the direction of natural selection.10
This is particularly relevant for trends in evolutionary history as a whole,
10As we will see in chapter 6, it is tempting to use the arms-race dynamic (or ‘evolu-
tionary escalation’: Vermeij 1987) to argue why certain privileged adaptations (such as
complexity and energy-intensiveness) are non-contingent outcomes of evolution. How-
ever, I will argue that such trends are still contingent on certain environmental states
occurring more often than others.
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since environments have undergone extreme changes over the course of
evolutionary history.
3.2 Trends Arising from Phylogenetic Constraints
If the contingency of the first type of trend arises from changing exter-
nal processes (i.e., changing environments), the contingency of the sec-
ond arises from changing internal processes. This type of directionality,
recognized by the Gouldian interpretation, arises from what Crick 1968
described as ‘frozen accidents’. Originally Crick used the term ‘frozen ac-
cident’ to describe a hypothesis of how DNA did not originate for any
special reason, but once it came into being it characterized all subsequent
life. However, the term is used more generally to describe how a contin-
gent event can nonetheless constrain subsequent evolution. Certain areas
in possibility space are precluded and are made improbable, and in this
sense the event introduces a ‘directionality’ into the subsequent evolution:
certain paths become more probable than others.
We have mentioned such constraints on many places in this dissertation
without going into much detail on how such constraints actually constrain
evolutionary trajectories. The general phenomenon by which past evo-
lutionary events can constrain subsequent evolutionary paths is termed
phylogenetic inertia. In analogy to inertia in Newtonian physics11, Hansen
and Orzack describe it as “the tendency of a trait to resist a current adap-
tive force” (Hansen and Orzack 2005: 2063) – by reducing the available
variation natural selection can act on.
However, phylogenetic inertia need not only refer to the evolution of a
trait, but can refer to the way an evolutionary trajectory more generally
can be constrained by previous adaptations, mutations or drift events (cf.
Johnson et al. 1999: 759). Further, phylogenetic inertia can also refer to a
tendency to resist drift or mutational changes. In this respect, McKitrick’s
definition 1993 of the related concept of phylogenetic constraint is the most
general: “any result or component of the phylogenetic history of a lineage
11A pre-Synthesis (and refuted) sense of phylogenetic inertia is rectilinearity, or the
tendency of phyla ‘to evolve in one direction without deviation’ (Simpson 1944b: 150).
However, unlike in Newtonian dynamics, constant change is not equivalent to stasis in
evolutionary dynamics. (See also McShea and Brandon (2010) for an argument that
stasis, not change, indicates the presence of evolutionary forces.)
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that prevents an anticipated course of evolution in that lineage”.
In this way, phylogenetic inertia can be understood a very broad phe-
nomenon but may refer to a variety of specific types of constraint. While
such constraints are broadly compatible with the Modern Synthesis frame-
work, as surveyed above, they tended to be ignored until the work of Gould
and others in the 1980s. Today the biological constraint literature has be-
come too complex to be briefly surveyed12; however, following Shanahan
(2011), it is useful to distinguish between three basic types of constraint.
The first is genetic constraints: if some variations of the genotype are
not present, then this will preclude certain evolutionary trajectories. For
example, Antarctic fish do not have the genes that code for the proteins and
regulatory mechanisms needed to live in warm waters; hence, the current
genetic variation precludes an evolutionary path where some Antarctic fish
species migrates to a warmer environment.
Such a constraint could be overcome by the introduction of a genotype
into the population; however, this is not always possible due to under-
lying developmental constraints. A simple example of a developmental
constraint is the difficulty for mutations in developmentally central genes
to be viable – such as the Hox gene, which determines important fea-
tures of the body plan (such as placement of limbs). The Hox gene is an
example of a gene playing an important role in ‘upstream’ development,
and when it would be changed, all the processes ‘downstream’ would need
to be correspondingly changed as well. Hence the difficulty of modifying
such upstream genes: the likelihood that a mutation would simultaneously
change all those genes responsible for downstream developmental processes
as well is extremely low (Shanahan 2011).
Such a constraint could be overcome by the introduction of a genotype
into the population; however, this is not always possible due to under-
lying developmental constraints13. A simple example of a developmental
constraint is the difficulty for mutations in developmentally central genes
to be viable – such as the Hox gene, which determines important fea-
tures of the body plan (such as placement of limbs). The Hox gene is an
example of a gene playing an important role in ‘upstream’ development,
12See for example Antonovics and van Tienderen (1991) or Arnold (1992).
13In the framework of Arnold (1992), developmental constraints give a deeper expla-
nation why genetic constraints exist.
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and when it would be changed, all the processes ‘downstream’ would need
to be correspondingly changed as well. Hence the difficulty of modifying
such upstream genes: the likelihood that a mutation would simultaneously
change all those genes responsible for downstream developmental processes
as well is extremely low.
A final example of constraint – one that illustrates how difficult it
may be in practice to distinguish between trends resulting from natural
selection and trends resulting from ‘constraints’ – is fitness constraint.
Fitness constraints occur when a certain phenotype cannot be realized
given the current phenotype because the intermediary forms are maladap-
tive. Shanahan (2011) gives the example of kangaroo locomotion: even if
bipedal running would be more adaptive for the kangaroo lineage, there
would be no way it could evolve because the intermediary forms in between
leaping and running are maladaptive. In this way, fitness constraints may
be a consequence of underlying developmental constraints that prevent
certain adaptive forms from appearing in a population.
4 The Challenge of Causal Complexity for Evolu-
tion by Natural Selection
In this way, the Modern Synthesis gives no theoretical reason to believe
that any evolutionary path should be more probable than another if the
tape of life were to be played from the beginning. Even while certain di-
rections may arise through natural selection, these directional trends are
likely to be short-lived, as they will be broken by changes in the envi-
ronment. Even if they are not short-lived, they are contingent, and do
not characterize all possible evolutionary histories. Directional trends may
arise without natural selection, for instance through the action of evolu-
tionary constraints, but very different constraints might have arisen had a
slightly different evolutionary path been taken initially.
In this way, while the Gouldian and convergence-centric interpretations
disagree as to how strong constraints are relative to natural selection, the
fundamental concepts they both rely on imply that all directional trends
are contingent. This is not so much a problem for the Gouldian narrative,
as it is for the convergence-centric narrative, since it aims to show how
certain outcomes are ‘inevitable’.
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This does not mean that there are no other resources in contemporary
biological theory with which to overcome the challenge of causal complex-
ity. In particular, it is increasingly being recognized that the phenomena of
plasticity and niche construction, emphasized in the Extended Synthesis,
significantly change our understanding of the causal structure of natural
selection.
In the rest of part II, therefore, we will focus on natural selection in
more detail in order to examine what types of patterns may be expected in
subsequent evolution. In particular, the discussion will target two aspects
of the challenge of causal complexity, each corresponding to two differ-
ent aspects of the complexity of natural environments: the great number
of independent causal processes that characterize organism-environment
interaction, and the variability of these processes.
The first one casts doubt not only on the possibility of making a gen-
eralization about the types of trend that can be expected in evolution by
natural selection, but also on whether natural selection can even be con-
sidered a causal process at all. When evolution by natural selection is
analyzed at a sufficiently fine-grained level, what appears is that ‘natural
selection’ is simply individuals producing varying numbers of offspring in a
population. Natural selection then appears to be an arbitrary abstraction,
projected onto individual-level causal processes for explanatory reasons.
In no way does it cause population change, let alone directional trends. If
directional trends occur, they are the result of a confluence of individual-
level causal processes – in a way similar to how an unloaded fair die might
still land on six multiple times in a row. This aspect of the challenge of
causal complexity is discussed in the next chapter, where it is called the
‘no privileged abstraction’ argument.
The second challenge is that variability in the environment implies
that natural selection will change its ‘direction’ along with the environ-
ment. This challenge has been alluded to in chapter 3 when discussing
the way in which the outcome of convergent evolution is sensitive to initial
environmental conditions. We will discuss this in more detail in chapter
6.
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Chapter 5
Local Symmetries in Evolution
by Natural Selection
In this chapter I will be examining the causal nature of natural selec-
tion, and what generalizations can be made about evolutionary patterns
resulting from natural selection given the fact that many environmental
processes may ‘interrupt’ natural selection. I will be situating this discus-
sion in the context of the debate between the statisticalist and causalist
interpretations of natural selection, and in the context of issues concerning
how drift and natural selection can be distinguished.
Natural selection, both in biology textbooks and philosophical repre-
sentations (e.g. Sober 1984), is often represented as some kind of Newto-
nian force, with magnitude and direction, originating in fitness differences
and driving evolutionary change. By contrast, the metaphor has been re-
jected by the statisticalist view of natural selection (e.g. Matthen and
Ariew 2002, 2009; Walsh et al. 2002), which claims natural selection is a
mere book-keeping device, a way to keep count of the genuinely causal in-
teractions that take place between individual organisms. Not even a cause,
selection is an epiphenomenon, useful only for explanatory purposes.
While there are multiple ways of parsing this specific debate, the ap-
proach I will be adopting – consistent with that in part II – is to examine
how the statisticalist view arises from the complexity of the organism-
environment interaction and from the ensuing reference class problems.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, complexity here refers to the very
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large number of independent processes that affect how often an organism
will have reproduced by the end of its life, and the reference class problems
that arise from this reflect the absence of any privileged abstraction away
from this complexity.
Such themes have been noted before (for example, Brandon 1990, 2005;
Kaplan 2013; Strevens 2016), but remain, on the whole, underemphasized.
On the basis of a few assumptions about organism-environment interac-
tion, a principled argument for the statisticalist view can be reconstructed,
somewhat in the following vein (to be laid out in detail later): most of
the individual-level interactions that affect reproductive outcome are ab-
stracted away from in an explanation by natural selection, but it is the
complex totality of organism-environment interactions that in fact causes
populations to change. Hence natural selection is an epiphenomenon with-
out any causal impact, a statistical apportioning of the fundamental causal
reality.
Some of the main causalist counterarguments fail to make inroads on
this (‘no-privileged-abstraction’) argument. One such counterargument
is that natural selection is a cause insofar as intervening in natural se-
lection at the population level ‘makes a difference’ to how populations
evolve (Reisman and Forber 2005; Millstein 2006; Shapiro and Sober 2007;
Glennan 2009; Gildenhuys 2014). Examples of interventions include mod-
ifying the selection coefficients and fitness values (Forber and Reisman
2007; Shapiro and Sober 2007), or introducing new phenotypes (Millstein
2006). This counterargument was rejected by Matthen and Ariew (2009)
and Walsh (2007; 2010), who pointed out in various ways that the corre-
lations between natural selection and different population parameters are
mathematical in nature, not causal.
Furthermore, attributing fitness values to a group of individual organ-
isms already presupposes a certain abstraction away from the complexity
of organism-environment interaction, and thus such counterarguments beg
the question. Hence, the question to be focused on instead is: are the
abstractions involved in explanations by natural selection problematic for
selection’s supposedly causal nature?
I will seek to undermine the no-privileged-abstraction argument by
considering a class of counterexample: tendencies towards stable equilib-
rium. A population tending towards stable equilibrium is strong evidence
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for natural selection (Endler 1986); such a tendency also allows certain ab-
stractions to be privileged over others. In particular, the individual-level
processes, which do not make any causal difference at the longest time-
scales (over multiple generations) and thus do not make a difference to the
outcome state,– may be abstracted away from. In such cases natural selec-
tion may be understood as a force, with definite direction and magnitude,
driving populations towards equilibrium.
Not all instances of evolution by natural selection actually tend to-
wards stable equilibrium; in particular, populations undergoing frequency-
dependent selection may fail to settle down at all. Such cases provide a
challenge to the equilibrium model of selection defended in this chapter,
and towards the end of the chapter I will outline two possible ways in
which they can be dealt with.
Nonetheless, perhaps the most general consequence of the account pre-
sented here is that it implies an alternative (or modified1) metaphor to that
of Newtonian force. Natural selection is closer in nature to entropic forces,
which are non-fundamental forces that originate in a system’s statistical
tendency to evolve towards a configuration with higher entropy. While the
concept of entropy may not be applicable to evolution by natural selection
(populations are far-from-equilibrium systems), natural selection, like en-
tropic forces, and in contrast to typical Newtonian forces, does not have
a localizable spatiotemporal source, and does not produce movement but
a reconfiguration of the system. Some on the causalist side of the debate
may be uncomfortable with the suggestion; however, entropic forces are not
epiphenomenal: they have real consequences (e.g. osmosis, the Casimir ef-
fect), and the distinction between fundamental and entropic forces may not
be so clear-cut at the level of fundamental physics (e.g. Verlinde 2011).
The chapter is structured as follows: in the first section I will make a
principled case for the statisticalist position, and in the second section will
criticize it in light of how field biologists test the presence of natural selec-
tion. In the third and fourth sections I present a model of natural selection
as a causal tendency towards stable equilibrium, and deal with potential
objections. The final section is a discussion about force metaphors, and
1There is no consensus as to what precisely are the defining conditions (e.g. additiv-
ity) of Newtonian forces. A detailed discussion of this would bring us too far from the
purposes of this chapter the topic at hand, but see Wilson (2007) or Stephens (2010).
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about the limitations of the account.
1 The No Privileged Abstraction Argument
The interaction between an organism and its environment is, generally
speaking, complex. More often than not, environments are chaotic, char-
acterized by ever-changing weather, geography and ecology. An organism
itself is composed of many interacting parts, across numerous hierarchical
structures – organ systems, organs, tissues, cells, nutrient gradients, etc.
The resulting interaction between organism and environment has such a
vast number of degrees of freedom as to make any parametrization practi-
cally impossible. Interactions can be biotic, such as competitive, symbiotic
and parasitic interactions, or abiotic, such as extracting resources from the
environment, or being affected by fundamental forces in the environment.
While ecological models focus on only a few of these interactions at a
time, in general, we can assume that the number of degrees of freedom
characterizing the actual organism-environment interaction is very large.2
Yet even among these difference-making interactions between organism
and environment, many will be abstracted away from in explanations by
natural selection. The vicinity of a moth to a forest fire is likely to be
ignored — unless, of course, the moth possesses some (perverse) herita-
ble trait that makes it more likely to seek out fires. Once-off interactions
are ignored, and interactions linked to the traits of an organism are in-
cluded. On what basis are such traits selected, and what is their relation
to the fitness (understood as the expected reproductive outcome3) of the
organism?
The relation between trait and organism fitness is a difficult one —
and, judging from a recent exchange between Sober (2013) and Pence and
Ramsey (2015), the two concepts seem intertwined. Pence and Ramsey
have argued that definitions of trait fitness depend on organismic fitness,
roughly because relevance for organismic reproductive success is the only
2To emphasize: complexity is here taken to refer to the number of degrees of freedom,
not functional complexity, or number of part-types (see Strevens 2003; McShea 2000).
3There are more accurate and sophisticated measures of fitness available (see Pence
and Ramsey 2013), but how precisely fitness values are extracted from life histories does
not materially affect the argument of this chapter.
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measure by which to judge the relevance of a trait. By contrast, Sober has
argued that organismic fitness is an actuarial quantity, estimated on the
basis of how various traits affect organismic reproductive outcome.
Regardless of which fitness concept is the more fundamental one, sta-
tisticalists have denied that either measure of fitness can be estimated in a
non-arbitrary way. Matthen (2009) has proposed that fitness measures are
obtained by means of the condition of metaconstancy : a process may be
excluded from consideration only if it is neutral with respect to (i.e. prob-
abilistically uninfluenced by) all heritable properties. There is no heritable
trait of a moth that correlates with its proximity to forest fires, and hence
the evolutionary biologist may ignore it. Thus, in explanations by natural
selection the causal difference-making processes that do not correlate with
a heritable trait are to be ignored (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Fitness abstracts away
from most causal processes.
The consequence for individual
fitness is that there is no privileged
way of calculating the probability
that an organism X will have n
offspring. If we exclude all non-
metaconstant processes, we may
arrive at a probability p; if we take
some other non-metaconstant pro-
cess (e.g. the strength of the wind)
into consideration, we might esti-
mate a probability p′ 6= p. The
value p reflects a particular theo-
retical interest, not an objective propensity. Yet it is the probability dis-
tribution (over possible reproductive outcomes) that takes into account all
difference-making processes that corresponds to how the population ac-
tually changes from generation to generation. Individual fitness, as it is
usually defined, only picks out one particular aspect of population change.
Trait fitness, taken here as the expected reproductive outcome of an
organism given a trait, does not fare much better4. The probability of
an individual having n offspring given trait T may depend on an indefi-
4One can also define trait fitness as the expected number of duplicates in the offspring
generation. However this definition runs into similar problems due to its dependence
on organismic fitness (see also Pence and Ramsey 2015).
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nite number of other unspecified traits T1,T2, . . . and so on — individual
organisms are by presupposition complex entities. According to which of
the other traits T1,T2, . . . an organism (of the same species5) possesses,
a different probability will be obtained. There is no privileged way of
calculating trait fitness either.
In a way this argument is fundamentally a restatement of the reference
class problem in a biological context. Individual organisms can be classified
into groups in many different ways, due to the complexity of the individual-
environment interactions, and hence there is a real problem in estimating
the probabilities underlying the actual births and deaths.
One may think a simple way out of the reference class problem for trait
fitness would be to exhaustively specify the traits of X, and to estimate
the causal impact of T by comparing X to an identical organism that is
missing T. Thus the reference class of X comprises the individuals with T
in a hypothetical, infinite population where all the other traits T1,T2, . . .
are equally represented. Cannot one thus arrive at a privileged calculation
of P (w = n|T)? Selection ‘for’ camouflage would then be represented by
the quantity s = E(w|T)−E(w|¬T), where E(w) represents the expected
reproductive outcome. In principle this would indeed be possible; however,
the problem is then that the quantity s may not describe natural selection
in the actual population, where many of the traits T1,T2, . . . may be
absent.
The no-privileged-abstraction argument allows some key statisticalist
positions to be reconstructed:
(1) Fitness can only be estimated through regression. Since some difference-
making processes are excluded from the explanation by abstraction, there
is no a priori way of estimating their impact on the probabilities of sur-
viving and reproducing. Is the probability of having two offspring given
the trait of camouflage .9 or .5? The value of that probability will be af-
fected by the various causal processes impacting the individual, and these
impacts will necessarily remain unknown since they were deliberately ab-
stracted away from (see Matthen 2009). Fitness values can be estimated
only retrospectively, by a statistical regression on the actually occurred
births and deaths in a population. Only by extrapolating from past indi-
5We will not consider the question whether organisms of a given species can even be
associated with a set of traits as this is outside the parameters of this investigation.
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vidual events does fitness have some predictive value. In this way, fitness
values are mere statistical descriptors, not causes of actual frequencies of
births and deaths.
(2) Fitness components are not additive. The probabilistic relevance
of having both traits T1 and T2 cannot be predicted from the relevance
that T1 and T2 have by themselves, because the traits may be causally de-
pendent (Matthen and Ariew 2002; Matthen 2009). For example (adapted
from Stephens (2004)), having resistance to malaria may increase fitness
by p and being able to run fast may increase fitness by q, but in general we
cannot know what fitness an organism will have when it has both traits,
due to the unknown interaction between the two traits. Selection is not a
causal force that can be simply divided into components.
(3) Natural selection refers to the mathematical relation between change
in frequencies and variance in rates, exemplified by Li’s theorem. Selection
is variation in fitness, and since fitness is only a statistical descriptor of
actual population, selection is not distinct from population change. To
say a population is changing and to say individuals are reproducing at
differential rates is to say the same thing. The upshot is that selection is
not a cause mediating between fitness differences and population change
in the way that the gravitational force mediates between mass distribution
and acceleration of bodies (as represented in Sober 1984); rather it is more
like the shadow of a flagpole (Walsh 2000; Matthen and Ariew 2009).
This is also why causalist appeals to interventionist causality fail (Wood-
ward 2003; Reisman and Forber 2005; Millstein 2006; Shapiro and Sober
2007; Glennan 2009): while it is conceivable to intervene on the gravita-
tional force alone while keeping mass distribution constant (for example
by changing the value of the gravitational constant), it is not conceivable
to manipulate selection without changing fitness differences. Neither does
the argument imply that there are no population-level causes (as claimed
by Shapiro and Sober (2007)): the epiphenomenality of selection is not a
consequence of its population-level nature, but of its mathematical nature.
In summary, the no-privileged-abstraction argument can be represented
in the following format:
139
CHAPTER 5. LOCAL SYMMETRIES IN EVOLUTION BY
NATURAL SELECTION
(1) The space of life histories Ω is characterized a high number
of degrees of freedom, where each independent variable makes a
difference for the reproductive outcome of a life history.
(2) Fitness (expected reproductive outcome) is specified by ignoring
all degrees of freedom except a select few, dependent on explanatory
interests.
(3) Yet evolutionary change, being constituted by individual births
and deaths, is affected by all degrees of freedom of Ω, and is not a
subset of them (from (1)).
∴ (4) Natural selection, defined as variation in fitness, describes a
particular pattern in population change, but since it does not refer
to the processes that define Ω, it does not correspond to the cause
of population change (from (2) and (3))
2 Epistemic Routes to Natural Selection
In light of the preceding argument, the central problem becomes an episte-
mological one: can selection (and drift) be estimated from complex, natural
populations – and not idealized toy models – in such a way that we can
be justified in believing that selection is an objective cause, and not just
one way among many of statistically apportioning the underlying causal
reality?
While a general solution to the reference class problem is likely im-
possible (Hájek 2007), I will argue there is a way out in the particular
case of evolution by natural selection. In this section I will lay the ground
by arguing that previous causalist arguments based on manipulating ab-
stract models do not work, and that instead we should examine how field
biologists test for selection in natural populations.
2.1 Abstract Models
One way the causality for selection has been argued for is by taking de-
viations from certain null models, such as Hardy-Weinberg equilibria, as
evidence of the causal impact of selection (e.g. Sober 1984; Stephens 2004).
Further, since deviation from those models indicates the presence of selec-
tion, it is sometimes claimed that natural selection must be an objective
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cause of evolutionary change, and not merely some arbitrary statistical
redescription of individual births and deaths (Gildenhuys 2014).
However, I would argue against the claim that “departure from Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium is sufficient (rather than necessary) for thinking that
some force must have been at work” (Stephens 2004: 559), for two reasons.
First, to claim this is to ignore the fact that Hardy-Weinberg equilib-
ria heavily abstract away from the complexity of individual-environment
interactions, and that they do not necessarily capture change in real pop-
ulations, even if there is no natural selection at work (see also Brandon
(2006)). Some of the presuppositions of the Hardy-Weinberg null model
are that individuals reproduce sexually, mate randomly and do not over-
lap with their offspring. Even when the test is properly applicable, Endler
(1986: 65) notes that it is a weak test statistically and that by itself the
method cannot demonstrate selection.
Second, on a more fundamental level, even if the presence of natural
selection were to be established despite the difficulties, it still would not
be able to adjudicate between a statisticalist and a causalist interpretation
of natural selection, and would not establish the presence of a ‘force’. The
ambiguity in divvying up the individual-level causal processes would re-
main. For example, if the frequency of the recessive homozygous genotype
aa is higher than expected by the Hardy-Weinberg model, this only means
that the genotype aa is correlated with a larger number of offspring in the
population under consideration. It may turn out that some other allele B
is not present at all in the population, and if it were, that different correla-
tions between aa and offspring number would be obtained (see discussion
about trait fitness in previous section). Thus the test does not establish
an objective fitness differential between aa and the other traits.
Another causalist strategy has been to draw on direct estimates of se-
lection, through response to selection (by means of the breeder’s equation)
or selection coefficients. Manipulating selection coefficients correlates with
population change, and hence is taken as a sign that selection must be
causal (e.g. Forber and Reisman 2007). However, even here the ambigui-
ties cannot be avoided, since they turn up in the manipulation of the co-
efficients. Coefficients are not manipulated directly: what is manipulated
in practice are traits, trait frequencies and trait-environment interactions,
and that such manipulations lead to population change is perfectly compat-
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ible with an epiphenomenalist interpretation of the selection coefficients.
Whether or not changes in selection coefficients can be neutrally estimated
on the basis of such manipulations is precisely the point of contention.
Even the arguments used by Sober in his well-known distinction be-
tween selection-of and selection-for rely on prior abstraction. His well-
known illustration of the distinction between selection-of and selection-
for relies on a toy model, where organisms (marbles) have two properties
(colour and size) and have a single difference-making interaction with their
environment (size of the hole). Thus selection for size seems to cause the
change in distribution in the marble population. The problem, however, is
that real-life organisms possess many more than two traits, interact with
the environment in more than a single way (fitting through a hole), and
that both the number of relevant traits and relevant interactions is un-
known. The question at hand is whether such abstract models can be
given a causal interpretation; hence they cannot be relied upon to defend
a causal interpretation of natural selection.
2.2 Natural Populations
While abstract models cannot be used to craft a response to the no-
privileged- abstraction argument, it is helpful to consider the methods
used by field biologists to establish the presence of selection. Such meth-
ods cast doubt on whether truly there is not any non-arbitrary way out
of the reference class problem. Of course, whether or not these methods
are sufficient to establish selection as a cause of evolution is a separate
question, and will be considered in the next section.
In actual field studies, estimating selection coefficients is often very
difficult because of the variability in the temporal dynamics of population
change. Siepielski et al. (2009), in a review of replicated field studies,
indicate that, in general, natural selection varies in strength, direction
(positive and negative) and form (linear and nonlinear selection) from one
generation to the next.
This variability in selection dynamics is a reflection of the complexity
of individual-environment interaction. Environments are rarely static, and
slight changes in biotic or abiotic variables may have large effects on the
patterns of births and deaths exhibited. Ideally we should be able to
exactly replicate population and environmental structure as to establish
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whether population changes are simply noise or follow an expected pattern;
however, in the vast majority of cases this is not possible. Even when
adequate temporal replicates exist, the duration of the study is very rarely
longer than a couple of years (Siepielski et al. 2009).
In such cases, where variability is so ubiquitous, it becomes difficult
to rebut statisticalist challenges. Many of the assumptions in popula-
tion genetics models (infinite populations, static environments, absence of
linkage, and so on) are made in order to gain mathematical tractability.
However, while variability and complexity may be eliminated in abstract
models, they are more or less permanent features of real environments,
and one may legitimately question whether such abstract models can be
used to judge on questions of causality when it is unclear whether even the
basic inputs of the models (such as selection coefficients) reflect objective
properties of organisms and populations.
Nonetheless, there is a powerful group of methods for cutting through
short term and individual-level complexity: tests for stable equilibrium.
Endler (1986) describes two ways in which equilibria may be used to es-
tablish the presence of natural selection. The first method (method V)
requires longitudinal studies on trait frequency distributions, and tests ei-
ther for long-term stability in frequencies, or steady directional change. Of
the two, an observed directionality is taken as stronger evidence for natural
selection. However, it is not foolproof: Endler describes how simulations of
coin-toss runs surprisingly often give rise to (temporary) directional trends.
Even though a single unbiased coin-tossing experiment leads to heads as
often as it does to tails, the probability of a significant run of either heads
or tails is surprisingly high.
The second method (VI) has a manipulative character: a population
at stasis is perturbed, and a subsequent observation of directional change,
either back to its previous state or towards a new state, is taken as strong
evidence for natural selection. One implementation of the perturbation
entails manipulating the trait frequencies of the population. Reversion to
the previous distribution of frequencies is taken as strong evidence for the
presence of natural selection. Changes in the environment constitute an-
other type of perturbation. Such perturbations can be human induced (e.g.
pesticides) or natural (e.g. volcanic eruptions, epidemics), and can occur
abruptly or gradually. An example of where a gradual change in environ-
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ment is used to establish selection is the well-known study of moth evolu-
tion in response to increasing air pollution in Britain (Kettlewell 1955).
Such methods are not always possible. Sometimes there are multiple
equilibria in the system, complicating the interpretation. Further, not all
forms of natural selection, such as certain types of frequency dependent
selection, seem to tend towards equilibrium. Nonetheless, when there is a
tendency towards equilibrium, it can be discerned in longitudinal studies
as a long-term effective change in population structure, despite short-term
fluctuations.
3 The Equilibrium Model of Causality
While such methods undercut the generality of the no-privileged-abstraction
argument, in themselves they do not constitute a direct argument for the
causality of selection. In this section such a direct argument will be at-
tempted. We will assume that a natural population is undergoing direc-
tional change in its trait frequency distribution, and is evolving towards
a stable equilibrium. This assumption may be thought of as the outcome
of an empirical field investigation. In the next section the assumption will
be discussed more critically, especially with regards to the worry that this
introduces some arbitrary abstraction.
I will first argue that natural selection, as tendency towards equilib-
rium, is a cause according to the (probabilistic) counterfactual understand-
ing of causality (e.g. Lewis 1986); subsequently I will argue it is a force
with direction and magnitude.
3.1 Relation and Relata
Let us first briefly outline the landscape of accounts of the causality of
selection with regard to two reference points: the causal relation and causal
relata. This will allow for the view defended here to be situated with more
precision.
Concerning relation, I subscribe to the statisticalist criticism that the
relation is not one of causal production (Matthen and Ariew 2002): evo-
lution by natural selection is not a spatiotemporally continuous process
where some physical mark is transmitted, or quantity conserved (Salmon
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1984; Dowe 2000). However, most causalist accounts have drawn on a
difference-making relation. In light of problems arising from the use of the
interventionalist criterion of causality to adjudicate on the epiphenomenal-
ity of population-level processes (Matthen and Ariew 2009; Baumgartner
2010), and in light of the fact that such interventions often depend on
abstract models, I will avoid that specific conception of causality (as does
e.g. Huneman 2012). Instead, I will consider whether natural selection
represents a probabilistic counterfactual relation between its relata (e.g.
Lewis 1986).
Even within the counterfactual option there are a number of possible
accounts according to how the relata — the source and effect of natural
selection — are to be understood. One point of controversy concerns the
level of analysis at which the source and effect of natural selection are
to be located. Bouchard and Rosenberg (2004) propose that the source
of natural selection consists in pair-wise individual-level competitive dif-
ferences and that the effect consists in pair-wise differences in (expected)
individual reproductive outcomes (Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004). I follow
Millstein’s (2006) criticism of this proposal, and consider natural selection
at the population level.
A further point of contention is whether the source of selection is
(population-level) fitness differences and whether the effect is changes in
trait frequencies (e.g. Sober 1984; Millstein 2006). One problem here is
that natural selection and changes in trait frequencies are mathematical,
not causal, consequences of fitness differences (Matthen 2009). Another
problem, as argued previously in this chapter, is that it is not clear whether
fitness variables are objective in the same way as mass or acceleration, and
hence to claim selection is causal because fitness values can be manipulated
is to beg the question.
By contrast, the proposal of this chapter can be summarized in the
following scheme:
population with trait distribution d and in environment E →
natural selection → directional change in trait frequencies
The vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) specifies the relative frequency of each of
the n traits that characterize organisms in the population. I will now argue
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that this proposal ensures that each of the relations (between selection and
source, and between selection and effect) is causally counterfactual.
First, with regard to the former relation, the combination of n traits
and environment E gives rise to a great number of biotic and abiotic
organism-environment interactions. Some of those interactions will make
no net difference to the effective direction of population change, while oth-
ers will. Natural selection is only constituted by the latter interactions.6
Understood in this way, natural selection is not a mathematical con-
sequence of d and E because the causal interactions between organisms
of the population and between organisms and environment are not math-
ematical consequences of a specification of d and E. (For example, if the
laws of physics were changed, the same d and E would give rise to different
causal interactions.) Further, if d and E were different, we would likely
see different causal interactions, and thus a different process of natural
selection.
Second, the effect of natural selection is to be sought in the direc-
tion of change, not the fact of change. This proposal contrasts with the
accounts presented by Millstein (2006), Matthen and Ariew (2009), and
Huneman (2012), who all locate the effect of natural selection in the fact
of population change. The problem with the latter proposal is that pop-
ulation change is just as likely to occur where natural selection is absent
— such as when drift is present, or when the population evolves towards
a Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium state. Hence the question to be asked is
not whether selection causes an accumulation of births and deaths, but
whether selection causes a stable trend in the accumulation of births and
deaths.
One could compare the effect of natural selection on a population to
the effect of an electric field on the random walk of a charged particle in a
gas. The gas has a certain temperature, and the particles collide randomly;
however, because of the electric field there is a bias in a certain direction.
The field does not cause the movement of the particle itself, but does make
a difference for the long-term ‘effective’ path the particle will take (Figure
6This is continuous with Huneman’s (2012) definition of selection pressures as eco-
logically “reliable factors which differentially affect the trait types” (185). The only
difference is that reliableness is specifically defined here in reference to an effective
directionality.
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Figure 5.2: Actual versus effective evolutionary change.
5.2). In this way natural selection’s causal influence is to be sought in
the effective direction of population change instead of change itself, as the
latter could also be the result of random fluctuation (drift).
The relation between natural selection and effect is causally counter-
factual: were natural selection not present, directional evolution would be
much less likely. Drift could in principle give rise to directional evolution,
but the probability of this occurring diminishes the longer the directional
change lasts. Further, natural selection is not sufficient for a directional
change in frequencies to take hold, as natural selection can be counteracted
by drift.
At this point, one may rehearse an objection, going back to Sober
(1983), that equilibrium explanations are not causal (see also Huneman
(2010)for a generalization of this argument). Sober argued that explana-
tions where the outcome state is explained as a stable equilibrium state are
not causal because such explanations do not pick out the actual cause of
the outcome state. For example, if a marble is let go at the rim of a bowl,
and proceeds to find its way to the lowest point of the bowl, we explain
its outcome state by the shape of the bowl, not by the particular path the
marble followed. In other words, we explain by referring to a disjunction
of possible causal scenarios (1983: 84): if a system had not followed this
particular pathway to equilibrium, it would have attained equilibrium by
another path.
However, this does not present a problem, because Sober is drawing on
a different notion of causality. If we mean by cause the actual, specific path
a population takes on the way to equilibrium, then indeed an explanation
by natural selection does not pick out any actual cause. However, a coun-
terfactual difference-making relation exists between the equilibrium state
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and the directionality of the trend leading up to the equilibrium. Expla-
nations by natural selection are causal insofar as they pick out directional
trends as causes of the outcome state (equilibrium).
A second objection concerns the directional evolution induced by the
two competing models of zero-force laws: Hardy-Weinberg (H-W) equilib-
ria (Sober 1984) and drift (Brandon 2006). Do the population dynamics
described by drift or by the H-W equilibria not lead to equilibrium states?
If only drift acts on a population, then indeed the population will
continue to change its structure until one trait becomes fixed. However,
the absorbing state of fixation is not a stable equilibrium, but a neutral
equilibrium state. When perturbed from the state of fixation of some
trait, the population will not necessarily drift back to the same state, but
may drift to the fixation of some other trait. The process of drift towards
fixation is like a drunk man’s walk on a sidewalk with a gutter on either
side. Once the drunk man falls into the gutter he stays there, but does
not necessarily return to the gutter if pulled out by someone. There is no
tendency towards falling into one particular gutter.
In an analogous way, an H-W equilibrium state is not stable either.
If (p, q, r) is a H-W equilibrium state (p and r represent the relative fre-
quencies of the homozygous traits AA and BB; q represents the relative
frequency of the heterozygous trait AB), and is perturbed to (p + δp, q +
δq, r+ δr), then this perturbed state will only evolve back towards (p, q, r)
if δp = δr and δq = −2δp (see appendix). H-W equilibrium points are not
stable equilibrium points, as they are stable only along one specific line in
state space.
In this way, if natural selection were not present, regardless of which
zero-force model one adheres to, there would not be a trend towards stable
equilibrium. Drift may lead to population change, but only selection leads
to a robust, multigenerational trend in the change of population structure.
3.2 Direction and Magnitude
In instances where natural selection causes a population to trend towards
a stable equilibrium state, the stable equilibrium is a reference point that
allows a direction to be ascribed to the population change. Note that,
stabilizing, disrupting and directional selection all are ‘directional’ in this
sense, since they tend either towards the fixation of a particular trait, or
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towards stable polymorphism.
The magnitude of selection can be estimated in the regular way, through
the response to selection. The only difference in the equilibrium framework
is that what matters is the effective response to selection. In the case only
a single trait is selected, the breeder’s equation is applicable.7
Reff = H
2seff
where H2 is the heritability, Reff the effective response to selection, and
seff the (effective) strength of natural selection.
Thus, if a population never reaches the equilibrium state (N → ∞),
the effective response to selection is zero, even though the magnitude of
selection may be nonzero. In this case the tendency towards the equi-
librium state does not translate into any actual trend. Some underlying
reasons for this can be seen by separating heritability into genetic and
environmental variation: H2 = VG/(VG + VE) where VG is the portion of
total phenotypic variance that can be explained by genetic variance, and
VE is the portion explainable by variation in the environment. Thus, as
drift increases, the environment will have an increasingly variable effect
on the population, and hence the effective response to selection goes to
zero. Likewise, if traits are transmitted poorly between generations, the
response to selection will be diminished.
4 Statisticalist Objections
In this section we consider two more fundamental objections to the model.
The first is that it simply reintroduces a different arbitrary abstraction
away from the complexity of organism-environment interaction. The sec-
ond is that natural selection still has an epiphenomenal character in the
model.
7In the case of multiple traits, this is generalized to Lande’s equation: Reff =
GP−1seff , where G and P are the additive genetic and phenotypic variance-covariance
matrices.
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4.1 Directionality and Abstraction
Even limiting attention to cases where populations trend to stable equilib-
rium, one objection could be that defining natural selection with respect
to the effective direction of population change is simply a different way of
arbitrarily abstracting away from the complexity of individual-level causal
processes. Based on an observed approach to stable equilibrium, the equi-
librium model distinguishes between processes that make a difference to an
individual’s reproductive outcome (∆2) and those that make a difference
to the stable equilibrium (∆3 — see Figure 5.3). However, or so the objec-
tion goes, in principle some explanatory interest in some other feature of
the population change could lead to some different distinction being made
among causal processes (∆′2 and ∆′3), and some other direction (if any at
all) being ascribed to the population change.
Figure 5.3: The solid lines represent causal relations; the dashed line rep-
resents a constitutive relation. ∆1 represents the set of all individual-level
causal processes (defining a specific life-history), ∆2 the set of all indivi-
dual-level processes affecting the reproductive outcome of a life-history,
and ∆3 the processes which make a difference to the equilibrium distribu-
tion of trait frequencies.
In response, one must first note that some dependence on explanatory
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interests is unavoidable. When observing the behaviour of natural popu-
lations, an evolutionary biologist will be interested in explaining different
types of outcome than, say, a biochemist, or an insurance agent. However,
what is at stake is the implication of the no-privileged-abstraction argu-
ment, that even when the outcome of interest is decided on, there is no
privileged way of (causally) explaining the evolutionary change in virtue
of the complexity and many-angled nature of organism-environment inter-
action.
The equilibrium model challenges this latter claim, arguing that some-
times population-level behaviour is simple even though the organism-environ-
ment interaction may be complex. The reason why simplicity can emerge
out of complexity is simply because many individual-level interactions
‘average-out’ to zero, which is to say, they make no long-term difference
to the structure of the population (see also Strevens 2003). At a given
time-scale, there is an objective fact of the matter, independent of the
type of trait or interaction one happens to be interested in, as to which
individual-level interactions make an overall difference and which do not.
Beyond choice of outcome state, the only dependence on explanatory
interests allowed for by the equilibrium model is that on time-scale. What
makes a difference in the long-term does not necessarily make a relevant
difference in the short-term, and vice versa. Further, there might not be
any processes which make a difference in the long term: in such cases, com-
plexity of organism-environment interaction does not give rise to a simple
approach to equilibrium (see next section). However, there is no depen-
dence on the traits or individual-level interactions the observer happens to
find interesting.
4.2 Epiphenomenalism
One of the key statisticalist challenges was to point to the epiphenomenal
character of natural selection: selection is a ‘tertium quid ’ that could be
eliminated from consideration without affecting the causes actually driving
evolution. The original version of this challenge focused on the mathemat-
ical character of natural selection, and while we have already argued why
natural selection is not a mathematical consequence of the source of selec-
tion, one could still object that the causal relations connecting organism-
environment structure, natural selection and directional change could be
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eliminated without affecting directional change.
Figure 5.3 schematically represents this objection: if natural selection
were to be eliminated from consideration, the causal relation between the
processes determining individual births and deaths, ∆2, and directional
change would still be intact. Evolution by natural selection is still ‘just’
an accumulation of births and deaths in the equilibrium model.
In response, one need only to point out that only the processes in
∆3, not ∆2, cause directional change. Aspects of the causal processes
impinging on organisms in a population may be changed without changing
the long-term outcome, but the latter depends counterfactually on the
long-term difference-making processes (∆3). To eliminate natural selection
from the causal scheme is to eliminate the difference between ∆2 and ∆3—
and this affects the causal scheme8.
A related way of putting the same point is that natural selection con-
tains more information about the causal structure of population change
than is contained by the mass of causal processes ∆2. Unlike ∆2, natural
selection tells us something about possible evolutionary changes, not just
about actual changes. Specifically, it tells that if the population were to be
perturbed, the population would tend to return to equilibrium, in virtue
of the processes in ∆3. Eliminating natural selection would eliminate this
information about the causal structure of population change.
5 Discussion: General Implications
5.1 What about Frequency-dependence?
Throughout the chapter we have alluded to cases such as frequency-dependent
selection, where evolution by natural selection does not always tend to-
wards stable equilibrium. Strictly speaking such cases are not covered
by the account presented here, and in principle the equilibrium model
could be interpreted as having limited scope, unchallenged by cases such
as frequency-dependence. However, it is natural to wonder to what extent
the model could be extended to cover such cases also.
8In this respect, the account presented here is continuous with the suggestion that
natural selection is a structuring cause in the space of population life-histories (Ramsey
2015). See also Kaplan (2013) for the suggestion that natural selection is some measure
of robustness.
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While a proper treatment is beyond the scope of this chapter, an easy
extension of the model would be to distinguish between a variable compo-
nent (changing direction) and an effective component (fixed direction) of
natural selection. The effective component would describe approaches to
stable equilibria, and in general, attractor states, while the variable com-
ponent would describe the rest. This distinction allows the question to be
rephrased with some more precision: to what extent is the variable com-
ponent of selection vulnerable to the no-privileged-abstraction argument?
Two alternative responses can be distinguished. The first would be to
admit that sometimes it is less meaningful to apply the predicate ‘causal’.
When evolution by natural selection tends towards stable equilibrium, the
process is clearly causal; however, as the overall directionality becomes
increasingly difficult to recognize, to the point that population change
continually changes apparent direction from one generation to the next,
selection becomes increasingly indistinguishable from drift, and it becomes
increasingly meaningless to attribute causality to natural selection. Thus
instances of selection are to be situated on a spectrum, from clearly causal
at one end (tendency towards stable equilibrium) to indistinguishable from
drift at the other.
One could formulate this in terms of time-scale relativity. Viewed from
a long time-scale, a population that cycles indefinitely might as well not
be changing at all: the frequency dependent selection responsible for the
cycling makes no causal difference at a long time scale. At a shorter time-
scale, perhaps over tens of generations, selection does make a difference,
and could be considered causal at this time scale, even though it will be
more difficult to disentangle selection’s causal contribution from drift. As
the time-scale decreases to a single generation, it becomes increasingly
difficult to judge what the precise causal impact of selection is (e.g. is
an observed and non-replicable change in the frequency of a trait due to
selection-for, selection-of, or drift?). Thus it could be ventured that it
makes increasingly less sense to attribute causality to selection.
The other response is to reduce the case of variable selection to the
equilibrium model by analyzing a single process of frequency-dependent se-
lection as a succession of different selection processes, each tending towards
(but not realizing) a stable equilibrium. For example, consider frequency-
dependent selection for colour in populations of Poecliid fish (cf. Huneman
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2012): predators are tuned to prey on fish with majority colours, so that
any one colour will undergo cycles of selection-for and selection-against,
depending on whether it is a majority or a minority colour. Is it the
same instance of natural selection doing the selecting for and the selecting
against? According to this response, it is not, as the interaction between
a fish with a given colour and its environment changes in the two cases.
Any cycle of selection-for and selection-against is a succession of selection
processes each tending towards a different stable equilibrium.
To fully elaborate this response, one would need to discuss the prob-
lem of identifying the selective environment of an organism. Instead, I
refer to an existing discussion by Brandon (2005), who argues that fitness
can only be ascribed to an organism or trait if the selective environment
is ‘homogeneous’ within the relevant region. If the selective environment
is heterogeneous, then the nature of the organism-environment interac-
tion fluctuates significantly, and Brandon terms the process of selection
that arises from such an environment ‘compound selection’. Similarly,
frequency-dependent selection could be understood as compound selec-
tion, where the selective environment is temporally heterogeneous (due to
changing biotic interactions).
In this way variable selection is reduced to a succession of different
instantaneous selection processes, each with a stable direction. So, while
the overall process of frequency-dependent selection may not be ascribed
a direction, the instantaneous selection processes can – and hence these
may be considered causal. Each instantaneous selection process tends to-
wards equilibrium, even though equilibrium is never reached because the
environment is continually changing.
5.2 What Kind of Force is Selection?
Finally, in order both to broaden the perspectives of the chapter and to
bring it to an intuitive close, I would wish to consider natural selection on
a more metaphorical level. I have argued natural selection is a causal force
on the basis of certain formal characteristics (counterfactual dependence,
direction, magnitude); however, it is fair to ask what kind of a force it is
precisely. It is clearly not a classical Newtonian force: neither its source,
nor its effect is spatiotemporally localizable. There is also no ‘field’ of
force associated with natural selection. Is it possible to say something
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more positive about what kind of force it is?
In their 2002 paper, Matthen and Ariew compare evolution by natural
selection to heat flow (Matthen and Ariew 2002). During heat flow there
is no transmission of a physical mark; it is instead a statistical process
where the concentration of fast-moving molecules in the warm part of the
gas spreads throughout the container. While the net effect is that energy
diffuses smoothly, in reality this occurs one discontinuous collision at a
time. Similarly, evolution by natural selection is not the smooth diffusion
of an advantageous trait, but is mediated by individual births and deaths.
From this perspective, the concept of entropic force has some suggestive
power. Entropic forces are forces that originate in the statistical tendency
of complex systems with many degrees of freedom to increase their entropy.
Natural populations are not in thermodynamic equilibrium, and hence
the concept of thermodynamic entropy has little meaning in this context.
However, the analogy does hold insofar as natural selection is an effective
population-level force that originates in a tendency of the population to
reorganize its structure through interaction with the environment.
Does this suggestion not undo the effort to argue against the epiphe-
nomenalism of selection? Not necessarily, because even though entropic
forces emerge out of lower-level interactions and thus are not fundamental,
they can work in displacing objects. Osmosis is an example of a process
driven by an entropic force. They have real effects, can be manipulated,
and can be ascribed a direction and magnitude. Entropic forces meet the
philosophical criteria of difference-making causality, whether Woodward’s
manipulationism, or a probabilistic counterfactual account.
Thus the fact that an entropic force is not fundamental but emerges
out of lower-level interactions does not in itself constitute an argument
that such forces are epiphenomenal and non-causal. Interestingly, it may
be pointed out that a strict distinction between a force being ‘fundamental’
and a ‘statistical byproduct’ is increasingly under pressure in contempo-
rary physics. Numerous proposals have been made as to how fundamental
forces, including gravity, may actually be entropic in nature (Freund 2010;
Verlinde 2011).
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6 Conclusion
The complexity of the organism-environment interaction means that the
resulting evolutionary change can, in principle, be statistically apportioned
in many ways. While statisticalists have argued that this multiplicity
implies that any single apportioning does not ‘cut nature at the joints’
and is instead dependent on arbitrary explanatory interests, I have argued
that, at least in some cases, a privileged apportioning can be made. In cases
where the population tends towards stable equilibrium, a clear distinction
can be made between individual-level interactions that do and do not make
a difference to the outcome equilibrium state.
Cases where there is no such tendency are more difficult to judge,
but when populations evolving by natural selection tend towards stable
equilibrium, natural selection has the character of an entropic force: a
non-fundamental force, arising out of statistical tendencies at the level of
individual interactions, with magnitude and direction.
Appendix: Instability of H-W equilibria
First, let us investigate when two distributions (p, q, r) and (p′, q′, r′) will
give rise to the same H-W equilibrium. Then the following three identities
must hold:
p+ q + r = p′ + q′ + r′ = 1
p+ q/2 = p′ + q′/2
r + q/2 = r′ + q′/2
These equations are dependent, and taking r′ as a parameter, we get the
following set of solutions {(p−r+r′, 1−p+r−2r′, r′)|r′ ∈ [0, 1]}. This can
be simplified with the change of variable δ = r′−r, and thus we can say that
the basin of the H-W equilibrium ((p+q/2)2, 2(p+q/2)(r+q/2), (r+q/2)2)
is
{(p+ δ, q − 2δ, r + δ)|δ ∈ [−r, 1− r]}.
The basin of a single H-W equilibrium point is the line with direction
(1,−2, 1) in distribution space. As one would expect, by letting δ = (p +
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q/2)2 − p one can see that the H-W equilibrium itself is part of its own
basin.
Hence we may conclude that there is no open neighbourhood N around
any H-W point (p, q, r) such that N is enclosed by the basin of (p, q, r). H-
W equilibria are stable only along one specific line, and hence are unstable
equilibria.
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Chapter 6
A Global Symmetry in
Evolution by Natural Selection
To recapitulate the challenge of causal complexity in the context of the
Modern Synthesis: there is no reason to expect that natural selection
should cause any non-contingent directional trend. Even if a directional
trend occurs, it is contingent on specific environmental states, due to what
we called the ‘local’ nature of natural selection: species can be locally
adapted only to a specific environment, and what is adaptive in one envi-
ronment may not be in the next environment. Natural selection does not
look ahead, nor is it in any way a teleological process. It merely describes
how different organisms reproduce at different rates due to certain traits,
and as described in the previous chapter, this process is dependent on
the features of the immediate environment. If the immediate environment
changes, so does the direction of natural selection. In this way, the causal
structure of natural selection implies an interpretation of evolutionary his-
tory as a succession of adaptations, without any large-scale directionality
that could characterize all possible histories.1 Put differently yet again,
natural selection may allow for local symmetries towards outcomes, but
not for a global symmetry towards an outcome.
This conclusion about evolutionary history, together with the under-
lying understanding of the basic concepts of environment and natural se-
1‘Large-scale’ refers to the temporal scale characterizing evolutionary history as a
whole. Also referred to as ‘global’.
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lection, has been challenged by many different evolutionary biologists. It
has been argued that there are certain privileged adaptations that are
adaptive across a broad range of environment-types. Candidates for such
adaptations, which I term general adaptations, range from body size (Bon-
ner 1988) and energy-intensiveness (Vermeij 1987), to autonomy (Rosslen-
broich 2006), information sensitivity (Ayala 1988; Simpson 1944a) and
functional complexity (Bonner 1988). Such adaptations are used as mea-
sures – degree of size, energy-intensiveness, complexity, and so on – to
define corresponding trends driven by natural selection.
Because the causal mechanisms underlying the selection for general
adaptations are common across all or almost all environments, trends in
general adaptations are often presented as not being contingent on the
precise succession of environments in evolutionary history.2 In the ter-
minology of this dissertation, trends in general adaptations can be seen
as large-scale features of all (or almost all) possible evolutionary histo-
ries, despite variability in environments – precisely because selection for
these general adaptations is constant or nearly constant across all possible
evolutionary trajectories.
We can locate the point of conflict more precisely by restating the
argument against non-contingent trends:
(P1) Static environmental states determine the outcomes of evolu-
tion by natural selection;
(P2) Environment-types are contingent occurrences in evolutionary
history;
∴ (C) Any possible large-scale trends are contingent occurrences in
evolutionary history.
By arguing that certain types of environment are much more frequent
than others (i.e., the environments that favour general adaptations), the
argument for general adaptations challenges (P2).
In this chapter I will argue that this strategy fails to establish any non-
contingent trends, mainly because a trend will be broken if the environment
changes towards extreme, hostile conditions – regardless of how frequent
the favourable environment is. A high frequency does not guarantee that
2Most biologists (except Van Valen, who is unapologetic in calling the Red Queen
dynamic and constant extinction rates an evolutionary ‘law’; see Valen 1973: 16) avoid
the loaded term ‘law’. Nonetheless, their arguments strongly suggest that they consider
the generalizations they propose to be non-contingent.
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a trend in general adaptations may be expected; one would also need to
assume that such extreme and hostile environments never occur.
Instead, I will draw on recent developments in the Extended Synthesis
to challenge (P1). Not only does variability in states lead to selection for
some outcomes (phenotypic plasticity), but outcomes also may influence
the environment and resulting selection pressures (through niche construc-
tion). The causal relation between environment and outcome of evolution
by natural selection resembles something of a causal feedback structure,
and I will use this to argue that, even if environment-types are contingent,
certain outcomes (specifically, a trend in phenotypic plasticity) need not
be contingent.
Central to this argument will be the non-contingent of variability in
environments. Recall how in chapter 5 we described the environment of
an organism as characterized by many degrees of freedom, and, more often
than not, highly variable. Variability is the rule, not the exception. Adding
biotic interactions to these environments only serves to increase complexity
and variability. From this characterization of the environment, one may
conclude that while any specific environmental state may be contingent,
variability in these states is not a contingent occurrence.
However, one cannot simply conclude from this that a trend in adapta-
tions to variability is to be expected given the nature of natural selection.
In particular, there are two main obstacles that this argument would need
to overcome in order to be successful. The first is to show how plastic-
ity can be thought of as something that can accumulate. As we will see,
plasticity is often quantified as the slope of the reaction norm. This defini-
tion reflects an understanding of plasticity as a property specific to a trait
of an individual organism in relation to a specific environmental variable
(following Bradshaw 1965: 122). According to this definition, it makes no
sense to speak of the plasticity of a lineage; there is only a plasticity of
a trait in relation to an environmental variable, and plasticity increases
when equal amounts of change in the environment produce larger changes
in the trait.
By contrast, I will draw on a rival concept, also identified by Bradshaw
as ‘phenotypic flexibility’, that is a property of the whole organism. I
will simply call this plasticity as well (it remains unclear to what extent
phenotypic flexibility is not simply a form of plasticity: see Nicoglou 2015),
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and will identify it with the number of environmental variables to which
an organism reacts. Thus, the plasticity of an organism (or species) may
increase if the organism becomes able to pick up cues in the environment
it was previously insensitive to, and thus in modulating its phenotype,
integrates more information about the state of the environment.
The second challenge is to show that increases in plasticity are robust
against the occurrence of suboptimal or hostile environments. Insofar as
plastic responses are adaptations (some plastic responses may also be the
default state of organisms), they are adaptations to certain patterns of
variability. There is no form of plasticity that is adaptive to variability as
such. This is a problem for the argument for a non-contingent trend in
plasticity, since these patterns of variability are contingent occurrences in
evolution (unlike variability itself).
However, I will argue that some increases in plasticity are ratchet-like.
Most importantly, many instances of plasticity, since they represent sen-
sitivity to environment variables, are coupled with various forms of niche
construction, where the organism may modify the environment so as to en-
hance fitness. After a lineage undergoes a plasticity increase in favourable
environments, its decrease in subsequent unfavourable environments will
be made less probable by niche construction. In this way, the causal feed-
back structure between organism and environment implied by plasticity
and niche construction is crucial for arguing that the contingency in pat-
terns of variability does not imply contingency in a trend in plasticity.
It is important to emphasize what the target of this argument is. It is
not to show that actual evolutionary history is necessarily characterized by
a trend in increased plasticity. It is merely to show that natural selection,
together with the complexity and variability of the environment, implies
an a priori expectation for such a trend in increased plasticity. Such
an expectation can be confounded in specific evolutionary histories, since
evolutionary history as a whole is influenced by many causal processes
other than natural selection. Evolution by natural selection is an idealized
evolutionary history, and for such an idealized evolutionary history, a trend
in plasticity is not a contingent pattern.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I elaborate
on the causal feedback structure of natural selection, and expand on the
phenomena of phenotypic plasticity and niche construction. In the second
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section I outline the argument from general adaptations, and in the third
and fourth sections I examine how a macroevolutionary trend in plasticity
may be understood.
1 Background: Natural Selection in the Extended
Synthesis
There have long been dissenting views to the Modern Synthesis; however,
developments starting in the 1980s have increasingly led to calls to expand
the original framework (Carroll 2000; Love 2003; Müller 2007; Pigliucci
2007). Evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) has played a sig-
nificant role in putting pressure on the view that evolution can simply be
characterized in terms of changes in gene frequencies. As already discussed,
developmental constraints may affect further evolution (Smith et al. 1985).
Developmental processes may have other effects on evolution: they may
facilitate evolution through increasing evolvability, or increase phenotypic
variation in response to environmental variation through plasticity. In this
way, an important goal of EvoDevo is to map how developmental processes
can affect evolution.3
As mentioned in chapter 4, how precisely the Extended Synthesis should
be defined is still controversial – and indeed, it is still unclear to what extent
the theories of the Extended Synthesis can fit within the theoretical frame-
work of the Modern Synthesis. For purposes here, we can simply target
an externalist view of evolution by natural selection, where the structure
of the external environment is thought to be sufficient to understand evo-
lution by natural selection. Such a view is reflected in Mayr’s distinction
between ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ causation in evolution. The proximate
causes for evolutionary outcomes are developmental programmes; how-
ever, to understand why such developmental programmes evolved in the
first place, we need to take into consideration the ultimate causes, which
are, for Mayr, selective pressures.
Whether to attribute this externalist framework to the Modern Synthe-
sis remains a point of continuing contention (see chapter 4, or, for example,
3Another important goal of EvoDevo is to explain how developmental processes
evolved in the first place, and how they changed over time. See Love 2015.
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Figure 6.1: Unidirectional representation of the causal structure of natural
selection.
Dickins and Barton 2013). I will follow Laland et al. (2013) in doing so,
partially because Futuyma’s five tenets characterizing the Modern Synthe-
sis do not say anything about the dynamic structure of the environment,
and partially because even the proponents of the hegemony of the Modern
Synthesis recognize that the macroevolutionary significance of plasticity
and niche construction remains underemphasized in the Modern Synthe-
sis. However, it is not crucial to the argument; more important is the
way reciprocal causation between organism and environment may imply a
large-scale evolutionary trend.
Consider the unidirectional structure of natural selection in Figure
1.Note that the causal structure of natural selection is more complicated
than represented in the figure above (see chapter 5). Strictly speaking,
natural selection does not cause any novel phenotypes to emerge, and thus
does not ‘shape’ phenotype to ‘match’ features in the environment. There
may be genetic constraints or developmental constraints preventing the
optimal phenotype from appearing in a population. However, since in this
chapter we are considering evolution by natural selection in an idealized
setting, we can ignore such constraints, and follow biologists (such as La-
land et al. 2013) in speaking of how natural selection ‘shapes’ organisms.
Laland et al. (2013) argue that the phenomena of plasticity and niche
construction show that how it is inadequate to work with this unidirec-
tional causal model. Phenotypic plasticity shows how the environment can
directly shape phenotype, without the action of natural selection, through
affecting development, behaviour or physiology; niche construction shows
how phenotype can affect environment by modifying features in the exter-
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Figure 6.2: Causal feedback occurs when plasticity and niche construction
are taken into account.
nal environment, so that the magnitude and direction of natural selection
are modified as well.
Before examining the consequences this causal structure has for macroevo-
lutionary trends, I will first give a broad overview of the various types of
plasticity and niche construction.
1.1 Phenotypic Plasticity
1.1.1 ANOVA and reaction norms
Phenotypic plasticity, in the broadest understanding of the term, refers
to all environmentally induced phenotypic variation. This means that a
single genotype can exhibit multiple phenotypes according to the state
of the environment. Traditionally (following Scheiner and Lyman 1989),
phenotypic variation is expressed through Analysis of Variance techniques
(ANOVA4) as:
σ2P = σ
2
G + σ
2
E + σ
2
G×E + σ
2
err
where the total variance in the phenotype (σ2P ) is partitioned into three
subvariances: variance in phenotype due to differences in genotype alone
(σ2G), variance in phenotype due to differences in environment alone (σ
2
E)
and variance in phenotype due to differences in how genotypes interact with
the environment (σ2G×E). The error term σ
2
err captures the effect of any
4This statistical technique, originally developed by R.A. Fisher to analyze phenotypic
variance, but now widely used across all domains, seeks to attribute the variation of
one variable (P) to variation in several other variables (G, E, G× E).
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Figure 6.3: Various nonlinear reaction norms in Drosphilia according to
growth temperature (Reproduced with permission from David et al. 2004).
process that may affect the measured phenotype but is not attributable
to the three previous factors (such as chance fluctuations in otherwise
identical environments, developmental errors or even experimental errors).
The equation above has a visual interpretation in the context of re-
action norms. Originally proposed by Woltereck (1909), a reaction norm
is the function that maps an environmental variable (e.g. temperature,
salinity, etc.) onto a phenotypic variable for a given genotype (Scheiner
1993; Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998; Chevin and G. M. Lande 2010). In
practice most reaction norms will be nonlinear (Figure 6.3).
In this way, the reaction norm is a simplified and quantitative represen-
tation of the developmental processes intermediating the environment and
the expressed phenotype. When the reaction norm is flat, then a change
in the environment does not lead to any change in phenotype, and hence
plasticity is zero. Often plasticity is modeled as a linear reaction norm,
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Figure 6.4: Illustration of how genetic variation, plasticity, and genetic
variation in plasticity come apart. (Reproduced with permission from
Pigliucci 2001)
where the change in phenotype is proportional to the change in the envi-
ronmental variable. In this case the degree of plasticity can be represented
by the slope of the linear reaction norm.
Linear reaction norms allow for a straightforward interpretation of the
ANOVA analysis (Pigliucci 2001). In that case, σ2E is nonzero if and only if
the reaction norm is not horizontal (i.e., the degree of plasticity is nonzero).
When σ2G is zero, then the reaction norms of different genotypes are iden-
tical; otherwise it quantifies the average difference in height between reac-
tion norms of different genotypes. Finally, when σ2G×E is zero the reaction
norms of different genotypes are parallel (indicating equal plasticity); when
nonzero, the different reaction norms have different slopes. In other words,
the degree of plasticity varies with genotype.
1.1.2 Types of plasticity
This understanding of plasticity, while abstract, is also very broad and
corresponds to a similarly broad range of phenomena. One classic example
is how the stems of some plants (such as dandelions) elongate when there
are other plants nearby competing for sunlight. Another is how some
animals develop defenses in response to the presence of predators (such
as snails growing thicker shells in presence of crab predators: Trussell
and Smith 2000), while others will, sometimes in response, develop more
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powerful ways of breaking through these defenses (crabs grow larger and
more powerful claws when exposed to armored prey: Smith and Palmer
1994).
This richness in the phenomena of plasticity involves very many types
of processes, which are not directly captured in the abstract characteriza-
tion above. One way to systematize the phenomena is to categorize them
according to environmental source. Environmental sources may be further
subdivided into abiotic and biotic variability. Examples of abiotic variabil-
ity include changes in sunlight, oxygen, temperature, humidity, salinity,
quantity and type of nutritive sources (see Whitman and Agrawal 2009
for an overview). Examples of biotic variability include the presence of
predators, parasites or competitors. Note that, at a more fundamental
level, biotic variability may be reduced to a special case of abiotic vari-
ability, since the proximate cause of an organism’s response to predators
or parasites will be changes in its abiotic environment (such as changes in
sunlight, or changes in chemical gradient).
A second dimension along which types of plasticity are categorized
is the type of trait affected. Thus plasticity can occur in biochemistry,
physiology, morphology, life history and behaviour (Whitman and Agrawal
2009), and in each case very different causal processes are involved. Some
changes, such as changes in life history (timing of reproduction or mat-
uration), are irreversible, and involve a host of developmental processes.
Such changes in life history often affect many other traits, from hormone
concentrations to body size. Other changes, such as in physiology (colour,
metabolic rate, digestion, etc.), may occur in a relatively isolated fashion
and may be reversible.
An important distinction is between developmental conversion and phe-
notypic modulation. Developmental conversion refers to plastic changes
that are irreversible and discrete, such as the choice of sex or of social caste
in some species; phenotypic modulation refers to plastic changes that are
reversible and continuous, such as body size. These two types of plasticity
represent extremes (Whitman and Agrawal 2009): most real instances of
plastic change will be capable of at least partial reversion, and will involve
some spectrum of intermediate forms.
Because plasticity may also refer to changes in the biochemistry of an
organism (e.g. enzyme or hormone concentrations), another important dis-
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tinction is between active and passive plasticity. Passive plasticity refers to
a more or less automatic ‘susceptibility’ of an organism that is not the re-
sult of any regulated process. Examples of such plasticity include the ways
in which toxins, poor nutrition, extreme temperatures, acidity, oxygen lev-
els and salinity may affect a range of processes, ranging from the chemical
and enzymatic to the cellular and developmental. A typical example here
is how small size results from poor nutrition. Active plasticity, by contrast,
refers to a highly regulated response to environmental variability, where a
host of processes coordinate to produce a particular phenotype in response
to the environment.5
This distinction is closely related to the distinction between antici-
patory and responsive phenotypic plasticity. In anticipatory plasticity, the
organism is able to detect certain environmental cues that are indicative of
a change in the environment that is beneficial or harmful to the organism.
Such cues set in motion a coordinated response; if the cue is undetected,
responsive plasticity may lead to an alternative change of phenotype. For
example, the detection of a predator may provoke a flight response in an
organism; however, if the predator remains undetected, this may also lead
to a merely responsive change in phenotype (for example, destruction of
the body).
There are some other factors, such as time-lag between cue and re-
sponse,that characterize a plastic response (see Whitman and Agrawal
2009). We will discuss these in some further detail when considering the
environmental conditions of selection for plasticity; however, more impor-
tant here is to note two difficulties.
First, what should count as a phenotype is not always clear. As De-
Witt and Scheiner (2004) remark, plasticity could also potentially refer
to changes in phenotype such as the buildup of muscles after use, or to
changes in behaviour through learning. Some biologists include only phe-
notypes that are affected by development within plasticity; others are more
liberal and include all forms of learning and behaviour. In this chapter we
will follow the liberal use of the term, and include any environmentally
induced change in phenotype that may affect the fitness of the organism.
5The existence of passive plasticity has led some to claim that plasticity, not canal-
ization, describes the default state of an organism. This will be important later in this
chapter.
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Another issue concerns how to distinguish active from passive plastic-
ities, since every phenotype is affected by the environment in some way.
As noted above, some degree of passive plasticity is the default state of
any trait, and is simply a consequence of physical and chemical causal pro-
cesses affecting an organism. One way to make sense of this is that a trait
can be simultaneously characterized by both active and passive plasticity
(Whitman and Agrawal 2009: 18): a trait may have an active response
to one environmental variable (in the sense of a coordinate response), but
only a passive response to another.
1.1.3 Plasticity as a Source of Phenotypic Variation
In the Modern Synthesis, the most important source of phenotypic vari-
ation was thought to be genetic variation. Environmental effects on phe-
notype were recognized, but were not thought to be relevant for under-
standing how evolutionary trajectories unfolded over time. Often such
environmental effects were categorized as developmental noise (Canfield
et al. 2009): often quoted in this regard is Fisher’s remark “It is not sur-
prising that such elaborate machinery should sometimes go wrong” (Wig-
glesworth 1961, cited in West-Eberhard 2003). Thus for example, a small
size resulting from a lack of nutrition was characterized as a development
gone wrong – not as the effect of an independent property (plasticity) that
itself could be the object of selection. Plasticity adds an important new
source of phenotypic variation, by introducing phenotypes that otherwise
might not be expressed. Further, such phenotypes can be inherited, not
directly, but through inheritance of the reaction norm. In this way, an
environmentally-induced phenotype may spread through a population by
natural selection through selection for the underlying reaction norm.
There is still some debate as to how precisely plasticity may affect
evolutionary trajectories. Some have suggested that phenotypic plasticity
may slow down the rate of genetic change, because a fixed reaction norm
would remain viable for longer than a fixed phenotype (Price et al. 2003).6
The threshold at which environmental change will favor genetic change is
higher when the organism has some degree of plasticity at its disposal. In
6Note that this is a form of counteractive niche construction: while the actual phys-
ical environment is not modified, the selection pressures are.
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this way, genetic change would be expected to occur faster in the absence
of plasticity.
Others have suggested that the opposite may happen: phenotypic plas-
ticity may speed up the process of genetic change. Drawing on the Baldwin
effect (1896) and the concept of genetic canalization (Waddington 1953),
West-Eberhard sketches a process how this may happen (West-Eberhard
2003). First, plasticity produces novel phenotypes in response to evolu-
tionary change. However, as the environment settles down into a more
static state, there will be selection for individuals in a population who are
able to produce the novel phenotype without cue from the environment
(since the latter can lead to detection errors, such as false positives and
negatives). This selection leads to a canalization of the trait in a pro-
cess of ‘genetic assimilation’. In this scenario, plasticity is the ‘leader’ of
evolutionary change, and genes are the ‘followers’.
In sum, plasticity represents a way in which the environment may play
a dual role in evolutionary by natural selection. Not only does the environ-
ment select genetically produced phenotypic phenotypes (through natural
selection), but it may also directly influence phenotype through plastic-
ity. This will then indirectly change the nature of selection, as the pool of
phenotypic variation is changed.
1.2 Niche Construction
Niche construction singles out a type of phenotype that is of special inter-
est to the process of evolution by natural selection, namely behaviours of
organisms that modify their selective environment. In the same way that
plasticity brings into focus the dual role of the environment in evolution, so
niche construction highlights the dual role of the phenotype (or organism):
first as object of natural selection, whereby the genotypes coding’ for var-
ious phenotypes is differentially transmitted to the next generation, and
second as cause of change in the environment of the organism, and thus
of change in the magnitude and direction of natural selection. An influen-
tial general theoretical case for niche construction was made by Lewontin
(1983; 2000), who formulated it in terms of a pair of differential equations:
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dO
dt
= f(O,E)
dE
dt
= g(O,E)
These equations are very general representations of evolutionary dy-
namics (and best interpreted as a heuristic). The first equation tells us that
the way in which organisms (populations) change over time is determined
by the properties of the organisms and of the environment. Similarly, the
way in which an environment evolves over time is not only dependent on
environmental variables, but also on organismic properties. Evolutionary
dynamics is considerably more complex than can be captured in this way
(see next chapter for a discussion of the statistical nature of natural se-
lection); however, it is a good illustration of the general idea behind niche
construction.
We can mention three classic examples of niche construction. The first
is how cyanobacteria modified the atmosphere of the Earth, converting it
from a reducing environment to an oxidizing one through the production
of oxygen (the ‘Great Oxygenation Event’). This then was thought to have
caused a mass extinction of anaerobic organisms and a strong constraint on
further evolutionary trajectories (Irwin and Schulze-Makuch 2010). The
second is the way in which earth worms, by burrowing, affect the amount
of topsoil and concentration of nutrients in the soil. This change in the
environment then affects subsequent selection for the structure of the epi-
dermis and quantity of secreted mucous (Laland and Sterelny 2006). Fi-
nally, beavers’ dam-building activity has been a key example of niche con-
struction. Dawkins (1982) had originally argued that dam-building was
an ‘extended’ phenotypic trait. In Dawkins’s gene-centered view of life,
the only genuine unit of selection is the gene, largely since genes, unlike
phenotypes, are the only units capable of high-fidelity replication, and so
are the only units that meet the heritability criterion for evolution by nat-
ural selection. Hence, according to this view, any physical process that
is produced by the genotype is considered a phenotype, including beaver
dams.
However, according to niche construction theorists, categorizing the
beaver dam simply as an extended phenotype misrepresents the causal
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interaction between phenotype and environment. In view of Dawkins,
beavers build dams because there in the beavers’ past there was selec-
tion for dam-building alleles over alternative alleles. Niche construction
theorists claim that this ignores how how dam-building phenotypes al-
ters magnitude and direction of selection on subsequent generations – in
particular, the selective feedback that occurs between initial dam-building
activity, and further selective reinforcement of the behaviour (Laland and
Sterelny 2006, Laland et al. 2013: 131). The spread of dam-building al-
leles in a population is likely an effect, not a cause of the evolution of
dam-building behaviour.7
Laland et al. (Laland et al. 1996; Laland and O’Brien 2010) distinguish
some specific types of evolutionary dynamics that not readily explainable
in the extended phenotype model: (1) inertia effects, where the evolu-
tionary response to selection only occurs after a number of generations
(2) momentum effects, where evolutionary change continues in the same
direction despite the stopping or reversal of selection, and (3) sudden ex-
tinctions and fixations. These patterns of evolutionary change (i.e. changes
in population composition over time) cannot be readily explained without
taking into account the niche construction aspect of the traits involved.
In this way, niche construction represents a causal relation between
phenotype (cause) and environmental state (effect) and, seen in this way,
is the converse relation of phenotypic plasticity. (Note that niche con-
struction traits may themselves be produced as plastic responses to envi-
ronmental change: this will be important later in this chapter.) Further,
just as different types of plasticity may be distinguished according to the
details involved in the causal process, Odling-Smee et al. (2003) categorize
different types of niche construction according to two axes.
The first axis distinguishes between perturbation and relocation niche
construction. In relocation, the selective environment of an organism is
changed by an organism migrating to a novel physical environment. By
contrast, in perturbation niche construction, the selective environment is
actively changed, by modifying the environmental state of the organism’s
current physical environment. In each case the selective environment is
7For instance, Wells (2015) claims that Dawkins’s argument cannot explain how
sometimes the host’s phenotype is what makes it possible for genes to exist (not the
other way around).
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changed, but the difference lies in whether the organism actively modi-
fies a physical environment or merely exposes itself to a novel physical
environment.
In many real cases, both perturbation and relocation are involved. Re-
location will in practice often result in slightly different selection pressures
from preceding ones, which then might be responded to by actively mod-
ifying the novel physical environment to some degree. And conversely,
perturbation may be coupled with some relocation, for example when an-
imals construct nests and burrows but also relocate in order to select a
beneficial location for their nests or burrows (Odling-Smee et al. 2003:
45).
The second dimension along which niche construction can be catego-
rized refers to whether the niche construction activity restores an earlier
environmental state or creates a new one. The first is called counterac-
tive niche construction, and can occur both through perturbation (such as
the thermoregulation of nests) or through relocation (such as the seasonal
migration of birds). Counteractive niche construction is not necessarily
adaptive, but when adaptive it is often because it is fitness-enhancing for
the organism to counteract environmental variability and maintain a more
or less constant environment. However, such niche construction can also
serve to counteract a new (fixed) environmental state by restoring a pre-
vious one.
At the opposite extreme is inceptive niche construction, by which the
environment is modified to a new state. Such inception can also occur
by perturbation (by an organism polluting its environment) as well as
by relocation (an organism invading a new habitat). Again, such niche
construction need not be adaptive, and to emphasize this Odling-Smee
et al. (2003) distinguish between positive (fitness enhancing) and negative
(fitness decreasing) niche construction. Invading a new ecosystem, where
a population would be at a competitive advantage, would be an instance
of positive niche construction, while the depletion of a food source (such
as occurs in predator-prey Lotka-Volterra models) would count as negative
niche construction.
As with phenotypic plasticity, we mention in passing a key conceptual
problem facing the definition of niche construction. First, niche construc-
tion may be the default state of an organism, since any organism will have
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a causal effect on its environment, if nothing else through its metabolism
which requires the consumption of nutritive sources in the environment
and the excretion of waste. Second, some biotic interaction with com-
petitors, prey or predators is nearly universal among living species. Hence
niche construction may be an exceptionally broad category, including most
if not all phenotypes and not necessarily referring to a special category of
phenotypes.
We need not take a stand here on issues concerning the delineation
of the boundaries of niche construction phenotypes, or plastic phenotypes
for that matter, since for present purposes we are primarily interested in
how the phenomena of niche construction and plasticity represent causal
pathways between environment and phenotype that have remained unrec-
ognized in interpretations of evolutionary history. Of interest is the causal
feedback loop that may be instantiated (see Figure 3) through phenotypic
plasticity and niche construction.
2 Natural Selection and General Adaptations
As mentioned in the introduction, given the dependence of the direction
of natural on the specific environmental state, there would seem to be no
a priori reason why natural selection should consistently favour one trait
over the other. If natural selection were to be represented as some force
vector, one would have no reason to expect the vectors instantiated in
evolutionary history to be pointing on average in one direction rather than
another.
This argument can be challenged by pointing to what seems to be a
considerable overlap in the causal processes of different possible environ-
ments. The challenge can be roughly constructed as follows. Organisms
must survive and reproduce in all environments, so if an adaptation were to
improve ‘general abilities’ such as foraging, predator avoidance, fecundity,
mating success, tolerance to stress, etc., it would seem likely that such an
adaptation would be favoured in most if not all environments. It is always
better to be more fecund than less — other factors being equal. Put more
abstractly, if an adaptation can take advantage of the overlap of the causal
structures of the different environments, and respond to the features that
many environments have in common, it will be generally adaptive.
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It is not even necessary that every single environment must participate
in the overlap, only that a ‘sufficient’ number of environments overlap so
that on average the general adaptation will be selected for. The relative
frequency with which the favourable type of environment occurs needs only
to reach a certain threshold; this threshold need not be a relative frequency
of 1.
Size has been argued to have these general adaptive benefits (Bonner
1988). Similarly, functional complexity has been argued to allow for a
division of labour between the parts of an organism, and thus an increased
energy efficiency of the organism as a whole (also Bonner 1988). Increased
energy efficiency is always to be favoured by natural selection (again: other
factors being equal).
A further example is Vermeij’s argument (1987) for a large-scale trend
in energy-intensiveness. Vermeij understands energy-intensiveness as a
banner term, one that can be manifested in different ways, including larger
size, longer life-span, higher metabolic rate, a larger number of interactions
with the environment, and a larger number of functions. In a competition
between an individual with higher energy-intensiveness and one with lower
energy-intensiveness, the former will have the edge, and thus selection will,
on average, favour energy-intensiveness. The condition for the selection of
increased energy-intensiveness is that there are sufficient environmental
resources available to support higher energy-intensiveness. Vermeij sug-
gests climatic warming, the spread of lowland forest, and expanded shal-
low marine waters as some factors (Vermeij 1987: 377). These conditions
notwithstanding, Vermeij characterizes the fitness increase brought on by
increased energy-intensiveness as a “nearly universal property” in compet-
itive environments (Vermeij 1999).8
There are two problems with this line of argument. The first is that it
is unclear why environments should be such that there will be selection on
average for general adaptations. This problem can be broken down into two
parts: the relative frequency of favourable environments, and the relative
weight that environments have for estimating the average selection.
Concerning relative frequency, when we look in detail at the causal
8In this way, while Vermeij does not use the term ‘law’ or ‘noncontingent gener-
alization’, it plausible that this is what he has in mind in formulating the trend in
energy-intensiveness.
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mechanisms underlying selection for general adaptations, we see a complex
web of conflicting mechanisms. For example, with regard to size, numerous
costs have been postulated, including increased foraging risk (Dibattista
et al. 2007; Carlson et al. 2008), structural problems, a greater danger of
reduced locomotory performance (Lankford et al. 2001), and a decreased
potential for adaptive evolution (Dombroskie and Aarssen 2010). The
benefits of a general adaptation may be widespread, but so may the costs,
and in this way there may be many environments where the costs of the
general adaptation outweigh the benefits.
Even if we were to grant the relatively high frequency of favourable
environments, this still does not guarantee a selection for the general adap-
tation on average. For that to occur, selection for the general adaptation
would need to outweigh selection against the adaptation, and it is also un-
clear why that should be the case. For example, with body size, it has been
argued that there is selection against size during deteriorating environmen-
tal conditions (such as mass extinctions), as larger organisms will be less
able to find sufficient nutritional resources in such conditions (LaBarbera
1986; Arnold et al. 1995; Alroy 1998). It has also been noted that in un-
stable and unpredictable environments there is selection for an increased
number of offspring and shorter generation times (r-selection), which are
correlated with decreased body size (Bonner 1988: 48). The question then
arises as to how to weigh the prevalence of resource-rich and resource-poor
environments, or stable and unstable environments? There is no reason to
believe that, in the grand scheme of things, the causal mechanisms leading
to an increase of some general measureM should systematically trump the
causal mechanisms leading to a decrease in M .
The second problem is that, even if there were an average selection for
the general adaptation, a trend in the general adaptation would still not be
guaranteed. For example, if the selection against the general adaptation
were infrequent but severe, the trend might simply be broken. Or, if
one type of environment were to be lethal to the general adaptation, any
incipient trend would be broken if that environment-type happened to
occur. Being adaptive on average does not imply that the increase in some
general adaptation would be robust against suboptimal environments.
The upshot of these difficulties is that additional hypotheses would need
to be made about the succession of environments in evolutionary history to
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guarantee a trend in the general adaptation. A global macroevolutionary
trend would require the environments to line up in a particularly beneficial
way. Trends in general adaptations are contingent generalizations about
evolutionary history, contingent on certain environmental conditions.9
Empirical studies have shown little support for the argument that
trends in general adaptations even characterize actual evolutionary his-
tory. While the proposed globally driven trend in size has received some
support as a local trend in lineages’ invertebrates (Chown and Gaston 2010;
Lamsdell and Braddy 2010), plants (Chaloner and Sheerin 1979) and ver-
tebrates (e.g. Lamsdell and Braddy 2010), there is much less support for it
being a global trend, characterizing evolutionary history as a whole. The
comprehensive review by Jablonski (1996) shows that many instances of
increases in body size depend on specific features of the environment. A
landmark paper by Payne et al. (2009) documents an increase in maximum
body size over evolutionary history, but does not note any evidence that
the trend is driven by natural selection. Similarly, the increase of func-
tional complexity has received scant support as a trend driven by natural
selection (McShea 1996). This is not surprising given the various ways in
which selection against functional complexity may be much more frequent
than selection for (Gould 1996; McShea 2005).
In summary, the theoretical argument for natural selection driving a
trend towards the increased development of some general adaptation (in-
creased size, increased complexity, etc.) fails because it is dependent on
contingent assumptions about which environments happen to occur. Given
what we know about the complexity of environmental structure, there is
little reason to believe that environments would necessarily line up in just
the way demanded by trends in general adaptations.
If such conditions are integrated into the generalization, the result-
ing trend at most describes a local symmetry: a trend that characterizes
some instances of evolution by natural selection. However, it does not
characterize evolution by natural selection generally. Given the nature
of environmental structure and of natural selection, there is no reason to
9Could one not apply the ceteris paribus strategy here, and obtain a noncontingent
generalization? Yes, but the generalizations would be vacuously true in some evolution-
ary histories. In this way, a trend in general adaptation may represent a local symmetry,
but not a global symmetry.
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expect a global trend in any type of general adaptation.
3 Natural Selection and Variability Adaptations
In the first section I gave an overview of different types of plasticity, and
of some of the way in which plasticity may be significant for the dynamics
of trajectories in evolutionary history. We passed over the difficulty that
different types of plasticity are selected for under different conditions, and
that some patterns of variability may lead to no selection or even selec-
tion against plasticity. In the current section I will outline these selective
conditions in some more detail.
3.1 Sources of Selection for Plasticity
Under what conditions will there be selection for plasticity? A first es-
timation is given by the tolerance curve, which represents the value of
fitness that can be expected in a given environment. The tolerance curve
for a non-plastic individual (see Figure 3) is a reflection of how adaptable
a given phenotype is in a particular environment. By contrast, the toler-
ance curve for a plastic individual shows what fitness is to be expected as
the individual changes its phenotype in response to the environment. The
effect of plasticity is to flatten the tolerance curve (lower maximum, but
larger variance), so that the geometric mean fitness will be raised when
there is environmental variability.
Besides environmental variation, another important condition deter-
mining whether plasticity is selected for is whether the plastic expression
of traits tracks the state of the environment with sufficient accuracy (Moran
1992; Sober 1994; Godfrey-Smith 1996). One specific way in this condition
can be violated is if the environment lacks a reliable cue. Another way is
if the time scale of the environmental variation is too extreme. The reason
for this is that, assuming there to be some time-lag between the change of
environment and the change of trait, there will be a brief moment in time
when the trait of the organism does not track the environment. When
the tracking mechanism of the organism can no longer keep up with the
frequency of environmental variation, a rigid response will be favourable.
In general, the specific type of pattern of variability will play a crucial
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role in determining what type of plasticity is favoured by selection — or if
plasticity is to be favoured at all. Some important parameters that define a
pattern of variability are (1) the time scale of temporal fluctuation, (2) the
scale of spatial fluctuation, and (3) the presence or not of a cue to detect
oncoming environmental change. Figure 6.5 (adapted from Pigliucci 2001)
shows various permutations of these selective conditions together with the
evolutionary outcome that may be expected.
Figure 6.5: An overview of different patterns of variability, with different
expected outcomes.
Note that variability need not always favour plasticity. Some patterns
of variation favour non-plastic adaptations to variability, such as genetic
polymorphism, which means that many different phenotypes are present
in a population. This represents a form of bet-hedging by a population,
and occurs whether or not the individuals in the population are plastic
with respect to the phenotype.
We need not go into further detail into the conditions under which
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plasticity is selected (but see Pigliucci 2001). For the purposes of this
chapter it is sufficient to establish that plasticity is not always adaptive
even if there is variability in the environment, and if it is adaptive, that
there are different types of plasticity which are adaptive according to the
pattern of variability in the environment. This means that if there can be
any trend in plasticity, it cannot be a trend across all types of plasticity,
nor can it result from a ubiquitous selection for these various types of
plasticity.
3.2 Plasticity and Niche Construction
The net effect of plasticity on fitness is sometimes represented as a flat-
tening of the tolerance curve, decreasing fitness variance in fluctuating
environments (Figure 3). For this reason, plasticity is sometimes repre-
sented as a buffer against environmental variation (e.g. Grove 2014; Ellis
et al. 2009; Kearney et al. 2009), and thus as a form of counteractive niche
construction. Lewontin (1983) suggests that many niche construction phe-
notypes, such as migration, hoarding, habitat selection and thermoregula-
tion, are adaptive because of this buffering that is made possible by plastic
responses to temporal variation in environmental resources (Laland et al.
1996).
This is closely related to the ‘retarding’ effect plasticity may have on
genetic change: plasticity in a trait gives an organism a repertoire of pos-
sible phenotypes instead of a single genetically determined one, and hence
it decreases the chance that the organism will be maladaptive in the suc-
cession of the different environments. This increases the average fitness
(averaged over a succession of environments) over that of a non-plastic or-
ganism, whose fitness will vary directly in accordance with environmental
variation.
Further, the evolution of plasticity may also be paired with inceptive
niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Grove 2011), since the plastic
response to variation in the environment may entail habitat expansion and
relocation. Relocation, whether by means of migration, foraging or sensing
a predator, allows an organism to respond to a changing environment by
extricating itself from suboptimal conditions. Thus relocation helps buffer
against environments that would otherwise be unfavourable, simply by
avoiding these unfavourable environments.
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Relocation is also one of the oldest adaptations to environmental vari-
ability. Consider undirected motility in bacteria. Undirected motility has
been hypothesized to be adaptive in spatially heterogeneous environments
because motility allows bacteria to distance themselves from others and
thus have access to more resources (Wei et al. 2011). Further, when motil-
ity is removed by researchers from bacterial strains, it rapidly reappears,
indicating a strong selection for motility (Taylor et al. 2015).
3.3 Distinguishing Selection for Plasticity and for General
Adaptations
At this point, it may be helpful to compare the selection for plasticity and
the selection for general adaptations. In a sense, plasticity and general
adaptations are superficially similar since both result in a higher average
fitness across diverse environments. However, the causal process underly-
ing each is very different. A general adaptation is adaptive in virtue of
specific causal processes that are common to a large proportion of envi-
ronments (for example, biotic competition); by contrast, plasticity is not
adaptive to any specific causal features of an environment. Plasticity gives
higher average fitness in fluctuating environments, simply because it allows
an organism to use a phenotypic repertoire as a hedge against environmen-
tal change. It does not matter what the specific causal processes are that
define the organism-environment interaction, as long as those processes
change over time. General adaptations give a higher average fitness by
reacting to a constant core in fluctuating environments; plasticity gives
higher fitness by reacting to the fluctuation itself.
In this way one can distinguish between variability and generality se-
lection (see also Potts 1998). These are two separate causal processes: the
former selecting adaptations to specific patterns of variability (which may
or may not be frequent) and the latter selecting adaptations to general fea-
tures across environments (which are assumed to be frequent). However,
their effects cannot always be easily distinguished. The selection for size
can lead to increased plasticity, as the increase in body size can lead to a
net increase in new behavioural and developmental pathways; conversely,
the selection for plasticity can drive an increase in size. It depends on
whether size is a response to specific features in an environment, or to
variability in the features of an environment.
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An implication of this is that the same trait can be seen both as a
general adaptation and as a variability adaptation. For example, sex has
been hypothesized to be a reaction to environmental variability or to biotic
competition (Scheiner 1993).
4 An Intermittent Global Trend
In this section I will argue that the mechanisms of selection for plastic-
ity imply an a priori expectation of a global macroevolutionary trend in
plasticity. Two conditions are necessary for a sustained trend, both of
which must be argued for. One of these is that plasticity must be a mea-
sure that can increase on a macroevolutionary scale — something that
does not make sense if plasticity is understood merely as the slope of a
reaction norm. The other condition is that a trend in plasticity must be
sufficiently robust against periods of nonoptimal environmental variability,
during which there may be selection against plasticity. If these conditions
are met, then it no longer matters how frequently favourable environments
appear, since even infrequently occurring favourable environments ensure
a trend if the increase in plasticity is ratchet-like.
4.1 Defining a Plasticity Measure
The most common plasticity measure is the slope of the reaction norm
(Bradshaw 1965). As the slope of the reaction norm increases, the same
amount of environmental change results in a larger difference in phenotype,
and for this reason it is said that the amount of plasticity in the trait is
‘larger’.
However, this plasticity measure is not a suitable candidate by which
to define a global trend, for two reasons. First, a reaction norm is a
specific adaptation to a particular pattern of variability, and will increase
or decrease as the environment changes. Second, the slope of the reaction
norm is associated with the property of a particular trait of an organism,
and cannot be used to compare two different organisms in the succession
of different selective environments. Hence, the slope of the reaction norm
cannot be used to compare the plasticity of different species’ lineages if
they are inhabiting different selective environments.
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Nonetheless, there is a meaningful extension of the common measure
of plasticity to the macroevolutionary context, and one that follows Brad-
shaw’s general idea of ‘phenotypic flexibility’ (Bradshaw 1965). According
to Bradshaw, an organism may have a ‘flexible’ response in some trait, even
if the organism does not change its phenotype in response to variability
in the environment. An example of this is homeostasis, where a pheno-
type is maintained in face of environmental change across many different
parameters.
Today, homeostasis is often categorized as a type of plasticity (see
Whitman and Agrawal 2009: 21), even though it presents difficulties for a
definition of plasticity solely in terms of reaction norms. In fact, increased
plasticity in one trait (in the sense of an increased slope in the reaction
norm) may lead to increased canalization in another trait, and vice versa.
The apparent lack of plasticity in one trait can reflect some buffering mech-
anism in another trait – and this argument is only strengthened when we
consider how some plasticity is likely a default state for many if not all
traits. In this way, the linkages between these different traits make it dif-
ficult to analyze the evolution of plasticity in a trait by isolating the trait
from the organism as a whole.
In light of some of these complications, some (e.g. Forsman 2015)
have called for a ‘whole organism’ approach to plasticity: plasticity should
also be thought of as a property of an organism as a whole (in relation
to the environment), not simply as a property of a trait (in relation to
the environment). However, the whole organism approach is related to
the trait-specific approach, and Forsman advocates that the trait-specific
plasticity of many different traits be analyzed simultaneously. By means
of multivariate statistical analysis and composite measures of plasticity,
these analyses then can be synthesized to estimate differences in plasticity
between organisms (Forsman 2015: 280).
With this theoretical background, we may make use of the following
heuristic definition of the degree of plasticity of an organism:
The degree of plasticity of an organism is the number of
environmental variables to which an organism has an active,
coordinated plastic response.
While this definition may or may not be of empirical use (I will not consider
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how such a degree should actually be measured), it does reflect the main
idea behind the ‘whole organism’ approach to plasticity, and, as I will
argue, is of heuristic value for considering how plasticity may accumulate
in evolution.
One consequence of the definition is that plasticity may increase, while
the phenotype remains unchanged. This is the case, for example, when
the homeostasis of an organism becomes more robust. In this way, this
definition overlaps with the way robustness (understood as an organism’s
buffering capacity against environmental variability) is measured in biolog-
ical systems theory (Kitano and Oda 2006). In that theory, the degree of
robustness reflects the number of ‘input networks’ of an organism, which in
turn is a measure of the organism’s detection capacity of the environment.
Another consequence of this definition is that plasticity may increase
simply by migrating to a new environment. Say organism A migrates to
a new environment, and A discovers that it has a previously latent plastic
response that is activated only in its new environment. Then A’s plasticity
has increased by changing environment, since in the process it has increased
the number of environmental variables to which it is sensitive (i.e., so as
to produce an active, coordinated response).
4.2 A Partial Ordering
It is important to note that plasticity thus understood is a partial or-
dering, as different organisms may be sensitive to different environmental
variables. Are phytoplankton and redwood trees equally plastic? Both are
sensitive to sunlight, but otherwise inhabit very different environments,
and the large size difference almost precludes that they would be sensi-
tive to the same environmental variables (for example, phytoplankton are
acutely sensitive to gradients of macronutrients while the same gradients
might be imperceptible for a redwood). It may not be possible to judge
one lineage to be more plastic overall than another lineage.
This has implications for the shape of any possible trend associated
with this measure. A total measure means that for any two entities, either
one is greater than the other or both are equal, implying that a trend would
have a linear structure. By contrast, a trend in plasticity, as understood
here, would branch out in different mutually incommensurable directions,
even while retaining an overall directionality.
185
CHAPTER 6. A GLOBAL SYMMETRY IN EVOLUTION BY
NATURAL SELECTION
That such a directionality is possible, at least in principle, is ensured
by the lack of a hard upper bound for the increase of plasticity. The
physical size of the selective environment may be bounded, even though it
has increased over many orders of magnitude in the course of the evolution
from small unicellular organisms to large multicellular ones. However, the
number of environmental variables an organism can be sensitive to would
not seem to be affected by such boundaries. Any physical environment
has an intractable number of causal processes that have an effect on an
organism’s viability and reproductive capacity; hence in principle, a plastic
response to each variable process could be developed (even though size
would be an obvious constraint). Further, the creation of socially selective
environments adds a new whole new and potentially unlimited source of
variability (e.g. through Machiavellian interactions, Humphrey 1976), and
hence also additional scope for plasticity to increase.
4.3 Frequency of Selection for Plasticity
In the previous section we discussed the conditions under which the various
types of plasticity are selected for. If the scale of temporal or spatial hetero-
geneity in some environmental variable is too long or too short, plasticity
will not be favoured. Another important condition is the detectability
of the environmental cue alerting the organism to changed environmental
conditions. Further, even when plasticity is favoured, different types of
plasticity will be favoured according to the specific nature of the environ-
mental variation (Figure 6.5). However, at this point in the argument,
we can abstract away from the details concerning which conditions are
and which are not favourable for plasticity, and speak only of ‘favourable’
and ‘unfavourable’ selective conditions for plasticity. Unfavourable envi-
ronments include both those in which there is no selection for plasticity
increase, and those in which there is selection for plasticity decrease.
At first sight, it would seem to be important for our argument to take
into consideration the frequency with which such optimal environments oc-
cur. Any assumption about the frequency of optimal environments would
constitute a contingently true proposition about what types of environ-
ment occur in evolutionary history. Making an assumption would imply
that the resulting trend would also be a contingent pattern in evolutionary
history.
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To address this, let us simply let p represent the probability of favorable
environmental conditions (for plasticity increase). This merely labels our
ignorance, since we have no reliable method to estimate what the actual
value of p would be: the probability represents an average probability over
all possible environments that organisms could inhabit. Given the com-
plexity of environments, this calculation would be intractable. However,
we will not assume any particular value of p except that it be nonzero:
optimal selective conditions for plasticity occur at least sporadically.
4.4 Relative Frequency is Non-zero
I will now argue that we may assume that all patterns of variability oc-
cur with nonzero probability. Variability as such would seem to be nec-
essary for biological evolution. Given that life itself arises in a far-from-
equilibrium environment characterized by chemical and temperature gradi-
ents (e.g. England 2013), static environments are likely to be incompatible
with life and do not need to be considered.
Within this general variability, the multidimensionality suggests that
this variability will be organized in various patterns, since the environment
of any organism contains a multitude of causal processes, all of which are
changing at different rates. This inevitably creates very complex patterns
of variability, where different environmental variables are fluctuating at
different time scales. For example, precipitation may undergo different
fluctuations at different time scales: random at the scale of days, seasonal
at the scale of months, uniformly increasing at the scale of centuries (cli-
mate change). Or, if the environment includes biotic interactions, such
as predator-prey interactions, the variability in the selective environment
will have an added layer of complexity. The upshot is that, unless con-
tingent assumptions are made about environmental structure, there is no
particular reason why those particular patterns of variability that favour
plasticity should be more common than the patterns that do not. No pat-
tern of variability is privileged, so also the selectively optimal patterns of
variability should occur sporadically.
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4.5 Robust vs. Non-robust Increases in Plasticity
Once contingent assumptions about the structure of the environment are
avoided, the greatest challenge is now to argue why increases in plasticity,
in contrast to increases in general adaptations, are robust. It is necessary
to argue this, because after some initial increase in plasticity in a lin-
eage, an unfavourable environment, such as a period of prolonged stasis,
is bound to set in at some point. However, there is reason to believe that,
because of the unique properties of plasticity, increases in plasticity should
be sufficiently robust against unfavourable conditions.
To make progress here, we must analyze some of the general processes
by which lineages can lose plasticity in unfavourable environments. I will
consider three of the most important: viability selection, interspecific com-
petition (competition with other lineages), and intraspecific competition
(in the form of genetic assimilation). It will turn out that it is not possible
to argue that all types of plasticity are robust: we must assume some form
of inceptive niche construction. This represents an important restriction of
the conclusions reached here: a trend is to be expected in certain types of
plasticity only, that is, those types of plasticity that also have the ability
(or increased ability) to avoid hostile environments.
First consider viability selection. As mentioned previously, plasticity
entails that an organism has a repertoire of phenotypes at its disposal, and
so if the environment fixates at a particular state, plasticity increases the
probability that an organism will be able to produce a phenotype more
adapted to the external environment than if the organism did not have
any plastic response. This is the buffering capacity of phenotypic plastic-
ity, and is a simple consequence of a plastic organism having a repertoire
of phenotypes available. A random rigid response, with a narrower tol-
erance curve, is more likely to miss out on a viable response to a static
environment.
However, plasticity does not guarantee survival in the face of environ-
mental change. An obvious challenge to this buffering aspect of plasticity
occurs when the environment undergoes extreme change, to a state outside
the range of its previous fluctuations. In such a case the plastic lineage
may no longer be viable. Thus plasticity merely increases the probability
that a lineage will be robust in an unfavourable environment.
Consider the situation when the unfavourable environmental lasts for
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a long time. Under such conditions, the viability-increasing property of
plasticity is not sufficient to ensure robustness, as one would expect the
plastic response to disappear through competition with non-plastic lin-
eages, where either a fixed response, or genetic polymorphism or adaptive
coin-flipping is favoured.
In this way, some patterns of variability, if not responded to, would in-
deed entail a break in the trend in plasticity. Extended stasis would induce
genetic assimilation (a form of intraspecific competition, where nonplas-
tic individuals are selected); extreme variability might hand a competitive
advantage to groups or lineages characterized by adaptive coin-flipping or
genetic polymorphism (Pigliucci 2001).
However, some forms of plasticity provide a buffer not only against
environmental variability as such, but also against variability in patterns
of environmental variability. This is precisely what various forms of niche
construction do. We mentioned earlier how relocation and migration may
buffer against unfavourable patterns of variability; however, not all re-
sponses to suboptimal variability need involve seeking out different spatial
locations. Some can do so by seeking out new niches in the same spatially
located environment.
An increase in ‘nestedness’ (multiple entities joining to form a greater
compositional whole) has been hypothesized to be an example of this,
through the mechanism of ‘self-extending symbiosis’ (Kitano and Oda
2006). Kitano and Oda propose that plastic systems (and specifically,
evolvable robust systems) increasingly improve their response to environ-
mental perturbation by integrating foreign biological forms (such as genes
and microorganisms). This allows sensitivity to novel environmental vari-
ables (or ‘inputs’ in their terminology).
A lineage thus transformed by self-extending symbiosis would no longer
be in direct competition with less nested organisms. Thus, increased nest-
edness may not only allow for greater viability in suboptimal environments
(without guaranteeing viability), but may also allow an organism to avoid
direct competition with less nested organisms, thus offering one route to
avoid the challenges of unfavourable variability. How large is the probabil-
ity that a lineage will increase in plasticity in such a way that it is not only
responds to variability, but also to variability in patterns of variability? It
does not matter how often this occurs: once it occurs, the lineage is robust
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against unfavourable environments.
This robustness need not imply that such a lineage is guaranteed to
flourish or even survive in all environments. Catastrophic mass-extinctions
may wipe out all life, regardless of the degree of plasticity. However, given
the multidimensionality and complexity of the environment, all patterns of
variability in environmental variables may be expected, and because some
forms of plasticity are not only adaptive to specific patterns of variability,
but also to variability in patterns of variability, lineages with such forms
of plasticity are unlikely to be at such a competitive disadvantage as to
become extinct.
Note that in this way it is not necessary for such lineages to be robust
against extinction as such; it is only necessary that they are never at a great
competitive disadvantage. Of course, in actual evolutionary history, some
particularly hostile environments may wipe out lineages with this type of
plasticity. In such a case, the trend in plasticity would indeed undergo
a local reversal along that area in the space of evolutionary trajectories.
However, we need not consider the occurrence of hostile environments that
would repeatedly wipe out all lineages with robust plasticity increases,
since if no single plastic response is viable, then no fixed response will be
viable either.10
4.6 Trend vs. Tendency
The combination of increased plasticity during periods of environmental
variability and robustness during subsequent suboptimal periods is suffi-
cient to imply a tendency for plasticity to accumulate, without having to
make specific assumptions about what types of environment occur. How-
10There is some controversy as to whether fixed development may produce extreme
phenotypes that would be impossible to produce through plastic phenotypes (DeWitt
et al. 1998). However, this is controversial because plasticity likely characterizes all phe-
notypes, and the effect of canalization might be simply to allow an extreme phenotype
to be reliably produced. Further, consider life forms in extreme conditions, for example,
extremophile bacteria and other organisms living in and around hydrothermal vents in
the ocean. Even such extreme but yet life-supporting conditions are characterized by
variability, and we see surprisingly rich ecosystems emerging in these conditions, where
species have varying degrees of plasticity. No matter how extreme, as long as an en-
vironment is life-supporting, it is characterized by variability, and, given the action of
natural selection alone, we may expect increases in plasticity.
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ever, a causal tendency does not automatically translate into an actual
trend, and many changes in the environment could disrupt a trend or in-
fluence the shape it takes. An analysis of the nature of the environment
and of natural selection can only establish a causal tendency or an ide-
alized, expected trend ; what the actual trend will look like is a different
matter. Even though an investigation of actual trends in plasticity is not
the purpose here, it may be helpful to mention some factors that go into
determining actual trends other than the tendency outlined above.
The actual conditions for a plasticity increase — such as the probability
of optimal patterns of variability, or developmental constraints — may be
such that the increase can only happen in a limited number of lineages at a
time, at irregular intervals, and that the trend may undergo interruptions
and reversals.
In general, there could be all sorts of costs that would shape a trend in
plasticity (see DeWitt et al. 1998). Some costs are taken to be caused by
the development and maintenance of the structures needed for plasticity
(‘constitutive’ costs). Other costs are ‘induced’ by switching phenotype
(for example, switching breeding date for birds, or sex changes for fish).
Regardless of the mechanism underlying the costs, the ‘jack-of-all-trades’
principle is often a motivation for introducing costs: the principle that
the optimally adaptive phenotype should perform better when expressed
by a specialized, non-plastic individual than when expressed by a plastic
individual.
Whether such costs are in fact widespread is controversial and the sub-
ject of active research. In principle, if plasticity is the default state – and
if non-plasticity requires an expensive suppression of variation through
canalization – this removes one obstacle from generalizing from the ideal-
ized tendency argued for here to empirical reality. An interesting meta-
analysis conducted by van Buskirk and Steiner (Van Buskirk and Steiner
2009) found no widespread costs associated with plasticity. This result
is discussed in Murren et al. 2015, who argue that the costs of plasticity
are negligible for the majority of organisms, becoming considerable only
for organisms with larger brains or complex immune systems. Instead,
they found the main limiting factor in the evolution of plasticity to be the
presence or absence of optimal selective conditions.
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4.7 Comparison with Trends in General Adaptations
The chaotic and multidimensional character of variability of the environ-
ment means that patterns of variability are variable as well, over space and
over time. Even when described by physical variables alone, the environ-
ment is too complex and chaotic to be characterized by a single pattern of
variability; this is even more the case when biotic interactions are added
into the mix. This ‘higher-level’ variability is simply another form of en-
vironmental variability, and certain forms of plasticity do not provide a
buffer either against environmental variability, or against variability in the
patterns of environmental variability.
This increase in the probability of viability is lacking in general adap-
tations, such as size. A large proportion of environments may be resource-
rich, or competitive; however, in resource-poor environments, size is not
only not optimally adaptive, but it is also not viable. General adaptations
produce specific phenotypic responses to common features in environments,
but lack the buffering capacity that comes with the ability to hedge over
possible phenotypic responses.
Nonetheless, in reality it may be difficult to distinguish trends in gen-
eral adaptions from trends in plasticity, as the former may be the result of
variability selection. For example, Gotanda et al. (2015), in investigating
Cope’s rule, show that the actual rates of phenotypic change at microevo-
lutionary scales show no bias towards increased body size, despite Cope’s
rule being reasonably well-confirmed at the macroevolutionary scale. They
suggest that the selection for increased body-size is episodic, and that these
rare events would often not be captured in microevolutionary studies, due
to the short time-scales involved (Gotanda et al. 2015: 1350). Such a
pulsed selection pattern (see also Vrba 1993) would be naturally compati-
ble with an intermittently driven variability-selection model, but would be
difficult to explain as a result of selection for general adaptations, as the
latter does not entail intermittent selection, nor robustness in suboptimal
environments.
5 Conclusion
The argument presented is almost wholly abstract, only relying on the
existing theoretical understanding of phenotypic plasticity and on facts
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about variability in the environment. First, variability in life-supporting
environments is ubiquitous and consists of many different temporal and
spatial patterns of variability in the various environmental variables.
Second, plasticity is an adaptation that takes advantage of this fact, in
a great variety of ways, corresponding to different patterns of variability
in different environmental variables. The resulting tendency for plastic
responses to accumulate is a reflection of the fact that, in an environment
that is variable across many degrees of freedom, a selective advantage can
be obtained by increasing sensitivity to information present in an environ-
ment and by responding flexibly to it. Such a tendency would correspond
to a trend over a succession of lineages (possibly marked by branching
events), where plastic responses to various environmental variables are ac-
cumulated.
Environments may conspire to interrupt and break such a trend. The
actual trend is not independent of what environments happen to transpire.
An actual trend in plasticity may be halted or even reversed among various
lineages, and may only continue in a fraction of lineages where novel plas-
tic responses to variability are also robust against variability in patterns
of variability. However, the succession of environment-types is insufficient
to guarantee that a trend in plasticity can be expected to break at some
point, in contrast to trends in general adaptations. In an idealized setting,
where among other conditions all patterns of variability are equiprobable,
a trend in plasticity would be expected to be robust against suboptimal en-
vironments, as changes in patterns of environmental variability are simply
a different type of environmental variability, for which plastic responses
exist. Put differently, given the nature of natural selection and the na-
ture of environmental structure alone, there is no impediment to a trend
in plasticity, while there is such an impediment to a trend in a general
adaptation.
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Conclusion
We frequently engage in speculation about life on other planets, and what
life may look many years from now. All such speculation is grounded in
a certain understanding of the shape of evolutionary history; yet it is not
immediately clear if anything definite can be said about this shape.
There is a proliferation of different interpretations of evolutionary his-
tory – different reconstructions of life’s plot, if you will – and some of these
interpretations reach directly opposed conclusions, despite being based on
the same empirical facts and the same biological theories.
Philosophers have not yet actively pursued fundamental conceptual
issues facing interpretations (or ‘views’, or ‘perspectives’) of evolutionary
history. The primary objective of this dissertation was not to defend this
or that account, but rather to show a method by which these fundamental
issues can be identified and analyzed constructively.
With a hard-nosed skeptic in mind who would be wary of lofty gen-
eralizations about complex phenomena we can never observe, I identified
two main conceptual issues. The first was the fact that claims about the
contingency of evolutionary outcomes depend on how these outcomes and
the evolutionary process itself is described. However, instead of consigning
ourselves to the conclusion that nothing valuable is to be said beyond ‘it
depends’, we set out to map the different ways in which the contingency
of outcomes changes as the phenomena are described in more and in less
detail, and as broader or narrower subsets of evolutionary history are taken
into account.
That such an analysis is useful to pursue, I attempted to show by apply-
ing it to two of the most prominent intepretations of evolutionary history,
those of Gould and Conway Morris. According to how their claims about
evolutionary history are analyzed, one can arrive at different conclusions
about the contingency of evolutionary outcomes.
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The second issue concerned whether lofty generalizations about evolu-
tionary history could be viewed as legitimate or not. Evolutionary history
is a complex mess of unrelated causal processes, and for every generaliza-
tion there is an exception. Yet, here again, I sought ways to resist the
skeptical conclusion that, therefore, it is a hopeless enterprise to search for
generalizations over evolutionary history.
Limiting the scope of the investigation to the ways in which environ-
mental complexity can interrupt trends in evolution by natural selection,
I considered first whether and how natural selection may be expected to
give rise to trends at all. Some philosophers have rejected that natural
selection is a cause at all, and that all evolution is simply an accumulation
of births and deaths. If any trend occurs at all, it is due to a confluence of
unrelated causal processes that could easily not have occurred. I argued
against this by showing (basically) that these philosophers overlooked the
issue of time-scale: causal processes may make a difference for reproduc-
tive outcome at a time-scale of a single generation without them making a
difference at the time-scale of mulitple generations. With this distinction
in mind, one can argue that natural selection causes a population to tend
towards equilibrium.
If a yet longer time-scale is taken – not that of multiple generations in
a single environment, but that of many species and genuses across many
environments – the challenge of causal complexity becomes much more
difficult to overcome. Drawing on the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity
and niche construction, I argued that selection for plasticity ‘feeds’ on this
complexity and variability in the environment. The trend in plasticity
is unique in this regard, as complexity and variability serve to interrupt
trends in other types of adaptation.
What the latter argument would mean beyond an idealized evolution
by natural selection, and for evolutionary history as a whole is a question
beyond the scope of this dissertation. The trend in plasticity has a certain
natural compatibility with the fundamental concepts of natural selection
and environmental structure, and if anything, would serve to define certain
parameters within which large-scale trends in evolutionary history may be
sought. In this way, this may orient future research into the twists and
turns of life’s plot.
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